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This dissertation studies physical layer security in wireless networks using an
information theoretic framework. The central theme of this work is exploring the
effect of delayed or no channel state information (CSI) on physical layer security in
various wireless channel models.
We begin with the fast Rayleigh fading wiretap channel, over which a legiti-
mate transmitter wishes to have secure communication with a legitimate receiver in
the presence of an eavesdropper. Subject to an average power constraint on the in-
put, and with no CSI at any user, we show that the input distribution that achieves
the secrecy capacity for this wiretap channel is discrete with a finite number of
mass points. This enables us to evaluate the exact secrecy capacity of this channel
numerically.
Next, we consider multi-user models, specifically, the wiretap channel with M
helpers, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel, and the K-user interference
channel with an external eavesdropper, when no eavesdropper’s CSI is available
at the transmitters. In each case, we establish the optimal sum secure degrees of
freedom (s.d.o.f.) by providing achievable schemes and matching converses. We
show that the unavailability of the eavesdropper’s CSI at the transmitter (CSIT)
does not reduce the s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with helpers. However, there
is loss in s.d.o.f. for both the multiple access wiretap channel and the interference
channel with an external eavesdropper. In particular, we show that in the absence
of eavesdropper’s CSIT, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel reduces to a
wiretap channel with (K−1) helpers from a sum s.d.o.f. perspective, and the optimal
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absence of the eavesdropper’s CSIT. Our results show that the lack of eavesdropper’s
CSIT does not have a significant impact on the optimal s.d.o.f. for any of the three
channel models, especially when the number of users is large.
We, then, study multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multi-user channels.
We begin with the case when full CSIT is available. We consider a two-user MIMO
multiple access wiretap channel with N antennas at each transmitter, N antennas
at the legitimate receiver, and K antennas at the eavesdropper. We determine the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. for this model for all values of N and K. We subdivide our
problem into several regimes based on the values of N and K, and provide achievable
schemes based on real and vector space alignment techniques for fixed and fading
channel gains, respectively. To prove the optimality of the achievable schemes, we
provide matching converses for each regime. Our results show how the number of
eavesdropper antennas affects the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap
channel.
In line with the theme of this dissertation, we next consider the MIMO wiretap
channel with one helper and the two-user MIMO multiple access channel when no
eavesdropper CSIT is available. In each case, the eavesdropper has K antennas
while the remaining terminals have N antennas. We determine the optimal sum
s.d.o.f. for each channel model for the regime K ≤ N , and we show that in this
regime, the multiple access wiretap channel reduces to the wiretap channel with a
helper in the absence of eavesdropper CSIT. For the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we obtain
the optimal linear s.d.o.f., and show that the multiple access wiretap channel and
the wiretap channel with a helper have the same optimal s.d.o.f. when restricted
to linear encoding strategies. In the absence of any such restrictions, we provide
an upper bound for the sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap channel in the
regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N . Our results show that unlike in the single-input single-output
(SISO) case, there is loss of s.d.o.f. for even the wiretap channel with a helper due
to lack of eavesdropper CSIT, when K ≥ N .
Finally, we explore the effect of delayed CSIT on physical layer security. In
particular, we consider the two user multiple-input single-output (MISO) broadcast
channel with confidential messages, in which the nature of CSIT from each user
can be of the form Ii, i = 1, 2 where I1, I2 ∈ {P,D,N}, and the forms P, D and
N correspond to perfect and instantaneous, completely delayed, and no CSIT, re-
spectively. Thus, the overall CSIT can be any of nine possible states corresponding
to all possible values of I1I2. While the optimal sum s.d.o.f. in the homogeneous
settings corresponding to I1 = I2 are already known in the literature, we focus on
the heterogeneous settings where I1 6= I2 and establish the optimal s.d.o.f. region in
each case. We further consider the case where the CSIT state varies with time. Each
state I1I2 can then occur for λI1I2 fraction of the total duration. We determine the
s.d.o.f. region of the MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages under such
an alternating CSIT setting, with a mild symmetry assumption, where λI1I2 = λI2I1 .
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Chapter 1: Introduction
The focus of this dissertation is on physical layer security in wireless communication
networks. Wireless communication networks are ubiquitous in the modern world;
common examples include cellular networks, Wi-Fi and Bluetooth. Yet the wireless
medium is inherently open to eavesdropping, and securing the information being
transmitted through wireless networks against potential eavesdroppers presents a
significant challenge. This dissertation explores the paradigm of physical layer secu-
rity, which seeks to exploit inherent physical layer channel properties such as noise,
fading, and multiple antennas at the terminals to guarantee security. The derived
security guarantees are based on an information theoretic framework, and are not
vulnerable to potential advances in the computational abilities of an eavesdropper.
The main thrust of this dissertation is on investigating how the availability
of channel state information (CSI) at the terminals affects physical layer security
in wireless networks. Wireless channels exhibit fading, that is, the channel gain
for each receiver varies with time. To ensure reliable communication, in practical
systems, the receivers measure the channel gains periodically and feed them back
to the transmitters. These channel measurements available at a terminal constitute
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Figure 1.1: Fading wiretap channel with no CSI anywhere.
wireless communication for various channel models, such as the wiretap channel, the
wiretap channel with helpers, the multiple access wiretap channel, the broadcast
channel with confidential messages and the interference channel with an external
eavesdropper.
We begin, in Chapter 2, with a fast fading Rayleigh wiretap channel where
each terminal is equipped with only one antenna, as shown in Fig. 1.1. We consider a
fast Rayleigh fading scenario, where the channel gains of both the legitimate link and
the eavesdropper link fade in an independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) fashion
from one symbol to the next with a Rayleigh distribution. This models a fast fading
wireless communication channel with coherence time of one symbol duration. Under
such a fast fading condition, the channel may change too quickly for receivers to
estimate it. In addition, the eavesdropper will not feed her CSI estimate back even
if she measures it. Thus, we assume no CSI is available at any terminal before
the communication begins. For this system model, we determine the exact secrecy
capacity.
We first show that this channel is equivalent to a degraded wiretap channel.
This implies that no channel prefixing is needed [1]. We then consider the secrecy
2
rate, which is the difference of mutual informations, as the objective function, which
is concave, and determine the optimal input distribution as the result of a functional
optimization problem. To analyze the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) optimality con-
ditions, we use a proof technique originally developed by Smith [2] to evaluate the
channel capacity of an amplitude constrained Gaussian channel and later extended
by Abou-Faycal et al. [3] to determine the channel capacity of a fast fading Rayleigh
channel under an average power constraint. We extend the KKT conditions to the
complex plane and use the identity theorem to prove that the optimum input dis-
tribution cannot have an infinite support over any finite interval. We then show
that the optimal distribution has a finite support. Though we do not have a closed
form expression for the secrecy capacity, it can be computed numerically by solving
a finite dimensional optimization problem.
In Chapter 3, we extend our investigation of the impact of no CSI to several
multi-terminal channel models. In particular, we consider three channel models:
the wiretap channel with M helpers, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel,
and the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, when no eaves-
dropper CSI is available at the transmitters. For each of these channel models,
the secrecy capacity regions remain unknown, even with full eavesdropper CSIT.
In the absence of exact capacity regions, we study the secure degrees of freedom
(s.d.o.f.) of each channel model in the high signal-to-noise (SNR) regime. For the
wiretap channel with M helpers and full eavesdropper CSIT, reference [4] deter-
mines the optimal s.d.o.f. to be M
M+1
. Further, reference [5] determines the optimal




















Figure 1.2: Wiretap channel with M helpers.
CSIT to be K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 . For the interference channel with an external eavesdropper,
the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is shown to be K(K−1)
2K−1 in reference [6], with full eavesdrop-
per CSIT. Here, we focus on the case when no eavesdropper CSIT is available. We
show that for the wiretap channel with M helpers, an s.d.o.f. of M
M+1
is achiev-
able even without eavesdropper’s CSIT; thus, there is no loss of s.d.o.f. due to the
unavailability of eavesdropper CSIT in this case. For the multiple access wiretap
channel and the interference channel with an external eavesdropper, however, the
optimal s.d.o.f. decreases when there is no eavesdropper CSIT. In particular, with-
out eavesdropper CSIT, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel reduces to a





. For the interference channel with an external eavesdropper, the




with no eavesdropper CSIT.
In order to establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f., we propose achievable schemes
and provide matching converse proofs for each of these channel models. First, we























Figure 1.3: K-user multiple access wiretap channel.
multiple access wiretap channel, shown in Fig. 1.3. We note that any achievable
scheme for the wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers is also an achievable scheme
for the K-user multiple access wiretap channel. Further, a converse for the K-user
multiple access wiretap channel is an upper bound for the wiretap channel with
(K−1) helpers as well. Thus, we provide achievable schemes for the wiretap channel
with helpe2rs and a converse for the multiple access wiretap channel. We consider
both fixed and fading channel gains. For the wiretap channel with helpers and
the multiple access wiretap channel, we present schemes based on real interference
alignment [7] and vector space alignment [8] for fixed and fading channel gains,
respectively.
For the interference channel, see Fig. 1.4, our achievable schemes are based on
asymptotic real alignment [7,9] and asymptotic vector space alignment [8] for fixed
and fading channel gains, respectively. As in [6], every transmitter sacrifices a part
of its message space to transmit cooperative jamming signals in the form of artificial
noise. However, instead of one artificial noise block as in [6], our scheme requires two




















Figure 1.4: K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper.
are then aligned at each legitimate receiver to occupy only (K+1) block dimensions
out of the full space of 2K dimensions, thus, achieving K−1
2K
s.d.o.f. per receiver.
At the eavesdropper, however, the noise blocks do not align, and therefore, occupy
the full space of 2K block dimensions, ensuring security of the message blocks. An
interesting aspect of our proposed schemes for the interference channel is that they
provide confidentiality of the messages not only from the external eavesdropper but
also from the unintended legitimate receivers. Thus, our schemes for both fixed and
fading channel gains achieve the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the K-user interference
channel with both confidential messages and an external eavesdropper, with no
eavesdropper CSIT.
To prove the converses, we combine techniques from [4,6] and [10]. We exploit
a key result in [10] that the output entropy at a receiver whose CSIT is not available
is at least as large as the output entropy at a receiver whose CSIT is available, even
when the transmitters cooperate and transmit correlated signals. This result is
similar in spirit to the least alignment lemma in [11], where only linear transmission
strategies are considered. Intuitively, no alignment of signals is possible at the
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receiver whose CSIT is unavailable; therefore, the signals occupy the maximum
possible space at that receiver. We combine this insight with the techniques of
[4, 6]. Specifically, we use discretized versions of the secrecy penalty lemma, which
quantifies the loss of rate due to the presence of an eavesdropper, and the role of a
helper lemma, which captures the trade-off, arising out of decodability constraints,
between the message rate and the entropy of an independent helper signal. Together,
these techniques enable us to establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the multiple
access wiretap channel with no eavesdropper CSIT to be K−1
K
and the optimal sum




In Chapter 4, we consider a multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) version of
the multiple access wiretap channel. However, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MIMO
multiple access wiretap channel is unknown even with two users and under full CSIT
assumptions. Thus, we deviate from our theme of no CSIT in this dissertation and
consider the two-user MIMO multiple access wiretap channel with full CSIT, where
each transmitter has N antennas, the legitimate receiver has N antennas and the
eavesdropper has K antennas; see Fig. 1.5. We study the case when the channel
gains are fixed throughout the duration of the communication, as well as the case
when the channel is fast fading and the channel gains vary in an i.i.d. fashion across
time. Our goal is to characterize how the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MIMO multiple
access wiretap channel varies with the number of antennas at the legitimate users
and the eavesdropper.
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Figure 1.5: The MIMO multiple access wiretap channel.
achievable schemes for each regime. Our schemes are based on a combination of zero-
forcing beamforming and vector space interference alignment techniques. When the
number of antennas at the eavesdropper is less than the number of antennas at the
transmitters, the nullspace of the eavesdropper channel can be exploited to send
secure signals to the legitimate transmitter. This strategy is, in fact, optimal when
the number of eavesdropper antennas is sufficiently small (K ≤ N
2
) and the optimal
sum s.d.o.f. is limited by the decoding capability of the legitimate receiver. We note
that the optimal scheme requires a single channel use and thus, can be used for both
fixed and fading channel gains.





≤ K ≤ 4N
3





, l = 0, 1, 2,
where d is an integer. For the case of fading channel gains, we use vector space
interference alignment [8] over three time slots to achieve the optimal sum s.d.o.f.
The structure of the optimal signaling scheme is inspired by ideas from the optimal
real alignment scheme presented in [4] for the single-input single-output (SISO)
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multiple access wiretap channel. Unlike the previous regime, this scheme for fading
channel gains cannot be directly extended to the fixed channel gains case, except
for the case l = 0, for which the sum s.d.o.f. is an integer and carefully precoded
Gaussian signaling suffices. When l 6= 0, the s.d.o.f. has a fractional part, and
Gaussian signaling alone is not optimal.
In order to handle the fractional s.d.o.f., we decompose the channel input at
each transmitter into two parts: a Gaussian signaling part carrying d (the integer
part) d.o.f. of information securely, and a structured signaling part carrying l
3
(the
fractional part) d.o.f. of information securely. The structure of the Gaussian signals
carrying the integer s.d.o.f. resembles that of the schemes for the fading channel
gains. When l = 1, we design the structured signals carrying 2
3
sum s.d.o.f. according
to the real interference alignment based SISO scheme of [4]. However, when l = 2,
a new scheme is required to achieve 4
3
sum s.d.o.f. on the MIMO multiple access
wiretap channel with two antennas at every terminal. To that end, we provide a
novel optimal scheme for the canonical 2× 2× 2× 2 MIMO multiple access wiretap
channel. Interestingly, the scheme relies on asymptotic real interference alignment [9]
at each antenna of the legitimate receiver.
When the number of eavesdropper antennas K is large enough K ≥ 4N
3
, the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. is given by (2N−K), which is always an integer. In this regime
Gaussian signaling along with vector space alignment techniques suffices. In fact, the
scheme uses only one time slot and can be used with both fixed and fading channel
gains. When the number of antennas at the eavesdropper is very large (K ≥ 3N
2
),
the two-user multiple access wiretap channel reduces to a wiretap channel with one
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helper, and, thus, the scheme for the MIMO wiretap channel with one helper in [12]
is optimal.
To establish the optimality of our achievable schemes, we present matching
converses in each regime. A simple upper bound is obtained by allowing cooperation
between the two transmitters. This enhances the two-user multiple access wiretap
channel to a MIMO wiretap channel with 2N antennas at the transmitter, N an-
tennas at the legitimate receiver and K antennas at the eavesdropper. The optimal
s.d.o.f. of this MIMO wiretap channel is well known to be min((2N−K)+, N) [13,14],
and this serves as an upper bound for the sum s.d.o.f. of the two-user multiple access
wiretap channel. This bound is optimal when the number of eavesdropper antennas
K is either quite small (K ≤ N
2
), or quite large (K ≥ 4N
3
). When K is small, the
sum s.d.o.f. is limited by the decoding capability of the legitimate receiver, and the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N which is optimal even without any secrecy constraints.
When K is large, the s.d.o.f. is limited by the requirement of secrecy from a very
strong eavesdropper. For intermediate values of K, the distributed nature of the
transmitters dominates, and we employ a generalization of the SISO converse tech-
niques of [4] for the converse proof in the MIMO case, similar to [12].
In Chapter 5, we return to our theme of no eavesdropper CSIT, and study two
channel models: the MIMO wiretap channel with one helper where the transmitter,
the helper and the legitimate receiver each have N antennas, and the eavesdropper
has K antennas; see Fig. 1.6, and the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel, where
both transmitters and the legitimate receiver have N antennas and the eavesdropper
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Figure 1.6: The MIMO wiretap channel with one helper and no Eve CSIT.
channel gains vary in an i.i.d. fashion across the links and time. We consider the
case when the eavesdropper’s CSI is not available at the transmitters. Our goal is to
investigate the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MIMO wiretap channel with one helper
and the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel as a function of N and K.
To that end, we provide an achievable scheme based on vector space align-
ment [8], that attains 1
2
(2N − K) s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with one helper
for all values of 0 ≤ K ≤ 2N . When K ≤ N , this value coincides with the optimal
s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with one helper in the case where full eavesdropper
CSIT is available. Therefore, for the regime K ≤ N , there is no loss of s.d.o.f. for
the wiretap channel with one helper due to the lack of eavesdropper CSIT. Further,
the proposed scheme which does not require eavesdropper CSIT, is optimal. The
achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with one helper also suffices as an achiev-
able scheme for the multiple access wiretap channel, since we can treat one of the
transmitters as a helper and use time-sharing among the two transmitters.
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Figure 1.7: The MIMO multiple access wiretap channel with no Eve CSIT.
channel in the regime K ≤ N , we provide a matching converse for this regime. For
the converse proof, we use MIMO versions of the secrecy penalty lemma and the role
of a helper lemma [4], and exploit channel symmetry at the eavesdropper. Since the
transmitters do not have the eavesdropper’s CSIT, the output at the K antennas
of the eavesdropper are entropy symmetric [15], i.e., any two subsets of the antenna
outputs have the same differential entropy, if the subsets are of equal size. Finally,
we use a MIMO version of the result in [10, 16], which states that the differential
entropy at the output of the terminal which does not provide CSIT is the greatest
among terminals having equal number of antennas. The converse in the regime
K ≤ N shows that the sum s.d.o.f. cannot exceed 1
2
(2N−K) for the multiple access
wiretap channel. Since a converse for the multiple access wiretap channel is valid for
the wiretap channel with one helper as well, together with the achievable scheme,
this shows that the optimal s.d.o.f. for both the wiretap channel with one helper
and the multiple access wiretap channel in this regime is 1
2
(2N −K); therefore, as
in the SISO case, which is a subset of this regime with N = K = 1, the multiple
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access wiretap channel reduces to the wiretap channel with one helper when the
eavesdropper’s CSIT is not available. Recalling that with full eavesdropper CSIT,
the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap channel in this regime is
min(N, 2
3
(2N − K)); this also illustrates the loss of s.d.o.f. for the multiple access
wiretap channel due to the lack of eavesdropper’s CSIT.
Next, we consider the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N . In this regime, we provide a
loose upper bound which shows that the sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap
channel cannot be larger than 2N(2N−K)
4N−K . This bound is clearly loose; at the point
N = K, it equals 2N
3
, which is achievable with full eavesdropper CSIT, but not
without eavesdropper CSIT. However, noting that 2N(2N−K)
4N−K < (2N − K), we can
conclude that there will be loss of s.d.o.f. due to lack of eavesdropper CSIT, even for
the wiretap channel with one helper, in the regime 3N
2
≤ K ≤ 2N , where (2N −K)
s.d.o.f. is achievable with full eavesdropper CSIT [12].
In order to further investigate the optimality of 1
2
(2N−K) as the sum s.d.o.f. for
the multiple access wiretap channel in the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we then restrict
ourselves to linear encoding strategies [11,17], where the channel input of each an-
tenna in every time slot is restricted to be a linear combination of some information
symbols intended for the legitimate receiver and some artificial noise symbols to
provide secrecy at the eavesdropper. We show that under this restriction to linear
encoding schemes, the linear sum s.d.o.f. can be no larger than 1
2
(2N − K). The
key idea of the proof is that since no alignment is possible at the eavesdropper,
the artificial noise symbols should asymptotically occupy the maximum number of







Figure 1.8: The MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages.
signal space at the eavesdropper should be Kn + o(n) in n channel uses. Thus,
1
2
(2N − K) is the optimal s.d.o.f. for the multiple access channel in the regime
N ≤ K ≤ 2N , at least when restricted to linear encoding strategies.
In Chapter 6, we explore the delay aspect of CSI in the context of physical layer
security. In practice, the delay occurs due to the time required for the acquisition
of the channel measurements at the receivers as well as the transmission of those
measurements to the transmitters. We adopt a simple modeling of the delay whereby
the CSIT from a user can be one of three possible states: perfect or instantaneous
(P), delayed (D) [18] or none (N). In state P, the transmitter has precise channel
knowledge before the start of the communication. In state D, the transmitter does
not have the CSI at the beginning of the communication. In slot t, the receiver may
send any function of all the channel coefficients upto and including time t as CSI
to the transmitter. However, the CSIT becomes available only after a delay such
that the CSI is completely outdated, that is, independent of the current channel
realization. In state N, no CSIT is available from the user.
We focus on the fading two-user multiple-input single-output (MISO) broad-
cast channel with confidential messages, in which the transmitter with two antennas
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has two confidential messages, one for each of the single antenna users; see Fig. 1.8.
The CSIT state of each of the two receivers may be either P, D or N. The optimal
sum s.d.o.f. of the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages is
well known in the existing literature under the homogeneous CSIT settings: PP,
DD and NN. In state PP, i.e., when both receivers provide perfect or instantaneous
CSIT, the sum s.d.o.f. is 2, which is achievable by beamforming. In state NN, i.e.,
when there is no CSIT from either receiver, the sum s.d.o.f. is zero as the two users
are statistically equivalent and hence no secrecy is possible. On the other hand, in
state DD, with completely outdated CSIT from both users, [15] showed that the
sum s.d.o.f. increases to 1.
In practice, however, the nature of CSIT can vary across users. This observa-
tion naturally leads to the setting of heterogeneous (or hybrid) CSIT which models
the variability in the quality/delay of channel knowledge supplied by different users.
In contrast to homogeneous CSIT, the setting of heterogeneous CSIT is much less
understood. To the best of our knowledge, the complete characterization of the
d.o.f. of all fixed heterogeneous CSIT configurations is only known for the two-user
MISO broadcast channel: see [19,20] for state PD for which the optimal sum d.o.f. is
shown to be 3/2; and [10] which recently settled the states PN and DN through a
novel converse proof and showed that the optimal sum d.o.f. is given by 1. Beyond
these results, partial results are available for the three-user MISO broadcast channel
with hybrid CSIT in [21, 22] but by and large the problem of heterogeneous CSIT
even without secrecy constraints remains open. In this chapter, we determine the
optimal s.d.o.f. region of the MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages in
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all three heterogeneous CSIT scenarios: PD, PN and DN. We show that the optimal
sum s.d.o.f. is 1 for both PD and PN states, while it is 1
2
for state DN.
Besides exhibiting heterogeneity across users, the nature of channel knowl-
edge may also vary over time/frequency. Such variability can arise either naturally
(due to the time variation in tolerable feedback overhead from a user) or it can be
artificially induced (by deliberately altering the channel feedback mechanism over
time/frequency). For example, instead of requiring perfect CSIT from one user and
delayed CSIT from the other user throughout the duration of communication, one
may require that for half of the time, the first user provide perfect CSIT while
the second user provide delayed CSIT (state PD), and the roles of the users are
reversed for the remaining half of the time (state DP), the total network feedback
overhead being the same in both cases. This leads naturally to the setting of alter-
nating CSIT in which multiple CSIT states, for instance, PD and DP in the above
example, arise over time. The alternating CSIT framework was introduced in [23]
where the d.o.f. region was characterized for the two-user MISO broadcast channel.
It was shown that synergistic gains in d.o.f. are possible by jointly coding across
these states. We show that similar synergistic gains are possible even with security
constraints for the MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages.
Our main contribution in this problem is the characterization of the optimal
s.d.o.f. region for the general model with all nine possible CSIT states: PP, PD,
PN, DP, NP, DD, DN, ND, and NN, where we assume that these states occur for
arbitrary fractions of time, except for a mild condition of symmetry, which is that
states I1I2 and I2I1 occur for equal fractions of the time if I1 6= I2. With 9 states,
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each occurring for arbitrary fractions of the time, it is not immediately clear how
to optimally code across the states and the achievability of the s.d.o.f. region is
highly non-trivial. To this end, we first develop several key constituent schemes,
where each scheme uses a subset of the 9 states to achieve a particular s.d.o.f. value.
Now given an arbitrary1 probability mass function (pmf) on the 9 CSIT states,
we judiciously time share between the constituent schemes to achieve the optimal
s.d.o.f. region.This is achieved by considering different sub-cases based on the relative
proportions of the various states and explicitly characterizing how the constituent
schemes should be time shared to obtain the optimal s.d.o.f. region in each sub-case.
Next, we provide a matching converse for the full region. The idea behind
the converse is to first enhance the channel by providing more CSIT to obtain a
new channel with fewer number of states but at least as large secrecy capacity
as the original channel. We introduce the local statistical equivalence property,
which states that if we consider the outputs of a receiver for such states in which
it supplies delayed or no CSIT, the entropy of the channel outputs conditioned on
the past outputs is the same as that of another artificial receiver whose channel is
distributed identically as the original receiver. Outer bounds on the s.d.o.f. region
for the enhanced channel are then derived using the local statistical equivalence
property and combining the obtained outer bounds give us the desired outer bounds
for the original channel.
1Arbitrary subject to mild symmetry, i.e., λI1I2 = λI2I1
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1.1 Related Work
The study of security under an information theoretic framework was pioneered by
Shannon in his seminal paper [24], where two legitimate parties wish to communi-
cate in the presence of an eavesdropper through noiseless channels. It was shown
that secret keys shared among the legitimate parties and one-time-pad encryption
was necessary for secure communications in this case. The noisy wiretap channel
was introduced by Wyner, who determined the capacity equivocation region for the
degraded case [1]. It was shown that secure communication is possible using stochas-
tic encoding even without any pre-shared secret keys, if the eavesdropper’s channel
observation is degraded with respect to the legitimate user’s channel. Csiszár and
Körner generalized his result to arbitrary, not necessarily degraded, wiretap chan-
nels [25]. Leung-Yan-Cheong and Hellman determined the capacity-equivocation
region of the Gaussian wiretap channel [26], and showed that the optimal channel
input was Gaussian and the secrecy capacity is the difference between the capacities
of the legitimate users’ channel and the eavesdropping links in this case.
Recently, the study of information theoretic security in the physical layer has
been extended to a variety of channel models ranging from fading channels [27–29],
MIMO wiretap channels [13, 14, 30, 31], multiple access channels [5, 32–35], broad-
cast channels with confidential messages (BCCM) [36–38], wiretap channels with
helpers [4, 39], and interference channels with confidential messages and external
eavesdroppers [40–43]. In this dissertation, we will mostly discuss the fading wire-
tap channel, the wiretap channel with helpers, the multiple access wiretap channel,
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the interference channel with external eavesdroppers and the broadcast channel with
confidential messages.
References [27,28,44,45] consider the fading wiretap channel where all parties
had complete and perfect CSI of both links. Modeling the fading wiretap under
full CSI as a bank of independent parallel channels, these references show that the
capacity achieving channel inputs are independent Gaussian random variables in all
parallel channels, and the variances of these random variables are found via water-
filling. Reference [29] considers the case where the transmitter has the legitimate
channel’s CSI but no eavesdropper CSI under the assumption of infinite coherence
times for channel fading, where the channel state of the eavesdropper, although
unknown at the transmitter, remains constant for an infinite duration, and shows
the optimality of Gaussian channel inputs in this model. Reference [46] considers the
same model under a fast fading condition, i.e., when the eavesdropper channel gain
is unknown at the transmitter and also varies at the order of symbol duration, and
shows that MQAM signaling or Gaussian signaling with added Gaussian artificial
noise, may outperform plain Gaussian signaling. The s.d.o.f. in each case is, however,
zero, irrespective of the availability or quality of CSI at the terminals.
In multi-user scenarios, however, positive s.d.o.f. values can be achieved, as in
multiple access wiretap channels introduced in [32, 33] and wiretap channels with
helpers introduced in [39, 47]. The multiple access wiretap channel was introduced
by [32,33], where the technique of cooperative jamming was introduced to improve
the rates achievable with Gaussian signaling. Reference [34] provides outer bounds
and identified cases where these outer bounds are within 0.5 bits per channel use
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of the rates achievable by Gaussian signaling. While the exact secrecy capacity
remains unknown, the achievable rates in [32–34] all yield zero s.d.o.f. Reference [35]
proposed scaling-based and ergodic alignment techniques to achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of
K−1
K
for theK-user MAC-WT; thus, showing that an alignment based scheme strictly
outperforms i.i.d. Gaussian signaling with or without cooperative jamming at high
SNR. Finally, references [4,48] establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f. to be K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 and
the full s.d.o.f. region, respectively, for the SISO multiple access wiretap channel.
The K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper is studied
in [40]. When the eavesdropper’s CSIT is available, [40] proposes a scheme that
achieves sum s.d.o.f. of K−1
2
. The optimal s.d.o.f. in this case, however, is estab-
lished in [6] to be K(K−1)
2K−1 , using cooperative jamming signals along with interference
alignment techniques. When the eavesdropper’s CSIT is not available, reference [40]
proposes a scheme that achieves a sum s.d.o.f. of K−2
2
.
The broadcast channel with confidential messages is studied in [36–38]. Ref-
erence [36] provided inner and outer bounds for the discrete memoryless broadcast
channel with confidential messages. References [37,38] establish the secrecy capacity
region of the MIMO broadcast channel with confidential messages when precise and
instantaneous CSIT is available. Using these results, it follows that for the two-user
MISO BCCM, the sum s.d.o.f. is 2 with perfect (P) CSIT. Even without any secrecy
constraints, the sum d.o.f. of the MISO broadcast channel is 2 with perfect CSIT.
With no CSIT (N) however, reference [49] showed that the sum d.o.f. collapses to
1. With delayed CSIT (D), it is shown in [18] that the sum d.o.f. for the two-user
MISO broadcast channel increases to 4
3
; with confidential messages, the optimal sum
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s.d.o.f. is 1 [15]. Reference [18] also presents novel results for the more general setting
of K-user MISO broadcast channel, for K ≥ 2. With delayed CSI, [50] established
the d.o.f. region for the two-user MIMO broadcast channel. References [19,20] con-
sider the two-user MISO broadcast channel in state PD and determine the optimal
d.o.f. to be 3
2
in this case. The optimal d.o.f. in states PN and DN are shown to be 1
in reference [10]. Partial results are also available for the three-user MISO BC with
hybrid CSIT in [21, 22]. Other channel models where the effect of delayed CSIT
has been investigated include the MIMO interference channel with delayed CSIT
and output feedback [51], the X-channel [17,52–55], the X-channel with global feed-
back [56], and the two-user SISO X-channel with confidential messages and global
output feedback, [57].
A line of research closely related to imperfect or unavailable CSIT investigates
the wiretap channel, the multiple access wiretap channel, and the broadcast chan-
nel with an arbitrarily varying eavesdropper [58–60], when the eavesdropper CSIT
is not available. The eavesdropper’s channel is assumed to be arbitrary, without
any assumptions on its distribution, and security is guaranteed for every realization
of the eavesdropper’s channel. This models an exceptionally strong eavesdropper,
which may control its own channel in an adversarial manner. Hence, the optimal
sum s.d.o.f. is zero in each case with single antenna terminals, since the eavesdrop-
per’s channel realizations may be exactly equal to the legitimate user’s channel
realizations. On the other hand, in our model, the eavesdropper’s channel gains
are drawn from a known distribution, though the realizations are not known at the
transmitters. We show that, with this mild assumption, strictly positive s.d.o.f. can
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be achieved even with single antennas at each transmitter and receiver for almost
all channel realizations for helper, multiple access, and interference networks.
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Chapter 2: The Wiretap Channel with No CSI
2.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the Gaussian wiretap channel under Rayleigh fading,
where the channel gains of both the legitimate link and the eavesdropper link fade
in an independent identically distributed (i.i.d.) fashion from one symbol to the
next with a Rayleigh distribution, see Fig. 2.1. This models a fast fading wireless
communication channel with coherence time of one symbol duration. Under such a
fast fading condition, the channel may change too quickly for receivers to estimate
it. In addition, the eavesdropper will not feed her CSI estimate back even if she
measures it. Thus, we assume no channel state information (CSI) is available at
any terminal at the start of communication. The goal is to characterize the exact
secrecy capacity for this channel model.
To that end, we use the proof technique that was originally developed by
Smith [2] to evaluate the channel capacity of an amplitude constrained Gaussian
channel. This technique was further used and extended by Abou-Faycal et al. [3] to
determine the channel capacity of a fast fading Rayleigh channel under an average
power constraint. Our work may be viewed as a wiretap version of Abou-Faycal et








N2 ∼ N (0, σ22)







Figure 2.1: Fading wiretap channel with no CSI anywhere.
whereas we consider both reliability and secrecy. Our work is also closely related
to [61] which considers secret key generation for a similar channel model.
We first show that this channel is equivalent to a degraded wiretap channel;
thus, no channel prefixing is needed [1]. We then consider the secrecy rate, which is
the difference of mutual informations, as the objective function, which is concave,
and determine the optimal input distribution as the result of a functional optimiza-
tion problem. We obtain the KKT optimality conditions, and extend these condi-
tions to the complex plane and reach a contradiction using the identity theorem to
conclude that the optimum input distribution cannot have an infinite support over
any finite interval. We then show that the optimal distribution has a finite support.
The secrecy capacity can then be evaluated numerically.
2.2 System Model, Definitions and Preliminaries
The fast Rayleigh fading wiretap channel, see Fig. 2.1 is given by:
Vi = AiUi +N1i (2.1)
Wi = BiUi +N2i (2.2)
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where Ui is the channel input, Vi and Wi are the channel outputs of the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and Ai and Bi are identically distributed
complex circular Gaussian random variables with zero-mean and variance σ2h, repre-
senting fading. The realizations of Ai and Bi are unknown to all users, though their
statistics are known. The noise terms N1i and N2i are zero-mean complex circular
Gaussian random variables with variances σ21 and σ
2





The random variables Ai, Bi, N1i, N2i are i.i.d. in time. The channel input is
average power constrained: E [|Ui|2] ≤ P .
As in [3], since the channel is stationary and memoryless, we can drop the time
index i without any loss of generality. Also, since the phases of the fading parameters
A and B are uniform, |V |2 and |W |2 are sufficient statistics to characterize the
conditional distributions of V and W respectively, given the input U . Conditioned




























The transmitter sends a message M , uniformly chosen from M, by encoding
it to an n-length codeword Un = ϕ(M) using a stochastic encoding function ϕ.
The legitimate receiver detects the message M̂ = ψ(V n) using a decoding function
ψ. The rate of communication is R = 1
n
log |M|, and the probability of error is




H(M |W n). The secrecy capacity is defined as the supremum of
all rates R where Pe ≤ ε, and the message is transmitted information-theoretically
securely, i.e., 1
n
H(M |W n) ≥ 1
n
H(M)− ε, in the limit as ε→ 0.
We note that encoding and decoding depend only on the input distribution and
the conditional marginals of the legitimate and eavesdropper channels. Thus, the
secrecy capacity of the channel given in (2.1)-(2.2) is equal to the secrecy capacity
of the following channel:
Vi = AiUi +N1i (2.5)
Wi = AiUi +N1i + Ñi (2.6)
where Ñi ∼ CN (0, σ22 − σ21) and Ñi is independent of N1i. It is clear that in the
channel model of (2.5)-(2.6) the eavesdropper’s output is a degraded version of the
legitimate receiver’s output, and U → V → W . In addition, since I(U ;V ) =
I(X;Y ) and I(U ;W ) = I(X;Z), the secrecy capacity is [1]
Cs = sup
F∈F
I(U ;V )− I(U ;W ) (2.7)
= sup
F∈F
I(X;Y )− I(X;Z) (2.8)
where F denotes the input distribution drawn from the class of distributions F which
satisfy the given power constraint. Furthermore, the Markov chain X → Y → Z
holds, because Z is independent of X given V , which follows from the Markov chain
U → V → W , and that the phase of V is independent of X given Y , since the
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phase of the fading parameter A is uniform and independent of X. As shown by
van Dijk [62] for the discrete case, for this continuous case also, we can show that
I(X;Y )−I(X;Z) is a concave function of the input distribution, whenX → Y → Z.
Thus, to find the secrecy capacity of the channel in (2.5)-(2.6), it suffices to solve
the convex optimization problem in (2.8).














This upper bound can be derived as follows:
I(U ;V )− I(U ;W ) = (h(V )− h(W ))− (h(V |U)− h(W |U)) (2.10)
The first term on the right side of (2.10) can be upper bounded by using the entropy
power inequality:










and the second term can be lower bounded by noting





giving the desired upper bound in (2.9). The inequality in (2.12) can be derived by
noting that I(V ;A|U) ≥ I(W ;A|U). The significance of the upper bound in (2.9) is
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that it shows that the secrecy capacity is always finite, even when the power goes to
infinity, and also that the secure degrees of freedom of this system is zero as in the
cases of non-fading Gaussian wiretap channel and fading Gaussian wiretap channel
with perfect CSI.
2.3 KKT Optimality Conditions
For a channel with continuous alphabet, the supremum in (2.8) need not be achiev-
able. A sufficient condition for the achievability of the supremum is that there exists
a topology on which mutual information is continuous in the input distribution, im-
plying that the difference of two mutual information quantities induced by the same
input distribution is also continuous, and the set of allowable input distributions F
is compact. Both of these criteria hold in our case, as was shown in [3, Appendix I].
We solve the maximization in (2.8) using convex optimization techniques following
Smith [2] and Abou-Faycal et al. [3]. The channel input X∗ with distribution F ∗
that achieves the secrecy capacity must satisfy the KKT optimality condition:















dz ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ R (2.13)
for some γ ≥ 0, which is the Lagrange multiplier due to the average power constraint
on the channel input. Furthermore, (2.13) is satisfied with equality if x lies in the
support of X∗. Note that, in (2.13), pY (y;F ) and pZ(z;F ) are the probability distri-
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butions of Y and Z, respectively, which are induced by the probability distribution
F , of X, i.e.,
pY (y;F ) =
∫
pY |X(y|x) dF (x) (2.14)
pZ(z;F ) =
∫
pZ|X(z|x) dF (x) (2.15)
In the next section, we will examine the implications of the KKT conditions in (2.13)
on the optimum probability distribution for the channel input X.
2.4 Characterization of X∗
Theorem 1 The optimal X∗ is discrete with only a finite number of points in any
bounded interval.
Proof: To prove the theorem, we need to rule out the following two cases:
1. The support of X∗ contains an interval.
2. X∗ is discrete but there exists a bounded interval containing infinitely many
points belonging to the support of X∗.
We proceed by contradiction. Therefore, let us assume that either of the two cases
1) or 2) holds. Let E be the support set of X∗. Noting that
∫








one can simplify (2.13) as:
f(x) ≥ 0, ∀x ∈ R (2.17)
with equality if x ∈ E, where f(x) is given by









pY |X(y|x) ln (pY (y;F ∗)) dy
−
∫
pZ|X(z|x) ln (pZ(z;F ∗)) dz (2.18)
Now, E contains a bounded set S with an infinite number of distinct points.
Let Sc be a compact neighbourhood containing S. By the Bolzano-Weierstrass
theorem, the set S must have an accumulation point in Sc. We extend f(x) to the
complex domain, and by letting lnx be the principal branch of the logarithm, f is
well defined and analytic on the complex plane. The KKT conditions in (2.17) tell
us that, f which is an analytic function on a domain D, is identically zero on a set
with an accumulation point in D. The identity theorem tells us that f must be
identically zero everywhere on D. More specifically, f must be zero on the entire
real line. Thus, the equality in (2.17) holds, i.e., f(x) = 0, for all x ∈ R. Since






pY |X(y|x)pZ|Y (z|y)dy (2.20)
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We use (2.20) in (2.18) and exchange the order of integrals using Fubini’s theorem,
which is permissible since | ln pZ(z;F ∗)| is bounded by α+ βz for some constants α
and β, as will be shown in (2.31) and (2.43). This enables us to rewrite the equation
f(x) = 0, for all x ∈ R, equivalently as
∫







, ∀x ∈ R (2.21)
where
g(y) = ln pY (y;F
∗)−
∫










and get, after some simplification,
∫


















Now, we recognize the left hand side of (2.24) as the Laplace transform of g(y), and
by taking an inverse Laplace transform of both sides, we get
g(y) = − γ
σ2h
y − e−∆y ln y −∆
∫ y
0
e−∆t ln t dt−K (2.25)
where K = −γ σ21
σ2h










− e−∆y ln y −∆
∫ y
0
e−∆t ln t dt−K (2.26)
Now, we bound each term on the right hand side of (2.26) to obtain a lower bound




e−∆t ln t dt ≤ ∆
∫ y
0
e−∆t ln y dt = (1− e−∆y) ln y (2.27)
and thus,
e−∆y ln y + ∆
∫ y
0
e−∆t ln t dt ≤ ln y (2.28)


























where we used the fact that 1
σ2hx
2+σ22
is convex in x2, Jensen’s inequality and the














From (2.6), W = V + Ñ . Denoting the real and imaginary parts of a complex
number by subscripts R and I, respectively, we note that,
Z = |W |2 = Y + |Ñ |2 + 2VRÑR + 2VIÑI (2.33)
and therefore,
E[Z|Y = y] = y + (σ22 − σ21) (2.34)
Using (2.32), (2.34) and (2.28) along with (2.26), we get,
ln pY (y;F
∗) ≥ lnK1 −K2y −K2(σ22 − σ21)−
γ
σ2h





e−c2y, y ≥ 0 (2.36)
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for any value of c1 and c2, and hence pY (y) cannot be a valid probability density
function and thus we have reached a contradiction. This contradiction implies that
the two cases stated at the beginning cannot occur, i.e., the optimum probability
distribution cannot contain a continuous interval, or an infinite number of discrete
points in a finite interval. Therefore, the optimum probability distribution contains
at most a finite number of discrete points in any given finite interval. 
In the following theorem, we show that, in fact, X∗ has a finite number of
mass points.
Theorem 2 The support of X∗ has a finite number of points.
Proof: Again, we proceed by contradiction. Assume that the support of X∗ has
infinitely many points. Let us denote the mass points by the increasing sequence
{xi}∞i=1 and their corresponding probabilities by the sequence {pi}
∞
i=1. Since, by
Theorem 1, there are only finitely many points in any bounded interval, we must





















































x2+σ21 is concave in x2, Jensen’s inequality and
the power constraint.
Now we observe that f(x) in (2.18) is a continuously differentiable function in
x. Also, KKT conditions in (2.17) imply that f(xi) = 0,∀i ∈ N and f(x) ≥ 0,∀x ∈
R. Denoting the derivative of f(x) by f ′(x), we must have f ′(xi) = 0,∀i. If not,
f(x) will change sign in the neighbourhood of xi, which is not possible. To compute


















































pZ|X(z|x) ln (pZ(z)) dz (2.45)
Using the bounds in (2.40) and (2.43) to bound the different terms in (2.45), we
obtain





























































































xi + o(xi) (2.47)
where o(x) denotes a function such that o(x) → 0 as x → ∞. By our assumption,
xi → ∞ as i → ∞. Thus, (2.47) implies that f ′(xi) → ∞ as i → ∞ which is
a contradiction, since, f ′(xi) = 0, for every i. We conclude, therefore, that the
support of the optimal input distribution has a finite number of points. 
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2.5 Numerical Results
In this section, we present simple numerical examples to verify and illustrate the
results of this chapter. Fig. 2.2 shows an example of how the KKT conditions
are satisfied for a particular value of power P . The plot shows that there are two
mass points, one at 0 and the other at 1.7348, with probabilities 0.9668 and 0.0332,
respectively. The secrecy capacity for this case is 0.03 bits per channel use.
Fig. 2.3 shows how the positions of the optimum probability mass points
change with power. Note that there is always a mass point at zero. As the power
increases, the optimum probability distribution has more and more mass points.
At the transitions, where a new mass point is introduced, the numerical algorithm
becomes unstable, nevertheless, it seems that the mass points originate far from the
origin with very low probabilities (as seen in Fig. 2.4), then come closer towards
the origin before receding away again with increasing power. Fig. 2.4 shows the
probabilities of the corresponding mass points. As expected, at very low power, the
probability of the point at zero is high, and it decreases as power is increased. The
probabilities stabilize asymptotically.
2.6 Conclusions
In this chapter, we considered the fast Rayleigh fading wiretap channel with coher-
ence time of one symbol duration. We proved that the optimal input distribution
that achieves the secrecy capacity is discrete with finite number of mass points.
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Figure 2.2: An optimal distribution satisfying the KKT conditions with P = 0.1,
σh = σ1 = 1, σ2 = 2, γ = 0.2461, Cs = 0.03 and F (x) = 0.9668δ(x) + 0.0332δ(x −
1.7348).
The secrecy capacity does not scale with power and the secure degrees of freedom
(s.d.o.f.) is zero.
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Figure 2.3: The position of the mass points versus power.







































Figure 2.4: The probabilities of the mass points versus power.
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Chapter 3: Secure Degrees of Freedom of One-hop Wireless Networks
with No Eavesdropper CSIT
3.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we investigate how the unavailability of the eavesdropper’s chan-
nel state information at the transmitter (CSIT) affects the optimal secure rates for
three important channel models: the wiretap channel with helpers, the multiple
access wiretap channel, and the interference channel with an external eavesdropper.
With full eavesdropper CSIT, references [4,63] determine the optimal s.d.o.f. of the
wiretap channel with M helpers to be M
M+1
. Further, references [5,64] determine the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with full eaves-
dropper CSIT to be K(K−1)
K(K−1)+1 , while for the interference channel with an external
eavesdropper, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is shown to be K(K−1)
2K−1 in references [6, 43].
In this chapter, we show that for the wiretap channel with M helpers, an
s.d.o.f. of M
M+1
is achievable even without eavesdropper’s CSIT; thus, there is no
loss of s.d.o.f. due to the unavailability of eavesdropper CSIT in this case. For
the multiple access wiretap channel and the interference channel with an external
eavesdropper, however, the optimal s.d.o.f. decreases when there is no eavesdrop-
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per CSIT. In particular, without eavesdropper CSIT, the K-user multiple access
wiretap channel reduces to a wiretap channel with (K − 1) helpers and the optimal




. For the interference channel with an





absence of eavesdropper CSIT.
In order to establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f., we propose achievable schemes
and provide matching converse proofs for each of these channel models. Our achiev-
able schemes are based on real interference alignment [7] and vector space align-
ment [8] for fixed and fading channel gains, respectively. To prove the converse, we
combine techniques from [4, 6] and [10]. We exploit a key result in [10] that the
output entropy at a receiver whose CSIT is not available is at least as large as the
output entropy at a receiver whose CSIT is available, even when the transmitters
cooperate and transmit correlated signals. Intuitively, no alignment of signals is
possible at the receiver whose CSIT is unavailable; therefore, the signals occupy the
maximum possible space at that receiver. We combine this insight with the tech-
niques of [4, 6] to establish the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the multiple access wiretap
channel with no eavesdropper CSIT to be K−1
K
and the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the





3.2 System Model and Definitions
In this chapter, we consider three fundamental channel models: the wiretap channel
with helpers, the multiple access wiretap channel, and the interference channel with
an external eavesdropper. For each channel model, we consider two scenarios of
channel variation: a) fixed channel gains, and b) fading channel gains. For the case
of fixed channel gains, we assume that the channel gains are non-zero and have
been drawn independently from a continuous distribution with bounded support
and remain fixed for the duration of the communication. On the other hand, in
the fading scenario, we assume a fast fading model, where the channel gains vary
in an i.i.d. fashion from one symbol period to another. In each symbol period, the
channel gains are non-zero and are drawn from a common continuous distribution
with bounded support. The common continuous distribution is known at all the
terminals in the system. While we consider only real channel gains in this chapter, we
believe our results can be extended for complex channel gains; for further discussion,
see [4, Section X].
Let Ω denote the collection of all channel gains in n channel uses. We assume
full CSI at the receivers, that is, both the legitimates receivers and the eavesdropper





















Figure 3.1: Wiretap channel with M helpers.
3.2.1 Wiretap Channel with Helpers
The wiretap channel with M helpers, see Fig. 3.1, is described by,








where X1(t) denotes the channel input of the legitimate transmitter, and Y (t) de-
notes the channel output at the legitimate receiver, at time t. X(i), i = 2, . . . ,M+1,
are the channel inputs of the M helpers, and Z(t) denotes the channel output at
the eavesdropper, at time t. In addition, N1(t) and N2(t) are white Gaussian noise
variables with zero-mean and unit-variance. Here, hi(t), gi(t) are the channel gains
of the users to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and gi(t)s
are not known at any of the transmitters. All channel inputs are subject to the
average power constraint E[Xi(t)2] ≤ P , i = 1, . . . ,M + 1.
The legitimate transmitter wishes to transmit a message W which is uniformly
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distributed in W . A secure rate R, with R = log |W|
n
is achievable if there exists a
sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver,
namely, Pr[W 6= Ŵ ] ≤ εn, and the secrecy constraint, namely,
1
n
I(W ;Zn,Ω) ≤ εn (3.3)
where εn → 0 as n → ∞. The supremum of all achievable secure rates R is the








3.2.2 Multiple Access Wiretap Channel









where Xi(t) denotes the ith user’s channel input, Y (t) denotes the legitimate re-
ceiver’s channel output, and Z(t) denotes the eavesdropper’s channel output, at
time t. In addition, N1(t) and N2(t) are white Gaussian noise variables with zero-
mean and unit-variance. Here, hi(t), gi(t) are the channel gains of the users to
the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, and gi(t)s are not known























Figure 3.2: K-user multiple access wiretap channel.
constraint E[Xi(t)2] ≤ P , i = 1, . . . , K.
The ith user transmits message Wi which is uniformly distributed in Wi. A
secure rate tuple (R1, . . . , RK), with Ri =
log |Wi|
n
is achievable if there exists a
sequence of codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver,
namely, Pr[Wi 6= Ŵi] ≤ εn, for i = 1, . . . , K, and the secrecy constraint, namely,
1
n
I(WK ;Zn,Ω) ≤ εn (3.7)
where εn → 0 as n → ∞. Here, WK denotes the set of all the messages, i.e.,
{W1, . . . ,WK}. An s.d.o.f. tuple (d1, . . . , dK) is said to be achievable if a rate tuple





























Figure 3.3: K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper.
3.2.3 Interference Channel with External Eavesdropper










where Yi(t) is the channel output of receiver i, Z(t) is the channel output at the
eavesdropper, Xj(t) is the channel input of transmitter j, hji(t) is the channel gain
from transmitter j to receiver i, gj(t) is the channel gain from transmitter j to the
eavesdropper, and {N1(t), . . . , NK(t), NZ(t)} are mutually independent zero-mean
unit-variance white Gaussian noise random variables, at time t. The channel gains
to the eavesdropper, gi(t)s are not known at any of the transmitters. All channel
inputs are subject to the average power constraint E[Xi(t)2] ≤ P , i = 1, . . . , K.
Transmitter i wishes to send a message Wi, chosen uniformly from a set Wi,
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to receiver i. The messages W1, . . . ,WK are mutually independent. A secure rate
tuple (R1, . . . , RK), with Ri =
log |Wi|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of
codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at all the legitimate receivers, namely,
Pr[Wi 6= Ŵi] ≤ εn, for i = 1, . . . , K, and the security condition
1
n
I(WK ;Zn,Ω) ≤ εn (3.10)
where εn → 0, as n→∞. An s.d.o.f. tuple (d1, . . . , dK) is said to be achievable if a










3.3 Main Results and Discussion
In this section, we state the main results of this chapter. We have the following
theorems:
Theorem 3 For the wiretap channel with M helpers and no eavesdropper CSIT,





for fading channel gains and almost surely, for fixed channel gains.
Theorem 4 For the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with no eavesdropper
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for fading channel gains and almost surely, for fixed channel gains.
Theorem 5 For the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper with





for fading channel gains and almost surely, for fixed channel gains.
We present the proofs of Theorems 3 and 4 in Section 3.4 and the proof of
Theorem 5 in Section 3.5. Let us first state a corollary obtained from Theorems 3
and 4, which establishes the entire s.d.o.f. region of the K-user multiple access
wiretap channel with no eavesdropper CSIT.
Corollary 1 The s.d.o.f. region of the K-user multiple access wiretap channel with
no eavesdropper CSIT is given by,







The proof of Corollary 1 follows directly from Theorems 3 and 4. In partic-
ular, we can treat the K-user multiple access wiretap channel as a (K − 1) helper
wiretap channel with transmitter i as the legitimate transmitter, and the remaining
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Channel model With Eve CSIT Without Eve CSIT


















Table 3.1: Summary of s.d.o.f. values with and without eavesdropper CSIT.
transmitters as helpers. This achieves the corner points di =
K−1
K
and dj = 0 for
j 6= i from Theorem 3. Therefore, given the sum s.d.o.f. upper bound in Theorem 4,
and that each corner point with s.d.o.f. of K−1
K
for a single user is achievable, the
region in Corollary 1 follows.
It is useful, at this point, to compare our results to the cases when the eaves-
dropper’s CSI is available at the transmitter. Table 3.1 shows a comparison of the
optimal s.d.o.f. values with and without eavesdropper CSIT. Interestingly, there is
no loss in s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with helpers due to the absence of eaves-
dropper’s CSIT.
However, for the multiple access wiretap channel and the interference channel
with an external eavesdropper, the optimal s.d.o.f. decreases due to the unavailabil-
ity of eavesdropper CSIT. For the multiple access wiretap channel, as the number
of users, K increases, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. approaches 1 as ∼ 1
K2
with eaves-
dropper’s CSIT but only as ∼ 1
K
without eavesdropper’s CSIT. Therefore, the loss




For the interference channel with an external eavesdropper too, there is a loss
in s.d.o.f. due to the unavailability of the eavesdropper’s CSIT. However, in this
case, the optimal s.d.o.f. without eavesdropper CSIT closely tracks the s.d.o.f. with
eavesdropper CSIT. In fact, it can be verified that the s.d.o.f. loss is bounded by
1
4
, which implies that the loss of s.d.o.f. as a fraction of the optimal s.d.o.f. with
eavesdropper CSIT is ∼ 1
K
for large K, in this case also.
For the multiple access wiretap channel, we also consider the case where some
of the transmitters have the eavesdropper’s CSI. We state our achievable s.d.o.f. in
this case in the following theorem.
Theorem 6 In the K-user MAC-WT, where 1 ≤ m ≤ K transmitters have eaves-
dropper CSI, and the remaining K −m transmitters have no eavesdropper CSI, the
following sum s.d.o.f. is achievable,
ds =
m(K − 1)
m(K − 1) + 1 (3.15)
for fading channel gains and almost surely, for fixed channel gains.
We present the proof of Theorem 6 in Section 3.6. In this case, we note that
when only one user has eavesdropper CSIT, i.e., m = 1, our achievable rate is the
same as when no user has eavesdropper CSIT as in Theorem 4. On the other hand,
when all users have eavesdropper CSIT, i.e., m = K, our achievable rate is the same
as the optimal sum s.d.o.f. in [4]. We note that our achievable sum s.d.o.f. varies
from the no eavesdropper CSIT result in Theorem 4 to the full eavesdropper CSIT
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sum s.d.o.f. in [4] as m increases from 1 to K.
3.4 Proofs of Theorems 3 and 4
First, we note that an achievable scheme for Theorem 3 implies an achievable scheme
for Theorem 4, since the K-user multiple access wiretap channel may be treated as a
wiretap channel with (K−1) helpers. Further, we note that a converse for Theorem 4
suffices as a converse for Theorem 3. Thus, we will only provide achievable schemes
for Theorem 3 and a converse proof for Theorem 4. An alternate converse for
Theorem 3 also follows from the converse presented in [4] for the wiretap channel
with M helpers and with eavesdropper CSIT, as the converse for the case of known
eavesdropper CSIT serves as a converse for the case of unknown eavesdropper CSIT.
Next, we note that under our fixed and fading channel models, it suffices
to provide an achievable scheme for the case of fixed channel gains and prove a
converse for the case of fading channel gains. In general, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. ds
for fixed channel gains may depend on the channel realization, and we denote by
dfixeds (ω), the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for the fixed channel realization ω
∆
= (h, g), where
h and g denote the channel realizations of the legitimate receivers’ channels and the
eavesdropper’s channel, respectively. We provide, in Section 3.4.1, a real alignment
based achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with M helpers, and thus, show
that the optimal sum s.d.o.f. dfixeds (ω) ≥ K−1K for almost all channel gains ω. Now,
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we show that
dvars ≥ Eω[dfixeds (ω)] (3.16)
where dvars is the optimal sum s.d.o.f. in the fading channel gains case, by showing
that a sum s.d.o.f. of Eω[dfixeds (ω)] is achievable on the fading channel. To that end,
we argue along the lines of [65]. Essentially, we quantize the (finite) range of each





k = 1, . . . ,m. This results in the quantization of h into mK rectangles Rj, j =
1, . . . ,mK . Let nj be the number of channel uses when the channel realization
h ∈ Rj. Due to the i.i.d. nature of channel variation, njn → P(h ∈ Rj), as n →
∞. When the channel realization h ∈ Rj, one can achieve the s.d.o.f. given by
ess infh∈Rj d
fixed
s (h, g), almost surely, over nj channel uses as nj →∞, where ess inf
denotes the essential infimum. Therefore, over n channel uses, one can achieve
an s.d.o.f. of at least
∑mK
j=1 ess infh∈Rj d
fixed
s (h, g)P(h ∈ Rj) which converges to
Eω[dfixeds (ω)] as m→∞, using the fact that
∑mK
j=1 ess infh∈Rj d
fixed
s (h, g)I(h ∈ Rj)
converges pointwise almost everywhere to dfixeds (h, g), and noting that for each
m,
∑mK
j=1 ess infh∈Rj d
fixed
s (h, g)I(h ∈ Rj) is bounded by 1 for the multiple access
wiretap channel.
Next, we prove the converse for the multiple access wiretap channel with fading












In order to determine the optimal sum s.d.o.f. in the fixed channel gains case,
we first note using (3.16) and (3.18) that




Combined with the fact that dfixeds (ω) ≥ K−1K for almost all channel gains ω, which





for almost all channel gains ω.
Thus, the achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with M helpers and fixed
channel gains in Section 3.4.1, and the converse for the multiple access wiretap
channel with fading channel gains in Section 3.4.2 suffice for the proofs of Theorems
3 and 4.
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3.4.1 Achievability for the Wiretap Channel with Helpers
We now present achievable schemes for the wiretap channel with M helpers for fixed
channel gains. We provide an achievable scheme for the case of fading channel gains
in Appendix 3.8.1. Although one can utilize the achievable scheme developed for
the fixed channel gains case on a symbol-by-symbol basis in the fading channel gains
case, the alternative scheme provided in Appendix 3.8.1 is worth examining as it
is designed to reveal similarities in the achievable schemes for the fixed and fading
channel gains cases.
For fixed channels, we use the technique of real interference alignment [7, 9].
Let {V2, V3, · · · ,
VM+1, U1, U2, U3, · · · , UM+1} be mutually independent discrete random variables,
each of which uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q)
C(a,Q) = a{−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (3.21)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number used to normalize the trans-
mission power, and is also the minimum distance between the points belonging to
C(a,Q). Exact values of a and Q will be specified later. We choose the input signal









where {αk}M+1k=2 are rationally independent among themselves and also rationally
independent of all channel gains. The input signal of the jth helper, j = 2, · · · ,M+





Note that, neither the legitimate transmitter signal in (3.22) nor the helper signals in
(3.23) depend on the eavesdropper CSI {gk}M+1k=1 . With these selections, observations




















The intuition here is as follows: We use M independent sub-signals Vk, k =
2, · · · ,M + 1, to represent the original message W . The input signal X1 is a lin-
ear combination of Vks and a jamming signal U1. At the legitimate receiver, all of
the cooperative jamming signals, Uks, are aligned such that they occupy a small
portion of the signal space. Since {1, h1α2, h1α3, · · · , h1αM+1} are rationally inde-
pendent for all channel gains, except for a set of Lebesgue measure zero, the signals
{




can be distinguished by the legitimate receiver. This
is similar to the case when there is full eavesdropper CSIT [4]. However, unlike the
scheme in [4], we can no longer align signals at the eavesdropper due to lack of eaves-























Figure 3.4: Illustration of the alignment scheme for the Gaussian wiretap channel
with M helpers with no eavesdropper CSI.
Fig. 3.4. Here, by the entire space, we mean the maximum number of dimensions
that the eavesdropper is capable of decoding, which is (M + 1) in this case. Since
the entire space at the eavesdropper is occupied by the cooperative jamming signals,
the message signals {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1} are secure, as we will mathematically prove
in the sequel.
The following secrecy rate is achievable [25]
Cs ≥ I(V;Y )− I(V;Z) (3.26)
where V
∆
= {V2, V3, · · · , VM+1}. Note that since Ω is known at both the legitimate
receiver and the eavesdropper, it can be considered to be an additional output at
both the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper. Further, since V is chosen to
be independent of Ω, Ω should appear in the conditioning of each of the mutual
information quantities in (3.26). We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of
notational simplicity.
First, we use Fano’s inequality to bound the first term in (3.26). Note that the
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space observed at receiver 1 consists of (2Q+1)M(2MQ+2Q+1) points in (M +1)
dimensions, and the sub-signal in each dimension is drawn from a constellation of
C(a, (M + 1)Q). Here, we use the property that C(a,Q) ⊂ C(a, (M + 1)Q). By
using the Khintchine-Groshev theorem of Diophantine approximation in number
theory [7,9], we can bound the minimum distance dmin between the points in receiver





for almost all rationally independent {1, h1α2, h1α3, · · · , h1αM+1}, except for a set
of Lebesgue measure zero. Then, we can upper bound the probability of decoding





















where V̂ is the estimate of V by choosing the closest point in the constellation based
on observation Y . For any δ > 0, if we choose Q = P
1−δ
2(M+1+δ) and a = γP
1
2/Q, where




























→ 0 as P →∞. To satisfy the power constraint at the

















By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain V→ Y → V̂, we know that
H(V|Y ) ≤ H(V|V̂) (3.33)









= o(logP ) (3.35)
where δ and γ are fixed, and o(·) is the little-o function. This means that
I(V;Y ) = H(V)−H(V|Y ) (3.36)
≥ H(V)− o(logP ) (3.37)
= log(2Q+ 1)M − o(logP ) (3.38)
≥ logP
M(1−δ)
2(M+1+δ) − o(logP ) (3.39)
=
M(1− δ)






− o(logP ) (3.40)
Next, we need to bound the second term in (3.26),
I(V;Z) = I(V,U;Z)− I(U;Z|V) (3.41)
= I(V,U;Z)−H(U|V) +H(U|Z,V) (3.42)
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= I(V,U;Z)−H(U) +H(U|Z,V) (3.43)
= h(Z)− h(Z|V,U)−H(U) +H(U|Z,V) (3.44)
= h(Z)− h(N2)−H(U) +H(U|Z,V) (3.45)





log 2πe− log(2Q+ 1)M+1 + o(logP ) (3.47)
≤ 1
2
logP − (M + 1)(1− δ)
2(M + 1 + δ)
logP + o(logP ) (3.48)
=
(M + 2)δ






+ o(logP ) (3.49)
where U
∆
= {U1, U2, · · · , UM+1}, and (3.46) is due to the fact that given V and




, · · · , gM+1
hM+1
}
are rationally independent for all channel gains, except for a set of
Lebesgue measure zero. Then, by Fano’s inequality, H(U|Z,V) ≤ o(logP ) similar
to the step in (3.35). In addition, h(Z) ≤ 1
2
logP + o(logP ) in (3.47), since all the
channel gains are drawn from a known distribution with bounded support.
Combining (3.40) and (3.49), we have
Cs ≥ I(V;Y )− I(V;Z) (3.50)
≥ M(1− δ)






− (M + 2)δ






− o(logP ) (3.51)
=
M − (2M + 2)δ






− o(logP ) (3.52)
where again o(·) is the little-o function. If we choose δ arbitrarily small, then we
can achieve M
M+1
s.d.o.f. for this model where there is no eavesdropper CSI at the
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transmitters.
3.4.2 Converse for the Fading Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
We combine techniques from [4] and [10] to prove the converse. Here, we use Xi
to denote the collection of all channel inputs {Xi(t), t = 1, . . . , n} of transmitter i.
Similarly, we use Y and Z to denote the channel outputs at the legitimate receiver
and the eavesdropper, respectively, over n channel uses. We further define XK1 as the
collection of all channel inputs from all of the transmitters, i.e., {Xi, i = 1 . . . , K}.
Finally, for a fixed j, we use X−j to denote all channel inputs from all transmitters
except transmitter j, i.e., {Xi, i 6= j, i = 1 . . . , K}. Since all receivers know Ω, it
appears in the conditioning in every entropy and mutual information term below.
We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational simplicity. We divide
the proof into three steps.
3.4.2.1 Deterministic Channel Model
We will show that there is no loss of s.d.o.f. in considering the following integer-input










with the constraint that
Xi ∈
{





To that end, we will show that given any codeword tuple (XG1 , . . . ,X
G
K) for the
original channel of (3.5)-(3.6), we can construct a codeword tuple (XD1 , . . . ,X
D
K)






P c, for the deterministic channel of (3.53)-(3.54),
that achieves an s.d.o.f. no smaller than the s.d.o.f. achieved by (XG1 , . . . ,X
G
K) on the
original channel. Let us denote by YG and ZG, the outputs of the original channel
of (3.5)-(3.6), when (XG1 , . . . ,X
G








































It suffices to show that
I(Wi; Y
G) ≤I(Wi; YD) + no(logP ) (3.60)
I(WK ; ZD) ≤I(WK ; ZG) + no(logP ) (3.61)
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for every i = 1, . . . , K. Here, (3.60) states that the information rate to the legitimate
receiver in the discretized channel is at least as large as the information rate in the
original Gaussian channel, and (3.61) states that the information leakage to the
eavesdropper in the discretized channel is at most at the level of the information
leakage in the original Gaussian channel, both of which quantified within a o(logP ).
The proof of (3.60) follows along similar lines as the proof presented in [10,
66]; we include a sketch here for completeness. First, note that there is no loss








, and E(t) = Y G(t)− Ȳ D(t). We have
I(Wi;Y
G|Ω) =I(Wi; Ȳ D +E|Ω) (3.62)
≤I(Wi; Ȳ D,E|Ω) (3.63)
=I(Wi; Ȳ
D|Ω) + I(Wi;E|Ȳ D,Ω) (3.64)
≤I(Wi; Ȳ D|Ω) + h(E|Ω)− h(E|Ȳ D,Wi,XK1 ,Ω) (3.65)
















≤I(Wi; Ȳ D|Ω) + no(logP ) (3.67)
Next, we show that imposing per-symbol power constraints as in (3.55) does
not incur any additional loss of d.o.f. It suffices to prove:
I(Wi; Ȳ
D|Ω)− I(Wi;Y D|Ω) ≤ no(logP ) (3.68)
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−XDi (t) and Ŷ = Ȳ D − Y D, and
I(Wi; Ȳ
D|Ω) ≤I(Wi;Y D, Ŷ |Ω) (3.69)










H(X̂i(t)) + no(logP ) (3.72)
Now, it can be shown that H((X̂i(t)) ≤ o(logP ) using the steps in [10][eqns. (138)-
(158)]. Thus, (3.68) is proved. This concludes the sketch of proof of (3.60).





















− Z̄(t)− bN2(t)c (3.75)
Then, we have,
I(WK ; ZD) ≤I(WK ; ZD,ZG, Z̄) (3.76)
=I(WK ; ZG) + I(WK ; Z̄|ZG) + I(WK ; ZD|Z̄,ZG) (3.77)
≤I(WK ; ZG) +H(Z̄|ZG) +H(ZD|Z̄,ZG) (3.78)
≤I(WK ; ZG) +H(Z̄|bZGc) +H(ZD|Z̄) (3.79)
≤I(WK ; ZG) +H(Z̄|Z̄ + Z̃ + bN2c) +H(Ẑ) (3.80)
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≤I(WK ; ZG) +
n∑
t=1





≤I(WK ; ZG) + no(logP ) (3.82)
where bZGc =
(
bZG(1)c, . . . , bZG(n)c
)
. Here, (3.82) follows sinceH(Ẑ(t)) ≤ o(logP )
following the steps of the proof in [10, Appendix A.2]. In addition, recalling that Ω
appears in the conditioning of each term in (3.81), note that H(Z̄(t)|Z̄(t) + Z̃(t) +
bN2(t)c ,Ω) ≤ E
[
H(Z̄(t)|Z̄(t) + Z̃(t) + bN2(t)c , gK1 = g̃K1 )
]
. To bound this term,
in going from (3.81) to (3.82), we have used the following lemma [67, Lemma E.1,
Appendix E]
Lemma 1 Consider integer valued random variables x, r and s such that
x ⊥ r (3.83)
s ∈ {−L, . . . , 0, . . . , L} (3.84)
P(|r| ≥ k) ≤ e−f(k) (3.85)
for all positive k, for some integer L and a function f(.). Let
y = x+ r + s (3.86)
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Then,













n ∈ Z+|e−f(n) > 1
2
}∣∣∣∣ (3.88)
Note that, in our case, Z̃(t) is integer valued and is bounded by
∑K
i=1 g̃i(t) +
K + 1 for each realization g̃i(t) of gi(t), and we have
P(| bN2(t)c | > k) =P(|N2(t)− {N2(t)} | > k) (3.89)
≤P(|N2(t)|+ | {N2(t)} | > k) (3.90)




Thus, using the choice f(k) = (k−1)
2
2
, Nf is clearly bounded and thus, H(Z̄(t)|Z̄(t)+
Z̃(t) + bN2(t)c ,Ω) ≤ o(logP ), which is the step going from (3.81) to (3.82).
Therefore, the s.d.o.f. of the deterministic channel in (3.53)-(3.54) with integer
channel inputs as described in (3.55) is no smaller than the s.d.o.f. of the original
channel in (3.5)-(3.6). Consequently, any upper bound (e.g., converse) developed
for the s.d.o.f. of (3.53)-(3.54) will serve as an upper bound for the s.d.o.f. of (3.5)-
(3.6). Thus, we will consider this deterministic channel in the remaining part of the
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converse.
3.4.2.2 An Upper Bound on the Sum Rate
We begin as in the secrecy penalty lemma in [4], i.e., [4, Lemma 1]. Note that,




Ri ≤I(WK ; Y)− I(WK ; Z) + nε (3.93)
≤I(WK ; Y|Z) + nε (3.94)
≤I(XK1 ; Y|Z) + nε (3.95)
≤H(Y|Z) + nε (3.96)
=H(Y,Z)−H(Z) + nε (3.97)
≤H(XK1 ,Y,Z)−H(Z) + nε (3.98)




H(Xk)−H(Z) + nε (3.100)
where (3.99) follows since H(Y,Z|XK1 ) = 0 for the channel in (3.53)-(3.54). Also,
to ensure decodability at the legitimate receiver, we use the role of a helper lemma




Ri ≤I(W−j; Y) + nε′ (3.101)
≤I(X−j; Y) + nε′ (3.102)
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=H(Y)−H(bhjXjc) + nε′ (3.105)
=H(Y)−H(bhjXjc ,Xj) +H(Xj| bhjXjc) + nε′ (3.106)




H(Xj(t)| bhj(t)Xj(t)c) + nε′ (3.108)
≤H(Y)−H(Xj) + nε′ + nc (3.109)
where hjXj
∆
= {hj(t)Xj(t), t = 1, . . . , n}, and recalling that Ω appears in the condi-
tioning of each term in (3.108), (3.109) follows using the following lemma.
Lemma 2 Let X be an integer valued random variable satisfying (3.55), and h






dF (h) ≤ c for some
c ∈ R. Then,
H(X| bhXc , h) ≤ c (3.110)
The proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix 3.8.3. The constraint imposed
in Lemma 2 is a mild technical condition. A sufficient condition for satisfying the
constraint is that there exists an ε > 0 such that the probability density function







































where f(h) ≤M on (−ε, ε), and the last step follows since both integrals in (3.112)
are bounded. Most common distributions such as Gaussian, exponential and Laplace
satisfy this condition.




Ri ≤KH(Y)−H(Z) + nK(ε′ + c) + nε (3.114)
≤(K − 1)n
2
logP + (H(Y)−H(Z)) + nε′′ (3.115)




Ri ≤(K − 1)
1
2





Now dividing by 1
2



















3.4.2.3 Bounding the Difference of Entropies







where X |= Y is used to denote that X and Y are statistically independent and
(3.119) follows from (3.118) by relaxing the condition of independence in (3.118).
Since the Xis in (3.119) may be arbitrarily correlated, we can think of the K single
antenna terminals as a single transmitter with K antennas. Thus, we wish to
maximize H(Y) − H(Z), where Y and Z are two single antenna receiver outputs,
under the constraint that the channel gains to Z are unknown at the transmitter.
This brings us to the K-user MISO broadcast channel setting of [10], where it is
shown that the difference of entropies, H(Y)−H(Z) cannot be larger than no(logP ),
if the channel gains to the second receiver are unknown, even without security
constraints. Indeed, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 3 For the deterministic channel model stated in (3.53)-(3.55), with the
channel gains to Z unknown at the transmitter, we have
H(Y|Ω)−H(Z|Ω) ≤ no(logP ) (3.120)
The proof of Lemma 3 follows along the lines of [10, eqns. (75)-(103)]; in order to
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make our proof self-contained1, we provide a sketch of the relevant steps in Appendix
3.8.4.







This completes the converse proof of Theorem 4.
3.5 Proof of Theorem 5
In this section, we present the proof of Theorem 5. We first present separate achiev-
able schemes for fixed and fading channel gains and then present the converse. For
the interference channel, we require asymptotic schemes with both real [9], and
vector space alignment [8] techniques. The converse combines techniques from [43]
and [10].
3.5.1 Achievability for the Interference Channel
An achievable scheme for the interference channel with an external eavesdropper and
no eavesdropper CSIT is presented in [40, Theorem 3]. That scheme achieves sum
s.d.o.f. of K−2
2
. Here, we present the optimal schemes which achieve K−1
2
sum s.d.o.f
for fixed channel gains. In this section, we focus on the case when K = 3, which
highlights the main ideas of the general K-user scheme for fixed channel gains. We
present a corresponding vector space alignment scheme for fading channel gains in























































Figure 3.5: Alignment for the interference channel with K = 3.
Appendix 3.8.5. We present the general K-user schemes for both fixed and fading
channel gains in Appendix 3.8.6. As in the achievability for the wiretap channel
with helpers, we use real interference alignment techniques for fixed channel gains.
However, unlike the case of wiretap channel with helpers, we need to use asymptotic
alignment in each case.
We use the technique of asymptotic real interference alignment introduced in
[9]. Fig. 3.5 shows the desired signal alignment at the receivers and the eavesdropper.
In the figure, the boxes labeled by V denote the message symbols, while the hatched
boxes labeled with U denote artificial noise symbols. We observe from Fig. 3.5 that
4 out of 6 signal dimensions are buried in the artificial noise. Thus, heuristically,













In the K-user case, we have a similar alignment scheme. Each transmitter
sends two artificial noise blocks along with (K − 1) message blocks. At each legit-
imate receiver, the 2K noise blocks from the K transmitters align such that they
occupy only (K + 1) block dimensions. This is done by aligning Ũk with Uk+1 for
k = 1, . . . , (K − 1), at each legitimate receiver. The unintended messages at each
legitimate receiver are aligned underneath the (K + 1) artificial noise dimensions.
To do so, we use two main ideas. First, two blocks from the same transmitter cannot
be aligned at any receiver. This is because if two blocks from the same transmitter
align at any receiver, they align at every other receiver as well, which is clearly not
desirable. Secondly, each message block aligns with the same artificial noise block
at every unintended receiver. Thus, in Fig. 3.5, V21 and V24 appear in different
columns at each receiver. Further, V21 appears underneath U1 at both of the unin-
tended legitimate receivers 1 and 2. It can be verified that these properties hold for
every message block. As an interesting by-product, this alignment scheme provides
confidentiality of the unintended messages at the legitimate transmitters for free.
The (K − 1) intended message blocks at a legitimate receiver occupy distinct block
dimensions; thus, achieving a d.o.f. of K−1
2K
for each transmitter-receiver pair. At the
eavesdropper, no alignment is possible since its CSIT is unavailable. Thus, the 2K
artificial noise blocks occupy the full space of 2K block dimensions. This ensures
security of the messages at the eavesdropper.
Note that we require two artificial noise blocks to be transmitted from each
transmitter. When the eavesdropper CSIT is available, the optimal achievable
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scheme, presented in [6], requires one artificial noise block from each transmitter;
the K noise blocks from the K transmitters are aligned with the messages at the
eavesdropper in order to ensure security. In our case, however, the eavesdropper’s
CSIT is not available. Thus, in order to guarantee security, we need a total of 2K
noise blocks to occupy the full space of 2K block dimensions at the eavesdropper.
This is achieved by sending two artificial noise blocks from each transmitter. Fur-
ther, to achieve an s.d.o.f. of K−1
2K
per user pair, we need to create (K− 1) noise-free
message block dimensions at each legitimate receiver. We ensure this by systemat-
ically aligning the 2K noise symbols to occupy only (K + 1) block dimensions at
each legitimate receiver. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first achievable
scheme in the literature that uses two artificial noise blocks from each transmit-
ter and then aligns them to maximize the noise-free message dimensions at each
legitimate receiver.
Let us now present the 3-user scheme in more detail. Let m be a large integer.
Also, let c1, c2, c3 and c4 be real constants drawn from a fixed continuous distribution
with bounded support independently of each other and of all the channel gains. This
ensures that the cis are rationally independent of each other and of the channel gains.
Now, we define four sets Ti, i = 1, . . . , 4, as follows:
T1
∆
















































= {hr3131 hr3232 hr3333 hr2121 hr1212 hr1313 hr2323 cs4 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . ,m}} (3.125)
Let Mi be the cardinality of the set Ti. Note that all the Mis are the same, which




We subdivide each message Wi into 2 independent sub-messages Vij, j = 1, . . . , 4, j 6=
i, i + 1. For each transmitter i, let pij be the vector containing all the elements of
Tj, for j 6= i, i+1. For any given (i, j) with j 6= i, i+1, pij represents the dimension
along which message Vij is sent. Further, at each transmitter i, let qi and q̃i be







, if i = 1, 2
1, if i = 3
(3.127)
The vectors qi and q̃i represent dimensions along which artificial noise symbols Ui
and Ũi, respectively, are sent. We define a 4M dimensional vector bi by stacking
the pijs, qi and q̃i as
bTi =
[




i(i+2) . . .pi4 qi q̃i
]
(3.128)
The transmitter encodes Vij using an M dimensional vector vij, and the cooperative
jamming signals Ui and Ũi using M dimensional vectors ui and ũi, respectively. Each
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element of vij, ui and ũi are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from C(a,Q) in (3.21). Let
aTi =
[




i(i+2) . . .vi4 ui ũi
]
(3.129)




Let us now analyze the structure of the received signals at the receivers. For
example, consider receiver 1. The desired signals at receiver 1, v13 and v14 arrive
along dimensions h11T3 and h11T4, respectively. Since only Ti (and not Tj, j 6= i)
contains ci, these dimensions are rationally independent. Thus, they appear along
different columns in Fig. 3.5. The artificial noise symbols u1, u2, u3 and ũ3 arrive
along dimensions h11T1, h21T2, h31T3 and h31T4, respectively. Again they are all
rationally separate and thus, appear along different columns in Fig. 3.5. Further,
they are all separate from the dimensions of the desired signals, because T3 and T4
do not contain h11, while T1 and T2 do not contain either c3 or c4. On the other
hand, the unintended signals v21 and v31 arrive along h21T1 and h31T1, and since T1
contains powers of h21 and h31, they align with the artificial noise u1 in T̃1, where,
T̃1
∆

















































= {hr3131 hr3232 hr3333 hr2121 hr1212 hr1313 hr2323 cs4 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . ,m+ 1}} (3.134)
We note that the unintended signals v32 and v24 arrive along h31T2 and h21T4 and
thus, align with u2 and ũ3, respectively, in T̃2 and T̃4. Thus, they appear in the
same column in Fig.3.5. Finally, the artificial noise symbols ũ1 and ũ2 align with
u2 and u3, respectively.
At receiver 2, the desired signals v21 and v24 arrive along rationally indepen-
dent dimensions h22T1 and h22T4, respectively. The artificial noise symbols u1, u2,
u3 and ũ3 arrive along dimensions h12T1, h22T2, h32T3 and h32T4, respectively. Thus,
they lie in dimensions T̃1, T̃2, T̃3 and T̃4, respectively. They are all separate from the
dimensions of the desired signals, because T̃1 and T̃4 do not contain h22, while T̃2






T2 and T3, respectively; thus, they align with u2 and u3 in
T̃2 and T̃3, respectively. The unintended signals v13 and v14 arrive along h12T3 and
h12T4, respectively, and lie in T̃3 and T̃4, respectively. Similarly, v31 and v32 lie in
T̃1 and T̃2, respectively. A similar analysis is true for receiver 3 as well.
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At the eavesdropper, there is no alignment, since the channel gains of the
eavesdropper are not known at the transmitters. In fact, the artificial noise symbols
all arrive along different dimensions at the receiver. Thus, heuristically, they exhaust
the decoding capability of the eavesdropper almost completely.
We note that the interference at each receiver is confined to the dimensions T̃1,
T̃2, T̃3 and T̃4. Further, these dimensions are separate from the dimensions occupied
by the desired signals at each receiver. Specifically, at receiver i, the desired signals
occupy dimensions hiiTj, j 6= i, i + 1. These dimensions are separate from T̃i and
T̃i+1, since only Tj contains powers of cj. Further, T̃j, j 6= i, i + 1 do not contain












8 + 4(m+ 1)8 (3.136)
Intuitively, out of these MS dimensions, 2m
8 dimensions carry the desired signals.





as m → ∞. Thus, the sum s.d.o.f. is 1. We omit the formal calculation of the
achievable rate here and instead present it in Appendix 3.8.7 for the general K-user
case. Further, note that the unintended messages at each receiver are buried in
artificial noise, see Fig. 3.5. Thus, our scheme provides confidentiality of messages
77
from unintended legitimate receivers as well.
3.5.2 Converse for the Interference Channel
The steps of the converse are similar to that of the proof in Section 3.4.2. The
notation here is also the same as in Section 3.4.2. Again, we divide the proof into
three steps.
3.5.2.1 Deterministic Channel Model









for k = 1, . . . , K, with the constraint that
Xi(t) ∈
{





We can show that there is no loss of s.d.o.f. in considering the channel in (3.137)-
(3.138) instead of the one in (3.8)-(3.9), as in Section 3.4.2.1. Thus, we will consider
this deterministic channel in the remaining part of the converse. Since all receivers
know Ω, it appears in the conditioning in every entropy and mutual information
term below. We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational simplicity.
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3.5.2.2 An Upper Bound on the Sum Rate
We begin as in the secrecy penalty lemma in [4], i.e., [4, Lemma 1]. Note that,




Ri ≤I(WK ; YK1 )− I(WK ; Z) + nε (3.140)
≤I(WK ; YK1 |Z) + nε (3.141)
≤I(XK1 ; YK1 |Z) + nε (3.142)
≤H(YK1 |Z) + nε (3.143)
=H(YK1 ,Z)−H(Z) + nε (3.144)
≤H(XK1 ,YK1 ,Z)−H(Z) + nε (3.145)




H(Xk)−H(Z) + nε (3.147)
where (3.146) follows since H(YK1 ,Z|XK1 ) = 0 for the channel in (3.137)-(3.138).
Also, to ensure decodability at the legitimate receiver, we use the role of a
helper lemma in [4], i.e., [4, Lemma 2],
nRi ≤I(Wi; Yi) + nε′ (3.148)
≤I(Xi; Yi) + nε′ (3.149)
=H(Yi)−H(Yi|Xi) + nε′ (3.150)
=H(Yi)−H(bhjXjc) + nε′ (3.151)
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=H(Yi)−H(bhjXjc ,Xj) +H(Xj| bhjXjc) + nε′ (3.152)




H(Xj(t)| bhj(t)Xj(t)c) + nε′ (3.154)
≤H(Yi)−H(Xj) + nε′ + nc (3.155)
for every i 6= j, where (3.155) follows using Lemma 2.











′ + c) (3.156)







H(Yk)−H(Z) + nK(ε′ + c) + nε (3.157)
≤(K − 1)n
2
logP + (H(YK)−H(Z)) + nε′′ (3.158)











(H(YK)−H(Z)) + ε′′ (3.159)
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Now dividing by 1
2


















3.5.2.3 Bounding the Difference of Entropies
As we did in Section 3.4.2.3, we enhance the system by relaxing the condition that
channel inputs from different transmitters are mutually independent, and think of
the K single antenna terminals as a single transmitter with K antennas. Thus,
we wish to maximize H(YK) − H(Z), where YK and Z are two single antenna
receiver outputs, under the constraint that the channel gains to Z are unknown at
the transmitter. Using Lemma 3, the difference of entropies, H(YK)−H(Z) cannot
be larger than no(logP ), if the channel gains to the second receiver is unknown.
Thus,
H(YK)−H(Z) ≤ no(logP ) (3.161)
























Figure 3.6: Alignment of signals when K = 3 and m = 2.
3.6 Proof of Theorem 6
As in the previous section, we focus on the fixed channel gains case and defer the
achievable scheme for the fading channel gains to Appendix 3.8.9. Our scheme
achieves a sum s.d.o.f. of m(K−1)
m(K−1)+1 , when m of the K transmitters have eaves-
dropper’s CSI for almost all fixed channel gains. In particular, it achieves the
s.d.o.f. tuple (d1, . . . , dm, dm+1, . . . , dK) =
(
K−1
m(K−1)+1 , . . . ,
K−1
m(K−1)+1 , 0, . . . , 0
)
. We
employ m(K − 1) +K mutually independent random variables:
Vij, i = 1, . . . ,m, j = 1, . . . , K, j 6= i
Uj, j = 1, . . . , K
uniformly drawn from the same PAM constellation C(a,Q) in (3.21). Transmitter









Ui, i = 1, . . . ,m (3.163)
82




Ui, i = m+ 1, . . . , K (3.164)
























Intuitively, every Vij gets superimposed with Uj at the eavesdropper, thus securing
it. This is shown in Fig. 3.6. The proof of decodability and security guarantee
follows exactly the proof in [4, Section IX-B ] and is omitted here.
3.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we established the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for three channel models:
the wiretap channel with M helpers, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel,
and the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, in the absence
of eavesdropper’s CSIT. While there is no loss in the s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel
with helpers in the absence of the eavesdropper’s CSIT, the s.d.o.f. decreases in
the cases of the multiple access wiretap channel and the interference channel with
an external eavesdropper. We show that in the absence of eavesdropper’s CSIT,
the K-user multiple access wiretap channel is equivalent to a wiretap channel with
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(K − 1) helpers from a sum s.d.o.f. perspective. The question of optimality of the
sum s.d.o.f. when some but not all of the transmitters have the eavesdropper’s CSIT
remains a subject of future work.
3.8 Appendix
3.8.1 Achievable Scheme for the Fading Wiretap Channel with Helpers
We present an achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with helpers for the case of
fading channel gains, i.e., when the channel gains vary in an i.i.d. fashion from one
time slot to another. In this scheme, the legitimate transmitter sendsM independent
Gaussian symbols, V = {V2, . . . , VM+1} securely to the legitimate receiver in (M+1)
time slots. This is done as follows:
At time t = 1, . . . ,M + 1, the legitimate transmitter sends a scaled artificial








where the αk(t)s are chosen such that the (M + 1)× (M + 1) matrix T , with entries
Tij = αi(j)h1(j), where α1(j) =
1
h1(j)



























Note the similarity of the scheme with that of the real interference scheme
for fixed channel gains, i.e., the similarity between (3.169)-(3.170) and (3.24)-(3.25).
Indeed the alignment structure after (M + 1) channel uses is exactly as in Fig. 3.4.
Note also how the artificial noise symbols align at the legitimate receiver over
(M + 1) time slots. At high SNR, at the end of the (M + 1) slots, the legiti-
mate receiver recovers (M + 1) linearly independent equations with (M + 1) vari-
ables: V2, . . . , VM+1,
∑M+1
j=1 Uj. Thus, the legitimate receiver can recover V
∆
=
(V2, . . . , VM+1) within noise variance.
Formally, let us define U
∆
= (U1, . . . , UM+1), Y
∆
= (Y (1), . . . , Y (M + 1)), and
Z
∆
= (Z(1), . . . , Z(M + 1)). The observations at the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper can then be compactly written as














where AV is a (M + 1)×M matrix with (AV )ij = h1(i)αj+1(i), AU is a (M + 1)×
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(M+1) matrix with all ones, BV is a (M+1)×M matrix with (BV )ij = g1(i)αj+1(i),
and BU is a (M + 1)× (M + 1) matrix with (BU)ij =
gj(i)
hj(i)
. N1 and N2 are (M + 1)
dimensional vectors containing the noise variables N1(t) and N2(t), respectively, for
t = 1, . . . ,M + 1. To calculate differential entropies, we use the following lemma.
Lemma 4 Let A be an M ×N dimensional matrix and let X = (X1, . . . , XN)T be
a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance P I. Also, let N =
(N1, . . . , NM)
T be a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and variance
σ2I, independent of X. If r = rank(A), then,






+ o(logP ) (3.173)
We present the proof of Lemma 4 in Appendix 3.8.2.
Using Lemma 4, we compute




















+ o(logP ) (3.177)
where (3.175) follows since U and N1 are independent of V and since (AV ,AU) has
rank (M + 1) due to the choice of αi(t)s, and (3.176) follows since AU clearly has
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rank 1. We also have,








logP − (M + 1)1
2
logP + o(logP ) (3.180)
=o(logP ) (3.181)
where we have used the fact that both (BV ,BU) and BU have rank (M + 1), almost
surely, since the αi(t)s do not depend on the gi(t)s and since both the gi(t)s and
hi(t)s come from a continuous distribution. Note that, in both calculations above,
we have implicitly used the fact that Ω is known to both the legitimate receiver and
the eavesdropper, and that it appears in the conditioning of each mutual informa-
tion and differential entropy term. Equation (3.181) means that the leakage to the
eavesdropper does not scale with logP .
Now, consider the vector wiretap channel from V to Y and Z, by treating the
M + 1 slots in the scheme above as one channel use. Similar to (3.26), the following
secrecy rate is achievable







+ o(logP ) (3.183)
Since each channel use of this vector channel uses (M + 1) actual channel uses, the
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+ o(logP ) (3.184)
Thus, the achievable s.d.o.f. of this scheme is M
M+1
. The results in (3.52) and (3.184)
complete the achievability of Theorem 3, for fixed and fading channel gains, respec-
tively.
3.8.2 Proof of Lemma 4
Since AX + N is a jointly Gaussian random vector with zero-mean and covariance
PAAT + σ2I, we have [68],





























+ o(logP ) (3.188)
where we note that AAT is positive semi-definite, with an eigenvalue decomposition
WΣWT , where Σ is a diagonal matrix with r non-zero entries λ1, . . . , λr.
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3.8.3 Proof of Lemma 2
First, note that
H(X| bhXc , h) = Eh
[
H(X| bhXc , h = h̃)
]
(3.189)
Now, for a fixed h, let us define Sh(ν) as the set of all realizations of X such that













X| bhXc , h = h̃
)
≤ log |Sh̃(bh̃Xc)| (3.190)
For any ν, we can upper-bound |Sh̃(ν)| as follows: Let, i1 and i2 be the minimum
and maximum elements of Sh̃(ν). Then, bi1h̃c = bi2h̃c implies that (i2 − i1)|h̃| < 1,
which means (i2 − i1) < 1|h̃| . Hence,





Thus, using (3.189) and (3.190), we have,









where c is a constant independent of P .
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3.8.4 Proof of Lemma 3
Recall that we wish to prove that for the deterministic channel model stated in
(3.53)-(3.55), with the channel gains to Z unknown at the transmitter, we have
H(Y|Ω)−H(Z|Ω) ≤ no(logP ) (3.194)







where X |= Y is used to denote that X and Y are statistically independent and
(3.196) follows from (3.195) by relaxing the condition of independence in (3.195).
Since the Xis in (3.196) may be arbitrarily correlated, we can think of the K single
antenna terminals as a single transmitter with K antennas. Thus, we wish to
maximizeH(Y|Ω)−H(Z|Ω), where Y and Z are two single antenna receiver outputs,
under the constraint that the channel gains to Z are unknown at the transmitter.
This brings us to the K-user MISO broadcast channel setting of [10]. The proof
then follows by following the steps of [10, eqns. (75)-(103)]; however, we present it
here for completeness. The proof has the following steps:
Functional Dependence: For a given channel realization ofH
∆
= {hni , i = 1,
. . . , K}, there may be multiple vectors (X1, . . . ,XK) that cast the same image at
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Y . Thus, the mapping from Y ,H to one of these vectors (X1, . . . ,XK) is random.
We denote this map as L, i.e.,
(X1, . . . ,XK) = L(Y ,H) (3.197)




H(Z|Ω,L = L) (3.199)
Let the minimizing mapping be L0. We choose this to be the deterministic mapping
(X1, . . . ,XK) = L0(Y ,H) (3.200)
Essentially, for a given Y andH , we choose the mapping that minimizes the entropy
at Z. Note that this mapping makes Z a deterministic function of (Y ,Ω), which
we denote by Z(Y ,Ω), and that while H(Y |Ω) is not affected, this choice of Z
minimizes H(Z|Ω), i.e.,
H(Y |Ω)−H(Z|Ω) ≤ H(Y |Ω)−H(Z(Y ,Ω)|Ω) (3.201)
Further, note that this selection can be done irrespective of any security or decod-
ability constraints.
Aligned Image Sets: For a given channel realization Ω, define the aligned
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image set A(Ω) as the set of all Y that have the same image in Z:
Aν(Ω) = {y : Z(y,Ω) = Z(ν,Ω)} (3.202)
Bounding Difference of Entropies via Size of Aligned Sets: We have
H(Y |Ω) =H(Y ,Z(Y ,Ω)|Ω) (3.203)
=H(Z(Y ,Ω)|Ω) +H(Y |Z(Y ,Ω),Ω) (3.204)
=H(Z(Y ,Ω)|Ω) +H(AY (Ω)|Ω) (3.205)
≤H(Z(Y ,Ω)|Ω) + E[log |AY (Ω)|] (3.206)
≤H(Z(Y ,Ω)|Ω) + logE[|AY (Ω)|] (3.207)
Therefore, we have,
H(Y |Ω)−H(Z(Y ,Ω)|Ω) ≤ E[|AY (Ω)|] (3.208)
Bounding the Probability of Alignment: Given the channel H and two
realizations y and y′ of Y , such that Xj(y,H) = xj, and X ′j(y
′,H) = x′j, we
bound the probability of image alignment at Z. Note that for alignment, we must








⇒ gi∗(t)(t)(x′i∗(t)− xi∗(t)) ∈
K∑
i=1,i 6=i∗(t)
bgi(t)xi(t)c − bgi(t)x′i(t)c+ ∆ (3.210)
where ∆ ∈ (−1, 1), and
i∗(t) = arg max
i
|(x′i(t)− xi(t)| (3.211)
Therefore, for any t such that x′i∗(t) 6= xi∗(t), gi∗(t)(t) must lie within an
interval of length 2|x′
i∗ (t)−xi∗ (t)|
. If fmax is the maximum of 1 and an upper bound on
the probability density function of gi(t) (note that the probability density is assumed
to be bounded), we have,















bhi(t)(xi(t)− x′(t))c+ (−K,K) (3.214)
Therefore, we have









|y′(t)− y(t)| −K (3.216)
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whenever |y′(t)− y(t)| > K. Thus, we have
















































i=1 |hi(t)|+K. Therefore, taking logarithms, we have
logE[|Ay(Ω)|] ≤ no(logP ) (3.222)
Now, combining (3.201), (3.208) and (3.222), we have the desired result, i.e.,
H(Y|Ω)−H(Z|Ω) ≤ no(logP ) (3.223)
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which completes the proof of Lemma 3.
3.8.5 Achievability for K = 3 with Fading Channel Gains
Our scheme uses asymptotic vector space alignment introduced in [8]. Let Γ =
(K − 1)2 = (3 − 1)2 = 4. We use Mn = 2nΓ + 4(n + 1)Γ channel uses to transmit
6nΓ message symbols securely to the legitimate receivers in the presence of the
eavesdropper. Thus, we achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 6n
Γ
2nΓ+4(n+1)Γ
, which approaches 1 as
n→∞.
First, at transmitter i, we divide its message Wi into 2 sub-messages Vij, j =
1, . . . , 4, j 6= i, i+1. Each Vij is encoded into nΓ independent streams vij(1), . . . , vij(nΓ),




vij(1), . . . , vij(n
Γ)
)T
. We also require artificial noise sym-






ui(1), . . . , ui((n+ 1)
Γ)
)T





ũi(1), . . . , ũi(n
Γ)
)T









In each channel use t ≤ Mn, we choose precoding column vectors pij(t), qi(t) and
q̃i(t) with the same number of elements as vij, ui and ũi, respectively. In channel
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where we have dropped the limits on j in the summation for notational simplicity.































Now, letting Xi = (Xi(1), . . . , Xi(Mn))
T , the channel input for transmitter i over




Pijvij + Qiui + Q̃iũi (3.229)
Recall that, channel use t, the channel output at receiver l and the eavesdrop-









where we have dropped the Gaussian noise at high SNR.
Let Hkl
∆
= diag (hkl(1), . . . , hkl(Mn)). Similarly, define Gk = diag (gk(1), . . . ,
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gk(Mn)). The channel outputs at receiver l and the eavesdropper over allMn channel
uses, Yl = (Yl(1), . . . , Yl(Mn))
T and Z = (Z(1), . . . , Z(Mn))

























































Now, receiver l wants to decode vlj, j = 1, . . . , 4, j 6= l, l + 1. Thus, the
remaining terms in (3.234) constitute interference at the lth receiver. Let CS(X)
denote the column space of matrix X. Then, Il denoting the space spanned by this
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Note that there are 2nΓ symbols to be decoded by each legitimate receiver in 2nΓ +
4(n+1)Γ channel uses. Thus, for decodability, the interference can occupy a subspace
of rank at most 4(n+ 1)Γ, that is,
rank(Il) ≤ 4(n+ 1)Γ (3.238)
To that end, we align the noise and message subspaces at each legitimate receiver
appropriately. Note that no such alignment is possible at the external eavesdropper
since the transmitters do not have its CSI. In addition, note that we have a total
of 2nΓ + 4(n + 1)Γ artificial noise symbols which will span the full received signal
space at the eavesdropper and secure all the messages.
Fig. 3.5 shows the alignment we desire. We remark that the same figure
represents the alignment of signals both for real interference alignment and the
vector space alignment schemes. Now, let us enumerate the conditions for the
desired signal alignment at each receiver. From Fig. 3.5, it is clear that there are 6
alignment equations at each legitimate receiver, corresponding to four unintended
messages and two artificial noise symbols Ũ1 and Ũ2. Table 3.2 shows the alignment
equations for each legitimate receiver.
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Q1 Q2 Q3 Q̃3
Receiver 1
H21P21  H11Q1 H11Q̃1  H21Q2 H21Q̃2  H31Q3 H21P24  H31Q̃3
H31P31  H11Q1 H31P32  H21Q2
Receiver 2
H12Q̃1  H22Q2 H22Q̃2  H32Q3
H32P31  H12Q1 H32P32  H22Q2 H12P13  H32Q3 H12P14  H32Q̃3
Receiver 3
H23P21  H13Q1 H13Q̃1  H23Q2 H23Q̃2  H33Q3 H23P24  H33Q̃3
H13P13  H33Q3 H13P14  H33Q̃3
Table 3.2: Summary of alignment equations.



















Note that (3.243) and (3.244) imply that the artificial noises ũ1 and ũ2 align exactly
with unintended message symbols v32 and v13 at receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
With these selections, it suffices to find matrices P̃i, i = 1, . . . , 4, Qi, i = 1, 2, 3, and
Q̃3. The alignment equations may now be written as
TijP̃i Qi, i = 1, 2, 3, j = 1, . . . , 4 (3.245)
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T1j T2j T3j T4j




































Table 3.3: Values of Tij.
T4jP̃4 Q̃3, j = 1, . . . , 4 (3.246)
where the Tijs are tabulated in Table 3.3, and the notation A  B is used to denote
that CS(A) ⊆ CS(B) for matrices A and B where CS(X) refers to the column
space of the matrix X.
































w4 : αj ∈ {1, . . . , n+ 1}
}
(3.249)
where each wi is the Mn×1 column vector containing elements drawn independently
from a continuous distribution with bounded support. Note that an element in Pi
is the product of powers of some channel coefficients and an extra random variable,
just like an element in the sets Ti defined for the real interference scheme. Further,
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the set of channel coefficients appearing in Pi is the same as those contained in
set Ti. Thus, there is a loose correspondence between the real and vector space
alignment techniques.
Now, consider the decodability of the desired signals at the receivers. For
example, consider receiver 1. Due to the alignment conditions in Table 3.2, the
interference subspace at receiver 1 is given by
I1 =
[
H11Q1 H21Q2 H31Q3 H31Q̃3
]
(3.250)






For decodability, it suffices to show that
Λ1 = [D1 I1] (3.252)
is full rank. To do so, we use [69, Lemmas 1, 2]. Consider any row m of the matrix
Λ1. Note that the mth row of Hi1Qi contains the term wmi with exponent 1, but
no wmj for i 6= j, where wmi denotes the element in the mth row of wi. In fact, for
i = 1, . . . , 4, the term wmi occurs nowhere else in the matrix Λl except in Hi1Qi
(H31Q̃3, when i = 4) and H11P̃i. This shows that D1 and I1 have full column ranks




has full column rank because
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rank for the same reason. Thus, Λ1, which is a Mn×Mn matrix, is full column rank,
and hence full rank. This ensures decodability of the desired signals at receiver 1.
a similar analysis holds for the other receivers as well.
The security of the message signals at the eavesdropper is ensured by the fact
that the artificial noises Qi and Q̃i, i = 1, 2, 3, do not align at the eavesdropper,




G1Q1 G2Q2 G3Q3 G1Q̃1 G2Q̃2 G3Q̃3
]
(3.253)
is full rank. Thus, if Vi = {vij, j 6= i, i+ 1} denotes the collection of all messages





















logP + o(logP ) (3.256)
=o(logP ) (3.257)
In the above calculation, we have dropped the conditioning on Ω for notational
simplicity. Now, by treating all Mn channel uses as 1 vector channel use, and
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using [43, Theorem 2], an achievable rate for the vector channel is
RMni =I(Vi; Yi)− I(Vi; Z|V−i) (3.258)
=2nΓ logP − o(logP ) (3.259)
where (3.259) follows since the 2nΓ symbols are decodable within noise variance,









3.8.6 Achievability for the K-user Interference Channel with an Ex-
ternal Eavesdropper
Here, we present the general achievable schemes for the K-user interference channel
with an external eavesdropper.
3.8.7 Fixed Channel Gains
Let m be a large constant. We pick (K + 1) points c1, . . . , cK+1 in an i.i.d. fashion
from a continuous distribution with bounded support. Then, c1, . . . , cK+1 are ratio-
nally independent almost surely. Let us define sets Ti, for i = 1, . . . , K + 1, which



































































































csK+1 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . ,m}
}
(3.263)





First, we divide each message into many sub-messages; specifically, the message of
the ith transmitter, Wi, is divided into (K−1) sub-messages Vij, j = 1, . . . , K+1, j 6=
i, i + 1. For each transmitter i, let pij be the vector containing all the elements of
Tj, for j 6= i, i+1. For any given (i, j) with j 6= i, i+1, pij represents the dimension
along which message Vij is sent. Further, at each transmitter i, let qi and q̃i be







, if 1 ≤ i ≤ K − 2
h12
hi2
, if i = K − 1
1, if i = K
(3.265)
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The vectors qi and q̃i represent dimensions along which artificial noise symbols Ui
and Ũi, respectively, are sent. We define a (K + 1)M dimensional vector bi by
stacking the pijs, qi and q̃i as
bTi =
[




i(i+2) . . .pi(K+1) qi q̃i
]
(3.266)
The transmitter encodes Vij using an M dimensional vector vij, and the cooperative
jamming signals Ui and Ũi using M dimensional vectors ui and ũi, respectively. Each
element of vij, ui and ũi are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from C(a,Q) in (3.21). Let
aTi =
[




i(i+2) . . .vi(K+1) ui ũi
]
(3.267)




Let us now analyze the structure of the received signals at the legitimate
receivers. The alignment of the interfering signal spaces at receiver i is shown in
Fig. 3.7. The ith row depicts the signals originating from transmitter i. The signals
in the same column align together at the receiver. For simplicity of exposition, let
us consider receiver 1.
At the first receiver, the desired signals v13, . . ., v1(K+1) come along dimen-
sions h11T3, . . ., h11TK+1, respectively. These dimensions are separate almost surely,
since Ti contains powers of ci while Tj, j 6= i does not. Thus, they correspond to
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T1 T2 T3 T4 Tj−1 Tj Tj+1 Tj+2
U1 Ũ1 V13 V14




V1KV1(j−1) V1j V1(j+1) V1(j+2) V1i V1(i+1)
V2KV2(j−1) V2j V2(j+1) V2(j+2) V2i V2(i+1)
Tx j Vj1 Vj2 Vj3 Vj4 Vj(j−1) Uj Ũj Vj(j+2) Vji Vj(i+1) VjK
Tx i Ui Ũi
Tx K VK1 VK2 VK3 VK4 VK(j−1) VK(j+2) VKi VK(i+1) ŨKVKj VK(j+1)
Figure 3.7: Alignment of interference signals at receiver i.
separate boxes in the Fig. 3.5 for K = 3. For the same reason, cooperative jam-
ming signals u1, . . ., uK , ũK , which arrive along the dimensions h11T1, . . ., hK1TK ,
hK1TK+1 occupy different dimensions almost surely. Further, the message signals
v13, . . . ,v1(K+1), and the cooperative jamming signals u1, . . . ,uK , ũK do not over-
lap, since none of T3 . . . , TK+1 contain h11. Thus, they appear as separate boxes in
Fig. 3.5.
Now, let us consider the signals that are not desired at receiver 1. A signal









































































































csK+1 : rjk, s ∈ {1, . . . ,m+ 1}
}
(3.272)
we notice that the dimensions in hk1Tl, k 6= 1 are subsets of T̃l, as is hl1Tl for every
l = 1, . . . , K. Thus, each vkl aligns with ul in T̃l, for l = 1, . . . , K, as is shown in
Fig. 3.7. Further, a signal vk(K+1), k 6= 1, K, arrives along the dimensions hk1TK+1,
k 6= 1 which is a subset of T̃K+1, as is hK1TK+1, along which ũK arrives. Thus, each
vk(K+1), k 6= 1, K aligns with ũK , see Fig. 3.7. Finally, the cooperative jamming






TK , respectively, which are all in T̃2 . . ., T̃K−1 and T̃K ,
respectively. Thus, the signal ũi, i = 1, . . . , K − 1 align with ui+1 in T̃i+1, which is
seen in Fig. 3.5 for K = 3, and in Fig. 3.7 for general K.
We further note that the sets h11T3, . . ., h11TK+1, T̃1, . . ., T̃K+1 are all separable
since only Ti and T̃i (and not Tj or T̃j) contain powers of ci, and none of T̃3, . . .,
T̃K+1 contains h11. A similar observation holds for the received signal at any of the












has cardinality given by
Ms = (K − 1)mK(K−1)+2 + (K + 1)(m+ 1)K(K−1)+2 (3.274)
At the external eavesdropper, there is no alignment and the cooperative jam-
ming signals occupy the full space, thereby exhausting the decoding capability of
the eavesdropper. This secures all the messages at the external eavesdropper.
We next provide an analysis for the achievable sum rate. Since we have only
one eavesdropper, we use [43, Theorem 2] and observe that the rate
Ri = I(Vi;Yi)− I(Vi;Z|V−i) (3.275)
is achievable, where Vi ia an auxiliary random variable satisfying Vi → Xi → Y, Z,
and V−i denotes the collection {Vj, j 6= i}. Note that since Ω is known at all the
legitimate receivers and the eavesdropper, and since Vis are chosen to be indepen-
dent of Ω, Ω should appear in the conditioning of each of the mutual information
quantities in (3.275). We keep this in mind, but drop it for the sake of notational
simplicity.





vi1 . . .vi(i−1) vi(i+2) . . .vi(K+1)
)
(3.276)
Then, for any δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which is independent of P ,
such that if we choose Q = P
1−δ




, then for almost all channel gains
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the average power constraint is satisfied and the probability of error is bounded by





where ηγi is a positive constant which is independent of P and V̂i is the estimate for
Vi obtained by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on observation
Yi.
By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain Vi → Yi → V̂i, we know that,
I(Vi;Yi) ≥ I(Vi; V̂i) (3.278)
= H(Vi)−H(Vi|V̂i) (3.279)
= log(|Vi|)−H(Vi|V̂i) (3.280)
≥ log(|Vi|)− 1− Pr(Vi 6= V̂i) log(|Vi|) (3.281)
=
[
1− Pr(Vi 6= V̂i)
]
log(|Vi|)− 1 (3.282)
= log(|Vi|)− o(logP ) (3.283)
=







+ o(logP ) (3.284)
where o(·) is the little-o function, Vi is the alphabet of Vi and, in this case, the
cardinality of Vi is (2Q+ 1)(K−1)M = (2Q+ 1)(K−1)mK(K−1)+2 . Here, M is defined in
(3.264).
Now, we bound the second term in (3.275). Let
U
∆
= {ui, ũi, i = 1, . . . , K} (3.285)
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We have,
I(Vi;Z|V−i) =I(Vi, U ;Z|V−i)− I(U ;Z|V K1 ) (3.286)
=h(Z)− h(Z|U, V K1 )−H(U |V K1 ) +H(U |Z, V K1 ) (3.287)
≤1
2












logP − (1− δ)2KM
2(MS + δ)
logP + o(logP ) (3.291)
Now, combining (3.284) and (3.291), we have,
Ri ≥
2KmK(K−1)+2 − (K + 1)(m+ 1)K(K−1)+2 −Mδ(3K − 1)








By choosing δ small enough and choosing m large enough, we can make Ri arbitrarily
close to K−1
2K
. Thus, the sum s.d.o.f. of K−1
2
is achievable with fixed channel gains.
3.8.8 Fading Channel Gains
Here, we present a scheme that achieves K−1
2
s.d.o.f. using asymptotic vector space
alignment with channel extension. Let Γ = (K − 1)2. We use Mn = (K − 1)nΓ +
(K + 1)(n + 1)Γ channel uses to transmit K(K − 1)nΓ message symbols securely
to the legitimate receivers in the presence of the eavesdropper. Thus, we achieve a
sum s.d.o.f. of K(K−1)n
Γ





First, we divide each message into many sub-messages; specifically, the message
of the ith transmitter, Wi, is divided into (K − 1) sub-messages Vij, j = 1, . . . , K +
1, j 6= i, i + 1. Each Vij is encoded into nΓ independent streams vij(1), . . . , vij(nΓ),




vij(1), . . . , vij(n
Γ)
)T
. We also require artificial noise
symbols Ui and Ũi at each transmitter i. Again, we encode the artificial noise





ui(1), . . . , ui((n+ 1)
Γ)
)T





ũi(1), . . . , ũi(n
Γ)
)T









In each channel use t ≤ Mn, we choose precoding column vectors pij(t), qi(t) and
q̃i(t) with the same number of elements as vij, ui and ũi, respectively. In channel








where we have dropped the limits on j in the summation for notational simplicity.
































Now, letting Xi = (Xi(1), . . . , Xi(Mn))
T , the channel input for all transmitter i over




Pijvij + Qiui + Q̃iũi (3.298)
Recall that, channel use t, the channel output at receiver l and the eavesdrop-











= diag (hkl(1), . . . , hkl(Mn)). Similarly, define Gk = diag (gk(1), . . . , gk(Mn)).
The channel outputs at receiver l and the eavesdropper over all Mn channel uses,
Yl = (Yl(1), . . . ,
Yl(Mn))
T and Z = (Z(1), . . . , Z(Mn))

























































Note that receiver l wants to decode vlj, j = 1, . . . , K + 1, j 6= l, l + 1. Thus,
the remaining terms in (3.303) constitute interference at the lth receiver. Recall
that CS(X) denotes the column space of the matrix X. Then, Il denoting the space















Note that there are (K − 1)nΓ symbols to be decoded by each legitimate receiver in
(K − 1)nΓ + (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ channel uses. Thus, for decodability, the interference
can occupy a subspace of rank at most (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ, that is,
rank(Il) ≤ (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ (3.307)
To that end, we align the noise and message subspaces at each legitimate receiver
appropriately. Note that no such alignment is possible at the external eavesdropper
since the transmitters do not have its CSI. However, note that we have a total of
(K−1)nΓ +(K+1)(n+1)Γ artificial noise symbols which will span the full received
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signal space at the eavesdropper and secures all the messages.
Fig. 3.5 shows the alignment for K = 3 receivers. For the general K-user case,
Fig. 3.7 shows the alignment in the interfering signal dimensions. At receiver l, it
is as follows: First, the artificial noise symbols ũk is aligned with uk+1, for every
k = 1, . . . , K − 1. Thus, we have,
HklQ̃k  H(k+1)lQ(k+1), k = 1, . . . , K − 1 (3.308)
where A  B is used to denote that CS(A) ⊆ CS(B). Thus, the subspace spanned
by the artificial noise symbols can have a rank of at most (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ.
The unwanted message symbols vkj, k 6= l, are aligned with uj if j ≤ K, or
ũK otherwise. Thus,
HklPkj  HjlQj, j ≤ K (3.309)
HklPk(K+1)  HKlQ̃K (3.310)
for each k 6= l. Since, the unwanted messages at each receiver are aligned under the
artificial noise subspaces, they do not increase the rank of Il any further.
We can group the alignment equations for the artificial noise uk, k = 1, . . . , K,
and ũK for all K legitimate receivers. For u1, we have,
HklPk1  H1lQ1, k ∈ {2, . . . , K} , l ∈ {1, . . . , K} , l 6= k (3.311)
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Clearly, these are (K − 1)2 alignment equations. Similarly, we have (K − 1)2 align-
ment equations for ũK , given by
HklPk(K+1)  HKlQ̃K , k ∈ {1, . . . , K − 1} , l ∈ {1, . . . , K} , l 6= k (3.312)
For the artificial noises uk, k = 2, . . . , K, we have the following alignment equations:
H(k−1)lQ̃k−1  HklQk (3.313)
HilPik  HklQk, i 6= k − 1, k, l 6= i (3.314)
Thus, there are (K − 1)2 + 1 alignment equations for each uk, k = 2, . . . , K. Now
we make the following selections:
Pk1 =P̃1, k = 2, . . . , K (3.315)
Pk(K+1) =P̃K+1, k = 1, . . . , K − 1 (3.316)
Pik =P̃k, i 6= k − 1, k, k = 2, . . . , K (3.317)
H(k−1)1Q̃k−1 =H(k+1)1P̃k, k = 2, . . . , K − 1 (3.318)
H(K−1)2Q̃K−1 =H12P̃K (3.319)
Now, note that it suffices to choose the matrices P̃k, k = 1, . . . , K + 1 in order to
specify all the precoding matrices. Using these selections in our alignment equations
in (3.311), (3.312), (3.313) and (3.314), we have (K − 1)2 alignment equations for
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each uk, k = 1, . . . , K and ũK , given by,
TkP̃k Qk, Tk ∈ τk, k = 1, . . . , K (3.320)
TK+1P̃K+1 Q̃K , TK+1 ∈ τK+1 (3.321)
where the sets τk, k = 1, . . . , K + 1 are given by
τ1 =
{


























(k−1)1H(k+1)1, l ∈ {1, . . . , K}
}




(K−1)2H12, l ∈ {1, . . . , K}
}
, if k = K
(3.326)
































where each wk is the Mn × 1 column vector containing elements drawn indepen-
dently from a continuous distribution with bounded support. This completes the
description of our scheme.
Decodability: By our construction, the interference space at legitimate re-











rank(Il) ≤ (K + 1)(n+ 1)Γ (3.331)
We only need to show that desired signals vlj, j 6= l, l+1 fall outside Il. The desired
signal space at receiver l is given by
Dl =
[
HllP̃1 . . .HllP̃l−1 HllP̃l+2 . . . ,HllP̃K
]
(3.332)










H1lQ1 . . .HKlQK HKlQ̃K
]
(3.334)
is full rank almost surely. To do so, we will use [69, Lemmas 1, 2]. Note that the mth
row of HklQk contains the term wmk with exponent 1, but no wmk′ for k 6= k′, where
wmk denotes the element in the mth row of wk. In fact, the term wmk occurs nowhere
else in the matrix Λl except in HklQk and HllP̃k. This shows, using [69, Lemmas



















is full column rank. Further, if k 6= l, l+1,




is full column rank. Finally,
note that the lth transmitter does not transmit any message signals along P̃k, when
k = l, l+1. Thus, the matrix Λl is full rank almost surely. This ensures decodability
of the desired signals at each receiver.
Security guarantee: Let v = {vij, i, j ∈ {1, . . . , K} , j 6= i, i+ 1}, that is,
v is the collection of all legitimate messages to be secured from the eavesdropper.
Also, let u = {uk, ũk, k = 1, . . . , K}, that is u is the collection of all the artificial
noise symbols. We note that
I(v; Z) =h(Z)− h(Z|v) (3.335)
≤Mn
2







logP + o(logP ) (3.337)
=o(logP ) (3.338)
where A is a Mn ×Mn full rank matrix, and we have used Lemma 4 in (3.337).
Also, we have implicitly used the fact that Ω appears in the conditioning of each
mutual information and differential entropy term in the above calculation. Now, as
before, by treating the vector channel with Mn slots as one channel use, and using




logP + o(logP ) (3.339)






3.8.9 Achievable Scheme for the Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
with Partial CSIT and Fading Channel Gains
We construct a scheme that achieves the desired sum s.d.o.f. of m(K−1)
m(K−1)+1 with fad-
ing channel gains. Without loss of generality, assume that the first m transmit-
ters have eavesdropper CSI, while the remaining transmitters have no eavesdropper
CSI. We provide a scheme to achieve the rate tuple (d1, . . . , dm, dm+1, . . . , dK) =
(
K−1
m(K−1)+1 , . . . ,
K−1
m(K−1)+1 , 0, . . . , 0
)
, thus, achieving the sum s.d.o.f. of m(K−1)
m(K−1)+1 . For
each i = 1, . . . ,m, transmitter i sends Vi = {Vij, , j 6= i, j = 1, . . . , K} symbols in
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m(K − 1) + 1 time slots. Let V = {Vi, i = 1, . . . , K}. Fig. 3.6 illustrates the align-
ment of the signals at the end of the scheme when K = 3 and m = 2. The scheme
is as follows:












Ui, 1 ≤ i ≤ m
1
hi(t)
Ui, m+ 1 ≤ i ≤ K
(3.340)
where Ui is an artificial noise symbol. This ensures that the noise symbols Ui all
align at the legitimate receiver. On the other hand, the artificial noise symbol from
the jth transmitter Uj protects all the messages Vij for every i, at the eavesdropper.
























After the m(K−1)+1 time slots, the legitimate receiver ends up with m(K−
1) + 1 linearly independent equations with m(K− 1) + 1 variables: ∑Ki=1 Ui and the
m(K − 1) variables {Vij}. Thus, it can decode all the m(K − 1) message symbols
Vij. Defining Y = {Y (t), t = 1, . . . ,m(K − 1) + 1} and Z similarly as Y, this
means that I(V; Y) = m(K − 1)1
2
logP + o(logP ), and also I(V; Z) ≤ o(logP ),
concluding the achievability proof.
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Chapter 4: Secure Degrees of Freedom of the Multiple Access Wire-
tap Channel with Multiple Antennas
4.1 Introduction
We consider the two-user multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) multiple access
wiretap channel where each transmitter has N antennas, the legitimate receiver has
N antennas and the eavesdropper has K antennas; see Fig. 4.1. We consider the case
when the channel gains are fixed throughout the duration of the communication,
as well as the case when the channel is fast fading and the channel gains vary
in an i.i.d. fashion across time. Our goal in this chapter is to characterize how
the optimal sum secure degrees of freedom (s.d.o.f.) of the MIMO multiple access
wiretap channel varies with the number of antennas at the legitimate users and the
eavesdropper.
To that end, we partition the range of K into various regimes, and propose
achievable schemes for each regime. With fading channel gains, our schemes are
based on a combination of zero-forcing beamforming and vector space interference













N antennas N antennas





Figure 4.1: The MIMO multiple access wiretap channel.
we decompose the channel input at each transmitter into two parts: a Gaussian
signaling part carrying d (the integer part) d.o.f. of information securely, and a
structured signaling part carrying l
3
(the fractional part) d.o.f. of information se-
curely. The structure of the Gaussian signals carrying the integer s.d.o.f. resembles
that of the schemes for the fading channel gains. The structured signals carrying 2l
3
sum s.d.o.f. are designed using the real interference alignment technique [9].
We also establish the optimality of our achievable schemes with matching
converses in each regime. A simple upper bound, given by min((2N − K)+, N),
is obtained by allowing cooperation between the two transmitters, which enhances
the two-user multiple access wiretap channel to a MIMO wiretap channel with 2N
antennas at the transmitter, N antennas at the legitimate receiver and K antennas
at the eavesdropper [13,14]. This bound is optimal when the number of eavesdropper
antennas K is either quite small (K ≤ N
2
), or quite large (K ≥ 4N
3
). When K
is small, the sum s.d.o.f. is limited by the decoding capability of the legitimate
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receiver, and the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N which is optimal even without any secrecy
constraints. When K is large, the s.d.o.f. is limited by the requirement of secrecy
from a very strong eavesdropper. For intermediate values of K, the distributed
nature of the transmitters dominates, and we employ a generalization of the SISO
converse techniques of [4] for the converse proof in the MIMO case.
4.2 System Model
The two-user multiple access wiretap channel, see Fig. 4.1, is described by,
Y(t) =H1(t)X1(t) + H2(t)X2(t) + N1(t) (4.1)
Z(t) =G1(t)X1(t) + G2(t)X2(t) + N2(t) (4.2)
where Xi(t) is an N dimensional column vector denoting the ith user’s channel
input, Y(t) is an N dimensional vector denoting the legitimate receiver’s channel
output, and Z(t) is a K dimensional vector denoting the eavesdropper’s channel
output, at time t. In addition, N1(t) and N2(t) are N and K dimensional white
Gaussian noise vectors, respectively, with N1 ∼ N (0, IN) and N2 ∼ N (0, IK),
where IN denotes the N ×N identity matrix. Here, Hi(t) and Gi(t) are the N ×N
and K × N channel matrices from transmitter i to the legitimate receiver and the
eavesdropper, respectively, at time t. When the channel gains are fixed, the entries
of Hi(t) and Gi(t) are drawn from an arbitrary but fixed continuous distribution
with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion prior to the start of the communication,
and remain fixed throughout the duration of the communication, i.e., for 1 ≤ t ≤ n.
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When the channel gains are fading, the entries of Hi(t) and Gi(t) are drawn from
the fixed continuous distribution with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion at every
time slot t. We assume that the channel matrices Hi(t) and Gi(t) are known with
full precision at all terminals, at time t. All channel inputs satisfy the average
power constraint E[‖Xi(t)‖2] ≤ P, i = 1, 2, where ‖X‖ denotes the Euclidean (or
the spectral norm) of the vector (or matrix) X.
Transmitter i wishes to send a message Wi, uniformly distributed in Wi, se-
curely to the legitimate receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. A secure
rate pair (R1, R2), with Ri =
log |Wi|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of
codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely,




n) ≤ εn (4.3)
where εn → 0 as n → ∞. An s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) is said to be achievable if a rate








The sum s.d.o.f. ds is the largest achievable d1 + d2.
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4.3 Main Result
The main result of this chapter is the determination of the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of
the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 7 The optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel
with N antennas at the transmitters, N antennas at the legitimate receiver and K










(2N −K), if 1
2
N ≤ K ≤ N
2
3
N, if N ≤ K ≤ 4
3
N
2N −K, if 4
3
N ≤ K ≤ 2N
0, if K ≥ 2N.
(4.5)
for almost all channel gains.
We present the converse proof for this theorem in Section 4.4. The achievable
schemes for the case of fading channel gains are presented in Section 4.5, while the
achievable schemes for the case of fixed channel gains are presented in Section 4.6.
Fig. 4.2 shows the variation of the optimal sum s.d.o.f. with the number of
eavesdropper antennas K. Note that as in the SISO case, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is
higher for the multiple access wiretap channel than for the wiretap channel with one


















Figure 4.2: ds versus K.
K is large enough, i.e., when K ≥ 3N/2, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple
access wiretap channel is the same as the optimal s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel
with a helper.
Further, note that when the number of eavesdropper antennas K is small
enough (K ≤ N
2
), the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N , which is the optimal d.o.f. of
the multiple access channel without any secrecy constraints. Thus, there is no
penalty for imposing the secrecy constraints in this regime. Also note that allowing
cooperation beteen the transmitters does not increase the sum s.d.o.f. in this regime.
Heuristically, the eavesdropper is quite weak in this regime, and the optimal sum
s.d.o.f. is limited by the decoding capabilities of the legitimate receiver.
On the other hand, when the number of antennas K is quite large (K ≥ 4N
3
),
the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is (2N − K), which is the optimal s.d.o.f. obtained by
allowing cooperation between the transmitters. Intuitively, the eavesdropper is very
strong in this regime and the sum s.d.o.f. is limited by the requirement of secrecy
from this strong eavesdropper. In the intermediate regime, when N
2




distributed nature of the transmitters becomes a key factor and the upper bound
obtained by allowing cooperation between the transmitters is no longer achievable;
see Fig. 4.3.
4.4 Proof of the Converse
We prove the following upper bounds which are combined to give the converse for
the full range of N and K,
d1 + d2 ≤min((2N −K)+, N) (4.6)









where (x)+ denotes max(x, 0).
It can be verified from Fig. 4.3 that the minimum of the two bounds in (4.6)-
(4.7) gives the converse to the sum s.d.o.f. stated in (4.5) for all ranges of N and K.
Thus, we next provide proofs of each of the bounds in (4.6) and (4.7).
4.4.1 Proof of d1 + d2 ≤ min((2N −K)+, N)
This bound follows by allowing cooperation between the transmitters, which reduces
the two-user multiple access wiretap channel to a single-user MIMO wiretap channel
with 2N antennas at the transmitter, N antennas at the legitimate receiver and K
antennas at the eavesdropper. The optimal s.d.o.f. for this MIMO wiretap channel
is known to be min((2N −K)+, N) [13, 14].
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We only show that d1 + d2 ≤ 23(2N −K), when K ≤ N , and note that the bound
d1 + d2 ≤ 23N for K > N follows from the fact that increasing the number of
eavesdropper antennas cannot increase the sum s.d.o.f.; thus, the sum s.d.o.f. when
K > N is upper-bounded by the sum s.d.o.f. for the case of K = N , which is 2
3
N .
To prove d1 +d2 ≤ 23(2N−K) when K ≤ N , we follow [4,12]. We define noisy








The secrecy penalty lemma [4] can then be derived as
n(R1 +R2) ≤I(W1,W2; Yn|Zn) + nε (4.8)
≤h(Yn|Zn) + nc1 (4.9)
=h(Yn,Zn)− h(Zn) + nc1 (4.10)
≤h(X̃n1 , X̃n2 )− h(Zn) + nc2 (4.11)
≤h(X̃n1 ) + h(X̃n2 )− h(Zn) + nc2 (4.12)
Now consider a stochastically equivalent version of Z given by Z̃ = G1X̃1 +G2X2 +
NZ , where NZ is an independent Gaussian noise vector, distributed as N (0, IK −
ρ21G1G
H







T , where G̃1 is the
matrix with the first K columns of G1, Ĝ1 has the last N −K columns of G1, X̃1a
is a vector with the top K elements of X̃1, while X̃1b has the remaining N − K






















Figure 4.3: The two upper bounds.


















=h(X̃n1a|X̃n1b) + nc3 (4.17)
Using (4.17) in (4.12), we have
n(R1 +R2) ≤h(X̃n1b) + h(X̃n2 ) + nc4 (4.18)
The role of a helper lemma [4] also generalizes to the MIMO case as
nR1 ≤I(Xn1 ; Yn) (4.19)
=h(Yn)− h(Hn2Xn2 + Nn1 ) (4.20)
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≤h(Yn)− h(X̃n2 ) + nc5 (4.21)
Adding (4.18) and (4.21), we have
n(2R1 +R2) ≤h(Yn) + h(X̃n1b) + nc6 (4.22)
≤Nn
2
logP + (N −K)n
2
logP + nc7 (4.23)
=(2N −K)n
2
logP + nc7 (4.24)
First dividing by n and letting n → ∞, and then dividing by 1
2
logP and letting
P →∞, we have
2d1 + d2 ≤ 2N −K (4.25)
By reversing the roles of the transmitters, we have
d1 + 2d2 ≤ 2N −K (4.26)
Combining (4.25) and (4.26), we have the required bound




This completes the proof of the converse of Theorem 7.
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4.5 Achievable Schemes for Fading Channel Gains
We provide separate achievable schemes for each of the following regimes:
1. K ≤ N/2
2. N/2 ≤ K ≤ N
3. N ≤ K ≤ 4N/3
4. 4N/3 ≤ K ≤ 3N/2
5. 3N/2 ≤ K ≤ 2N
Each scheme described in the following sections can be outlined as follows. We
neglect the impact of noise at high SNR. Then, to achieve a certain sum s.d.o.f.,
ds, we achieve the s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) with ds = d1 + d2. We send n1 symbols
v1 = (v11, . . . , v1n1) and n2 symbols v2 = (v21, . . . , v2n2) from the first and second
transmitters, respectively, in nB slots, such that d1 = n1/nB and d2 = n2/nB.
Finally, we show that the leakage of information symbols at the eavesdropper is





as n → ∞. To achieve this, we view the nB slots described in the scheme as a
block and treat the equivalent channel from v1 and v2 to Y and Z as a memoryless
multiple access wiretap channel with Y being the output at the legitimate receiver
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and Z being the output at the eavesdropper. The following sum secure rate is
achievable [70]:
sup(R1 +R2) ≥ I(V; Y)− I(V; Z) (4.29)
where V
∆
= {v1,v2}. Using the proposed scheme, v1 and v2 can be reconstructed
from Y to within noise distortion. Thus,
I(V; Y) =(n1 + n2)
1
2
logP + o(logP ) (4.30)
Also, for each scheme, by design
I(V; Z) =o(logP ) (4.31)












logP + o(logP ) (4.32)
Thus, the achievable sum s.d.o.f. is n1+n2
nB
, with the stringent security requirement
as well.
In the following subsections, we present the achievable scheme for each regime.
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4.5.1 K ≤ N/2
In this regime, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is N . In our scheme, transmitter 1 sends
(N − K) independent Gaussian symbols v1 ∈ RN−K while transmitter 2 sends K
independent Gaussian symbols v2 ∈ RK , in one time slot. This can be done by
beamforming the information streams at both transmitters to directions that are
orthogonal to the eavesdropper’s channel. To this end, the transmitted signals are:
X1 = P1v1 (4.33)
X2 = P2v2 (4.34)
where P1 ∈ RN×(N−K) is a matrix whose (N −K) columns span the (N −K) di-
mensional nullspace of G1, and P2 ∈ RN×K is a matrix with K linearly independent
vectors drawn from the (N − K) dimensional nullspace of G2. This can be done









Note that [H1P1 H2P2] is an N×N matrix with full rank almost surely, and thus,
both v1 and v2 can be decoded at the legitimate receiver to within noise variance.
On the other hand, they do not appear in the eavesdropper’s observation and thus
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their security is guaranteed.
4.5.2 N/2 ≤ K ≤ N
The optimal sum s.d.o.f. in this regime is 2
3
(2N − K). Thus, transmitter i sends
(2N − K) Gaussian symbols
{
vi ∈ R2K−N , ṽi(t) ∈ RN−K , t = 1, 2, 3
}
, each drawn
independently from N (0, P̄ ), in 3 time slots for i = 1, 2, where P̄ = αP and α is
chosen to satisfy the power constraint. Intuitively, transmitter i sends the (N −K)
symbols ṽi(t) by beamforming orthogonal to the eavesdropper in each time slot
t = 1, 2, 3. The remaining (2K − N) symbols are sent over 3 time slots using a
scheme similar to the SISO scheme of [4]. Thus, the transmitted signals at time t
are:
X1(t) =G1(t)
⊥ṽ1(t) + P1(t)v1 + H1(t)
−1Q(t)u1 (4.37)
X2(t) =G2(t)
⊥ṽ2(t) + P2(t)v2 + H2(t)
−1Q(t)u2 (4.38)
where Gi(t)
⊥ is an N × (N −K) full rank matrix with Gi(t)Gi(t)⊥ = 0N×(N−K), ui
is a (2K −N) dimensional vector whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from
N (0, P̄ ), and Pi and Q are N × (2K − N) precoding matrices that will be fixed
later. The channel outputs are:
Y(t) =H1(t)G1(t)
⊥ṽ1(t) + H1(t)P1(t)v1 + H2(t)P2(t)v2
+ H2(t)G2(t)
⊥ṽ2(t) + Q(t)(u1 + u2) + N1(t) (4.39)
Z(t) =G1(t)P1(t)v1 + G2(t)H2(t)
−1Q(t)u2
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+ G2(t)P2(t)v2 + G1(t)H1(t)
−1Q(t)u1 + N2(t) (4.40)






where i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j. It can be verified that this selection aligns vi with
uj, i 6= j, at the eavesdropper, and this guarantees that the information leakage
is o(logP ). On the other hand, the legitimate receiver decodes the desired signals
{




vi ∈ R2K−N , i = 1, 2
}
and the aligned artificial noise
symbols u1 + u2 ∈ R2K−N , i.e., 6(N − K) + 3(2N − K) = 3N symbols using 3N
observations in 3 time slots, to within noise variance. This completes the scheme
for the regime N/2 ≤ K ≤ N .
4.5.3 N ≤ K ≤ 4N/3
In this regime, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 2
3
N . Therefore, transmitter i in our scheme
sends N Gaussian symbols, vi ∈ RN , in 3 time slots. The transmitted signals in
time slot t are given by
X1(t) = P1(t)v1 + H1(t)
−1Q(t)u1 (4.42)
X2(t) = P2(t)v2 + H1(t)
−1Q(t)u2 (4.43)
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and G̃i similarly, we can compactly represent the channel outputs over all 3 time
slots as
Ỹ =H̃1P̃1v1 + H̃2P̃2v2 + Q̃(u1 + u2) + Ñ1 (4.46)
Z̃ =G̃1P̃1v1 + G̃2H̃
−1
2 Q̃u2 + G̃2P̃2v2 + G̃1H̃
−1






T ]T , Ỹ
∆
= [Y(1)T Y(2)T Y(3)T ]T , and Z̃ is




























Note that Ψ has a nullity 9N − 6K. Since 9N − 6K ≥ N in this regime, we can
choose N vectors of dimension 9N randomly such that they are linearly independent
and lie in the nullspace of Ψ. We can then assign to P̃1, P̃2 and Q̃, the top, the
middle and the bottom 3N rows of the matrix comprising the N chosen vectors.
This guarantees secrecy of the message symbols at the eavesdropper.













= [H̃1P̃1 H̃2P̃2 Q̃]. We note that Φ is 3N × 3N and full rank almost
surely; thus, the desired signals v1 and v2 can be decoded at the legitimate receiver
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within noise distortion at high SNR.
4.5.4 4N/3 ≤ K ≤ 3N/2
The optimal s.d.o.f. in this regime is 2N − K. To achieve this s.d.o.f., the first
transmitter sends K −N Gaussian symbols
{
v1 ∈ R3N−2K , ṽ ∈ R3K−4N
}
, while the




, in one time
slot. The scheme is as follows. The transmitted signals are
X1 = R1ṽ + P1v1 + H
−1
1 Qu1 (4.53)
X2 = R2ũ + P2v2 + H
−1
2 Qu2 (4.54)
where ũ ∈ R3K−4N and u1,u2 ∈ R3N−2K are artificial noise vectors, whose entries are
drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from N (0, P̄ ). The precoding matrices Ri ∈ RN×(3K−4N),
and Pi,Qi ∈ RN×(3N−2K) will be chosen later. The channel outputs are
Y =H1R1ṽ + H1P1v1 + H2P2v2 + H2R2ũ + Q(u1 + u2) + N1 (4.55)
Z =G1R1ṽ + G2R2ũ + G1P1v1 + G2H
−1
2 Qu2 + G2P2v2 + G1H
−1
1 Qu1 + N2
(4.56)









To satisfy (4.57), we choose R1 and R2 to be the first and the last N rows of a
2N × 3K − 4N matrix whose columns consist of any 3K − 4N linearly independent
vectors drawn randomly from the nullspace of [G1 −G2]. This is possible since,
3K − 4N ≤ 2N −K in this regime. To satisfy (4.58)-(4.59), we let P1, P2 and Q
to be the first, the second and the last N rows of a 3N × (3N − 2K) matrix whose
columns are randomly chosen to span the (3N − 2K) dimensional nullspace of the
























where Φ is the N ×N matrix defined as
Φ = [H1R1 H1P1 H2P2 H2R2 Q] (4.62)
Since Φ is full rank almost surely, the legitimate receiver can decode its desired
symbols ṽ,v1, and v2.
4.5.5 3N/2 ≤ K ≤ 2N
In this regime, it is clear from Fig. 4.2 that the multiple access wiretap channel has
the same optimal sum s.d.o.f. as the optimal s.d.o.f. of the wiretap channel with
one helper. Thus, an optimal achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with one
helper suffices as the scheme for the multiple access wiretap channel as well. Such
an optimal scheme, based on real interference alignment, is provided in [12] for the
wiretap channel with one helper with fixed channel gains. Here, we provide a scheme
based on vector space alignment.
In order to achieve the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of 2N −K in this regime, the first
transmitter sends 2N−K independent Gaussian symbols v ∈ R2N−K securely, in one
time slot. The second transmitter just transmits artificial noise symbols u ∈ R2N−K ,
whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion from N (0, P̄ ). The transmitted signals
are
X1 = Pv (4.63)
X2 = Qu (4.64)
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where P and Q are N×(2N−K) precoding matrices to be fixed later. The received
signals are
Y =H1Pv + H2Qu + N1 (4.65)
Z =G1Pv + G2Qu + N2 (4.66)
To ensure security, we wish to ensure that
G1P = G2Q (4.67)
This can be done by choosing P and Q to be the top and the bottom N rows of
a 2N × (2N −K) matrix whose linearly independent columns are drawn randomly
from the nullspace of [G1 −G2]. The decodability is ensured by noting that the
matrix [H1P H2Q] is full column rank and 2(2N −K) ≤ N in this regime.
4.6 Achievable Schemes for Fixed Channel Gains
We note that the achievable schemes proposed for the fading channel gains in the




≤ K ≤ 2N are single time-slot schemes and suffice for the
fixed channel gains case. However, in the regime N
2
≤ K ≤ 4N
3
, the schemes for
the fading channel gains exploit the diversity of channel gains over three time slots;
thus, these schemes cannot be used in the fixed channel gains case. Therefore, we
now propose new achievable schemes for this regime. In this regime, the optimal





, l = 0, 1, 2, where d is an integer. When l = 0,
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the sum s.d.o.f. is an integer and carefully precoded Gaussian signaling suffices.
However, when l 6= 0, the s.d.o.f. has a fractional part, and Gaussian signaling alone
is not optimal, since Gaussian signals with full power cannot carry fractional d.o.f. of
information.
The general structure of our schemes is as follows: We decompose the channel
input at each transmitter into two parts: a Gaussian signaling part carrying d (the
integer part) d.o.f. of information securely, and a structured signaling part carrying
l
3
(the fractional part) d.o.f. of information securely. The structure of the Gaussian
signals carrying the integer s.d.o.f. d are the same as that of the corresponding
schemes for the fading channel gains. This ensures security at the eavesdropper
as well as decodability at the legitimate receiver as long as the structured signals
carrying the fractional s.d.o.f. 2l
3
from both transmitters can be decoded at the
legitimate receiver. The design of the structured signals is motivated from the SISO
scheme of [4]. In fact, when l = 1, we use the signal structure of the scheme in [4],
where real interference alignment is used to transmit 2
3
sum s.d.o.f. on the SISO
multiple access wiretap channel. However, when l = 2, a new scheme is required
to achieve 4
3
sum s.d.o.f. on the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel with two
antennas at every terminal. To that end, we first provide a novel scheme, based on
asymptotic real interference alignment [7,9], for the canonical 2× 2× 2× 2 MIMO
multiple access wiretap channel.
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4.6.1 Scheme for the 2× 2× 2× 2 System
The optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 4
3
. Since the legitimate receiver has 2 antennas, we
achieve 2
3
s.d.o.f. on each antenna. The scheme is as follows.
Let m be a large integer. Define M
∆
= mΓ, where Γ will be specified later. The







































where ti, i = 1, 2 are M dimensional precoding vectors which will be fixed later,
and uij,vij are independent random variables drawn uniformly from the same PAM
constellation C(a,Q) given by
C(a,Q) = a {−Q,−Q+ 1, . . . , Q− 1, Q} (4.70)
where Q is a positive integer and a is a real number used to normalize the trans-
mission power. The exact values of a and Q will be specified later. The variables
vij denote the information symbols of transmitter i, while uij are the cooperative
jamming signals being transmitted from transmitter i.
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1 . Note that the information
symbols vij are buried in the cooperative jamming signals ukj, where k 6= i, at the
eavesdropper. Intuitively, this ensures security of the information symbols at the




tT2 (a12v12 + b12v22) + t
T
1 (a11v11 + b11v21 + u11 + u21)
tT1 (a21v11 + b21v21) + t
T




T1 = {ar111br211, ri ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}} (4.74)
T2 = {ar122br222, ri ∈ {0, . . . ,m− 1}} (4.75)
Letting Γ = 2, we note that
|T1| = |T2| = M (4.76)
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We choose ti to be the M dimensional vector that has all the elements of Ti. We
note that all elements in Ti are rationally independent, since the channel gains are
drawn independently from a continuous distribution. Also, the elements of Ti can
be verified to be rationally independent of the elements of Tj, if i 6= j. With the
above selections, let us analyze the structure of the received signal at the legitimate
receiver.
At the first antenna, u11 and u21 arrive along the dimensions of T1. The signals
v11 and v21 arrive along dimensions a11T1 and b11T1 and, thus, they align with u11
and u21 in T̃1, where,
T̃1 = {ar111br211, ri ∈ {0, . . . ,m}} (4.77)
Thus, v11 and v21 cannot be reliably decoded from the observation of the first
antenna. However, the desired signals v12 and v22 arrive along dimensions a12T2
and b12T2, respectively. Note that the elements of a12T2 and b12T2 are rationally
independent and thus, v12 and v22 occupy separate rational dimensions. Also they
are separate from the interference space T̃1. Therefore, v12 and v22 can be reliably







for large enough m.
At the second antenna, a similar analysis holds. The signals v12, v22, u12 and
u22 align with each other in the dimensions of T̃2, which is defined as
T̃2 = {ar122br222, ri ∈ {0, . . . ,m}} (4.78)
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The signals v11 and v21 arrive along dimensions that are separate from each other
as well as from the dimensions in T̃2, and thus, can be decoded reliably. The





for large m. Therefore,
the sum s.d.o.f. achieved using both antennas is 4
3
, as desired.
Formally, an achievable sum rate is given in equation (4.29), where V
∆
=
{vij, i, j ∈ {1, 2}}. In order to bound the term I(V; Y), we first bound the probabil-
ity of error. Let MS
∆
= 2m2 + (m+ 1)2 be the number of rational dimensions at each
receiver antenna. Also let Vi = {vkj, k = 1, 2; j 6= i} be the desired symbols at the
ith antenna of the receiver. In order to decode, the receiver makes an estimate V̂i
of Vi by choosing the closest point in the constellation based on the signal received
at antenna i. For any δ > 0, there exists a positive constant γ, which is indepen-
dent of P , such that if we choose Q = P
1−δ




, then for almost all
channel gains the average power constraint is satisfied and the probability of error,




, where ηγ is a positive constant
which is independent of P . Since V = {Vi, i = 1, 2},





By Fano’s inequality and the Markov chain V→ Y → V̂,
I(V; Y) = H(V)−H(V|V̂) (4.80)
≥ log(|V|)− 1− Pr(V 6= V̂) log(|V|) (4.81)










+ o(logP ) (4.83)



















H(vij + uîj)−H(uîj) (4.85)
≤4M log(4Q+ 1)− 4M log(2Q+ 1) (4.86)
≤4M = o(logP ) (4.87)









+ o(logP ) (4.88)
By choosing δ small enough and m large enough, we can make the sum s.d.o.f. ar-
bitrarily close to 4
3
.
4.6.2 Achievable Schemes for N2 ≤ K ≤ N
We use structured PAM signaling along with Gaussian signaling. Let d = b2K−N
3
c,
and l = (2K − N)mod 3 = (2N − K)mod 3. Let v(1)i = {vij, j = 1, . . . , d},
where each vij, j = 1, . . . , d is drawn in an i.i.d. fashion ∼ N (0, αP ), and v(2)i =
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{
vi(d+1), . . . , vi(d+l)
}
are structured PAM signals to be specified later. When l = 0,
v
(2)








. Also, let ṽi = {ṽij, j = 1, . . . , N −K}
denote the symbols that can be transmitted securely by beamforming orthogonal to
the eavesdropper channel. Transmitter i sends:
Xi =G
⊥
i ṽi + Pivi + H
−1
i Qui (4.89)








is a (d+l) dimensional vector with the entries of u
(1)
i = {uij, j = 1, . . . , d}





ui(d+1), . . . , ui(d+l)
}
will be specified later. Pi and Q are N × (d + l)
precoding matrices that will also be fixed later. The received signals are:
Y =H1G
⊥
1 ṽ1 + H1P1v1 + H2P2v2 + H2G
⊥
2 ṽ2 + Q(u1 + u2) + N1 (4.90)
Z =G1P1v1 + G2H
−1
2 Qu2 + G2P2v2 + G1H
−1
1 Qu1 + N2 (4.91)








j )Q, where i, j ∈ {1, 2} , i 6= j. It can be verified that this
selection aligns vi with uj, i 6= j, at the eavesdropper, and this guarantees that the
information leakage is o(logP ). Next, let P
(1)
i , Q
(1) be matrices containing the first
d columns of Pi and Q, respectively, while P
(2)
i and Q
(2) contain the last l columns
of Pi and Q, respectively. Let B be a matrix whose columns lie in the nullspace









(1)]T . Note that F is a
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(N − l)×N matrix and thus there exists a N × l matrix B such that FB = 0. We





















2 ) + DN1 (4.93)
Note that (4.93) represents the output at the receiver of a multiple access wire-
tap channel with l antennas at each terminal. If l = 1, we let v
(2)
i = vi(d+1)
be drawn uniformly and independently from the PAM constellation C(a,Q), with
Q = P
1−δ






i = ui(d+1) is chosen uniformly from C(a,Q) and
independently from vj, j = 1, 2. The receiver can then decode v1(d+1), v2(d+1) and





i as in the 2× 2× 2× 2 multiple access wiretap channel, i.e.,
vi(d+k) = t
T
k v̂ik, k = 1, 2, where v̂ik is an M dimensional vector whose entries are
drawn from the PAM constellation C(a,Q) with Q = P
1−δ





ti is chosen appropriately analogous to the selection for the 2 × 2 × 2 × 2 multiple
access wiretap channel, noting the similarity of (4.93) with (4.71). The cooperative
jamming signal u
(2)







2 with vanishing probability of error.






2 can be eliminated from Ŷ. Noting that
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2(N −K) + 3d ≤ N − l, ṽi and v(1)i can also be decoded from Ỹ. We compute




2 , ṽ1, ṽ2; Y|v(2)1 ,v(2)2 ) + I(v(2)1 ,v(2)2 ; Y) (4.94)





2 ; Y) = log(2Q+ 1)









+ o(logP ) (4.96)













+ o(logP ) (4.97)



































+ o(logP ) (4.99)
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Using (4.98) and (4.99) in (4.94), we have,
I(v1,v2, ṽ1, ṽ2; Y) ≥2
(

















+ o(logP ) (4.101)
This completes the achievable schemes for the regime N
2
≤ K ≤ N .
4.6.3 Achievable Schemes for N ≤ K ≤ 4N3
As in the previous regime, we use structured PAM signaling along with Gaussian
signaling. Let d = bN
3









symbols such that the entries of v
(1)
i = {vij, j = 1, . . . , d} are drawn in an i.i.d. fash-
ion ∼ N (0, αP ), and the entries of v(2)i = {vij, j = d+ 1, . . . , d+ l} are structured









jamming symbols such that the entries of u
(1)
i = {uij, j = 1, . . . , d} are drawn in an
i.i.d. fashion ∼ N (0, αP ), and the entries of u(2)i = {uij, j = d+ 1, . . . , d+ l} are
structured PAM signals independent of vj, j = 1, 2 and uj, j 6= i. Transmitter i
sends




where the P1, Q, and P2 are N × (d + l) precoding matrices to be designed. The
channel outputs are given by
Y =H1P1v1 + H2P2v2 + Q(u1 + u2) + N1 (4.103)
Z =G1P1v1 + G2H
−1
2 Qu2 + G2P2v2 + G1H
−1
1 Qu1 + N2 (4.104)























Note that Ψ has a nullity 3N−2K. This alignment is feasible if 3N−2K ≥ d+l, i.e.,
if K ≤ 4d+ l. This is satisfied since, in this regime, K ≤ 4d+ l+ 1
3
l, which implies
K ≤ 4d+ 1 for integers N and K, since 0 ≤ l ≤ 2. This guarantees security and the











the first d columns of Pi. We define Q
(1) and Q(2) similarly. Let B be a matrix
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Note that F is a (N − l)×N matrix and thus there exists a non-zero N × l matrix
B such that FB = 0. We consider the filtered output [Ỹ, Ŷ]T = EY, where E is as













2 ) + DN1 (4.108)
When l = 1, we choose v
(2)
i = vi(d+1) and u
(2)
i = ui(d+1) to be PAM signals drawn
independently from C(a,Q) with Q = P
1−δ




. The receiver can then
decode v1(d+1), v2(d+1) and (u1(d+1) + u2(d+1)) with vanishing probability of error.




i analogous to the case of the 2 × 2 × 2 × 2
multiple access wiretap channel, i.e., vi(d+k) = t
T
k v̂ik, k = 1, 2, where v̂ik is an M
dimensional vector whose entries are drawn from the PAM constellation C(a,Q) with
Q = P
1−δ




, and ti is chosen appropriately, noting the similarity
of (4.108) with (4.71). The cooperative jamming signals u
(2)
i , i = 1, 2 are chosen
similarly. Such a selection allows the receiver to decode v
(2)





with vanishing probability of error. Thus, they can be eliminated from the received
observation Y.






2 from Ŷ. Noting that 3d ≤ N − l,
v
(1)














+ o(logP ) (4.109)
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+ o(logP ) (4.110)





















+ o(logP ) (4.112)
4.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we determined the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the two-user MIMO
multiple access wiretap channel with N antennas at each transmitter, N antennas
at the legitimate receiver and K antennas at the eavesdropper. For the case of fading
channel gains, we provided vector space alignment based achievable schemes that
exploit the channel variation over multiple time slots in general. When the channel
gains are fixed, such channel diversity is not available, and we provided single time-
slot schemes that use real interference alignment on structured signaling. We also
provided matching converses to establish the optimality of the achievable schemes for
both fixed and fading channel gains. Our results highlight the effect of the number
of eavesdropper antennas on the s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap channel.
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Chapter 5: MIMO One Hop Networks with No Eve CSIT
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we study the MIMO wiretap channel with one helper and the MIMO
multiple access wiretap channel without eavesdropper CSIT. In each case, the le-
gitimate transmitters and the receiver have N antennas each, and the eavesdropper
has K antennas; see Fig. 5.1 and Fig. 5.2. In both cases, the channel is fast fading
and the channel gains vary in an i.i.d. fashion across the links and time. Our goal in
this chapter is to investigate the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the MIMO wiretap channel
with one helper and the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel as a function of N
and K.
To that end, we provide an achievable scheme based on vector space alignment
[8], that attains 1
2
(2N − K) s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with one helper for
all values of 0 ≤ K ≤ 2N . Note that when K ≤ N , this value coincides with
the optimal s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with one helper in the case where full
eavesdropper CSIT is available, and is, therefore, optimal without eavesdropper
CSIT as well. Further, the proposed scheme suffices as an achievable scheme for the
multiple access wiretap channel as well.
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W
Figure 5.1: Wiretap channel with a helper.
channel, we next provide a matching converse for the regime K ≤ N . We use the
MIMO versions of the secrecy penalty lemma and the role of a helper lemma [4],
and exploit channel symmetry at the eavesdropper. Since the transmitters do not
have the eavesdropper’s CSIT, the output at the K antennas of the eavesdropper
are entropy symmetric [15], i.e., any two subsets of the antenna outputs have the
same differential entropy, if the subsets are of equal size. Finally, we use a MIMO
version of the least alignment lemma [10, 16] to complete the proof of the converse.
As in the SISO case, when K ≤ N the multiple access wiretap channel reduces to
the wiretap channel with one helper when the eavesdropper’s CSIT is not available.
Next, for the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we provide an upper bound which shows
that the sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap channel cannot be larger than
2N(2N−K)
4N−K . Though loose, this bound suffices to show that, unlike the regime K ≤ N ,
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Figure 5.2: The multiple access wiretap channel.
with one helper, in the regime 3N
2
≤ K ≤ 2N .
Finally, for the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we restrict ourselves to linear encod-
ing strategies [11, 17], where the channel input of each antenna in every time slot
is restricted to be a linear combination of some information symbols intended for
the legitimate receiver and some artificial noise symbols to provide secrecy at the
eavesdropper, and show that under this restriction to linear encoding schemes, the
linear sum s.d.o.f. can be no larger than 1
2
(2N − K). The key idea of the proof
is that since no alignment is possible at the eavesdropper, the artificial noise sym-
bols should asymptotically occupy the maximum number of dimensions available
at the eavesdropper; consequently, the dimension of the linear signal space at the
eavesdropper should be Kn+ o(n) in n channel uses.
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5.2 System Model
We consider two fundamental channel models: the wiretap channel with one helper
and the multiple access wiretap channel. In each case, we assume that the chan-
nel gains are non-zero and are drawn from a common continuous distribution with
bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion in each channel use. The common continuous
distribution is known at all the terminals in the system. We assume no eavesdropper
CSIT, that is, the channel gains to the eavesdropper are not available at any trans-
mitter. In the following subsections we describe each channel model and provide
the relevant definitions.
5.2.1 Wiretap Channel with Helpers
The MIMO wiretap channel with one helper, see Fig. 5.1, is described by,
Y(t) =H1(t)X1(t) + H2(t)X2(t) + N1(t) (5.1)
Z(t) =G1(t)X1(t) + G2(t)X2(t) + N2(t) (5.2)
where X1(t) and X2(t) are the N dimensional column vectors denoting the input
of the legitimate transmitter and the helper, respectively, Y(t) is an N dimensional
vector denoting the legitimate receiver’s channel output, and Z(t) is a K dimensional
vector denoting the eavesdropper’s channel output, at time t. In addition, N1(t)
and N2(t) are N and K dimensional white Gaussian noise vectors, respectively,
with N1 ∼ N (0, IN) and N2 ∼ N (0, IK), where IN denotes the N × N identity
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matrix. Here, Hi(t) and Gi(t) are the N × N and K × N channel matrices from
transmitter i to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper, respectively, at time
t. The entries of Hi(t) and Gi(t) are drawn from a fixed continuous distribution
with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion at every time slot t. We assume that the
channel matrices at the legitimate receiver, Hi(t), are known with full precision at
all terminals, at time t. However, the channel matrices to the eavesdropper, Gi(t)
are not known at any transmitter. All channel inputs satisfy the average power
constraint E[‖Xi(t)‖2] ≤ P, i = 1, 2, where ‖X‖ denotes the Euclidean (or the
spectral) norm of the vector (or matrix) X.
The transmitter wishes to send a message W , uniformly distributed in Wi,
securely to the legitimate receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. A secure rate
R, with R = log |W|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes which satisfy
the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely, Pr[W 6= Ŵ ] ≤ εn, for
i = 1, 2, and the secrecy constraint, namely,
1
n
I(W ; Zn) ≤ εn (5.3)










5.2.2 The Multiple Access Wiretap Channel
The two-user multiple access wiretap channel, see Fig. 5.2, is as follows:
Y(t) =H1(t)X1(t) + H2(t)X2(t) + N1(t) (5.5)
Z(t) =G1(t)X1(t) + G2(t)X2(t) + N2(t) (5.6)
where Xi(t) is anN dimensional column vector denoting the ith user’s channel input,
Y(t) is an N dimensional vector denoting the legitimate receiver’s channel output,
and Z(t) is a K dimensional vector denoting the eavesdropper’s channel output, at
time t. In addition, N1(t) and N2(t) are N and K dimensional white Gaussian noise
vectors, respectively, with N1 ∼ N (0, IN) and N2 ∼ N (0, IK), where IN denotes
the N × N identity matrix. Here, Hi(t) and Gi(t) are the N × N and K × N
channel matrices from transmitter i to the legitimate receiver and the eavesdropper,
respectively, at time t. The entries of Hi(t) and Gi(t) are drawn from a fixed
continuous distribution with bounded support in an i.i.d. fashion at every time slot
t. We assume that the channel matrices to the legitimate receiver, Hi(t), are known
with full precision at all terminals, at time t. However, the channel matrices to the
eavesdropper, Gi(t), are not available at the transmitters. All channel inputs satisfy
the average power constraint E[‖Xi(t)‖2] ≤ P, i = 1, 2.
Transmitter i wishes to send a message Wi, uniformly distributed in Wi, se-
curely to the legitimate receiver in the presence of the eavesdropper. A secure
rate pair (R1, R2), with Ri =
log |Wi|
n
is achievable if there exists a sequence of
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codes which satisfy the reliability constraints at the legitimate receiver, namely,




n) ≤ εn (5.7)
where εn → 0 as n → ∞. An s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) is said to be achievable if a rate








The sum s.d.o.f. ds is the largest achievable d1 + d2.
5.2.3 A Linear Secure Degrees of Freedom Perspective
In this chapter, we will also consider linear coding strategies as defined in [17, 71].
In such cases, the degrees of freedom simply represents the dimension of the linear
subspace of transmitted signals.
When we focus on linear coding schemes, we consider a communication scheme
of blocklength n, where transmitter i wishes to send mi(n) information symbols
vi ∈ Rmi(n) to the legitimate receiver reliably and securely. In case of the wiretap
channel with one helper, m2(n) = 0. Each information symbol is a zero-mean
Gaussian random variable with variance αP , where α is a constant chosen to ensure
that the power constraints are satisfied at each transmitter. In addition to the
information symbols, transmitter i can use ni(n) artificial noise symbols, ui ∈ Rni(n)
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each of which is a zero-mean Gaussian random variable with variance αP . These
artificial noise symbols need not be decoded at the receiver; instead they help to
drown out the information symbols at the eavesdropper, thus, providing security.
At each time t, the information symbols vi at transmitter i are modulated
by a precoding matrix Pi(t) ∈ RN×mi(n), while the artificial noise symbols ui are
modulated using a precoding matrix Qi(t) ∈ RN×ni(n). Since the channel gains
Hi(t), i = 1, 2 are known at both transmitters at time t, the precoding matrices
Pi(t) and Qi(t) can each depend on {H1(k),H2(k), k = 1, . . . , t}. However, since the
channel gains Gi(t) are not available at any transmitter, Pi and Qi are independent
of {Gi(t), t = 1, . . . , n}.
At time t, transmitter i sends a linear combination of the information and the
artificial noise symbols:
Xi(t) = Pi(t)vi + Qi(t)ui (5.9)
The channel outputs at time t are, therefore,
Y(t) =H1(t)P1(t)v1 + H2(t)P2(t)v2
+ H1(t)Q1(t)u1 + H2(t)Q2(t)u2 + N1(t) (5.10)
Z(t) =G1(t)P1(t)v1 + G2(t)P2(t)v2
+ G1(t)Q1(t)u1 + G2(t)Q2(t)u2 + N2(t) (5.11)
Now letting P̄i = [Pi(1), . . . ,Pi(n)]
T , Q̄i = [Qi(1), . . . ,Qi(n)], we can compactly
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write the channel outputs as
Ȳ = H̄1P̄1v1 + H̄2P̄2v2 + H̄1Q̄1u1 + H̄2Q̄2u2 + N̄1 (5.12)
Z̄ = Ḡ1P̄1v1 + Ḡ2P̄2v2 + Ḡ1Q̄1u1 + Ḡ2Q̄2u2 + N̄2 (5.13)




Hi(1) 0 . . . 0












Gi(1) 0 . . . 0









and N̄i = [Ni(1), . . . ,Ni(n)]
T for i = 1, 2.
At the legitimate receiver, the interference subspace is
IB = colspan([H̄1Q̄1, H̄2Q̄2]) (5.16)
Let IcB denote the orthogonal subspace of IB. If we ignore the additive Gaussian
noise, i.e., in the high transmit power regime, the decodability of v1 and v2 at the
legitimate receiver corresponds to the constraint that the projection of the subspace
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= m1(n) +m2(n) (5.17)
This can be rewritten as requiring that
rank
(



















= 0, a.s. (5.19)
where
IE = colspan([Ḡ1Q̄1, Ḡ2Q̄2]) (5.20)
The security requirement in (5.19) can be reformulated as follows: Let L(n) be the
number of leakage dimensions defined as
L(n) =rank
(













= 0, a.s. (5.22)
In other words, we want the artificial noise symbols to occupy the full received sig-
nal space at the eavesdropper asymptotically. This secrecy requirement is a weaker
version of the original constraint 1
n
I(W1,W2; Z
n) → 0. Indeed, it is analogous to
requiring that limn→∞ limP→∞
I(W1,W2;Zn)
logP
= 0. However, this does not lead to any
loss of generality in our case because the proposed achievable scheme which satisfies
the weakened secrecy requirement may be modified using stochastic encoding tech-
niques [1] to obtain a scheme that satisfies the stronger security constraint as well.
Note that a converse with the weaker secrecy requirement suffices as a converse for
the case of the stronger secrecy requirement.
For the wiretap channel with one helper, a linear s.d.o.f. d with d = m1(n)/n
is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of precoding matrices P̄1, Q̄1, Q̄2
such that both the reliability constraints in (5.17) and the security constraints in
(5.19) are satisfied.
For the multiple access wiretap channel, a linear s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2), with
di = mi(n)/n is said to be achievable if there exists a sequence of precoding matrices
P̄i, Q̄i such that both the reliability constraints in (5.17) and the security constraints
in (5.19) are satisfied. The linear sum s.d.o.f. ds is the supremum of d1 + d2, such
that the pair (d1, d2) is achievable.
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5.3 Main Results
The main result of this chapter is the determination of the optimal linear sum
s.d.o.f. for the MIMO wiretap channel with one helper and the MIMO multiple
access channel. We have the following theorem.
Theorem 8 For both the N ×N ×N ×K wiretap channel with one helper and the









for almost all channel gains. Further, without any linearity constraints on the en-







(2N −K), 0 ≤ K ≤ N
≤ 2N(2N−K)
4N−K , N ≤ K ≤ 2N
= 0, K ≥ 2N
(5.24)
We also have the following corollary.
Corollary 2 For the N × N × N × K multiple access wiretap channel with no














MAC-WT with Eve CSI
WTH with Eve CSI
MAC-WT and WTH with
no Eve CSI (linear)
Converse for the MAC-WT
with no Eve CSIT
Figure 5.3: Sum s.d.o.f. with number of eavesdropper antennas.
pairs (d1, d2 that satisfy:




The proof of the corollary follows from the observation that every point in the given












, which can themselves be attained by treating the multiple access
wiretap channel as a wiretap channel with one helper. Also, no point outside the
given region is achievable since the sum s.d.o.f. is bounded by 1
2
(2N − K), from
Theorem 8.
Fig. 5.3 shows the optimal linear sum s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel with one
helper and the multiple access wiretap channel with and without eavesdropper CSIT.
Similar to the SISO case in Chapter 3, the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel
reduces to the wiretap channel with one helper when the eavesdropper CSIT is not
available for the regime 0 ≤ K ≤ N , and at least from a linear s.d.o.f. perspective
in the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N . However, unlike in the SISO case, the linear s.d.o.f. for
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the wiretap channel with one helper decreases due to the lack of eavesdropper CSIT.
Even without any linearity constraints, the optimal s.d.o.f. for the wiretap channel
with one helper does decrease due to lack of eavesdropper CSIT, as can be seen from
the general loose upper bound, especially in the regime 3N
2
≤ K ≤ 2N .
5.4 Proof of Theorem 8
In this section, we will prove Theorem 8 by providing an achievable scheme and a
converse. Since Theorem 8 implies that the wiretap channel with one helper and the
multiple access wiretap channel have the same linear sum s.d.o.f., we first note that
it suffices to provide a linear achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with one
helper, since the multiple access wiretap channel can be treated as a wiretap channel
with one helper with time sharing between the users. Also, since any rate achievable
for the wiretap channel with one helper is achievable for the multiple access wiretap
channel, a converse for the multiple access wiretap channel suffices as a converse for
the wiretap channel with one helper as well. Thus, in the following subsections, we
provide an achievable scheme for the wiretap channel with one helper and a converse
for the multiple access wiretap channel.
5.4.1 Achievable Scheme for the Wiretap Channel with One Helper
In this scheme, the transmitter sends (2N − K) information symbols reliably and
securely to the legitimate receiver in two time slots, in order to achieve 1
2
(2N −K)
s.d.o.f. In the framework of linear coding strategies discussed in Section 5.2.3, we set
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the blocklength n = 2, m1 = 2N −K, m2 = 0. Also, we choose n1 = n2 = K, i.e.,
K artificial noise symbols are sent from each transmitter over the two time slots.
At each time slot, transmitter i sends a linear combination of its information and
artificial noise symbols as in (5.9). Note, however, that for the wiretap channel with
one helper, transmitter 2 does not have any information symbols v2, and hence,
there is no P2. The channel outputs can be written compactly as in (5.12)-(5.13)
as:
Ȳ = H̄1P̄1v1 + H̄1Q̄1u1 + H̄2Q̄2u2 + N̄1 (5.26)
Z̄ = Ḡ1P̄1v1 + Ḡ1Q̄1u1 + Ḡ2Q̄2u2 + N̄2 (5.27)




i Q̄, i = 1, 2 (5.28)
where Q̄ is a 2N ×K matrix with rank K. Also choose P̄1 to be a 2N × (2N −K)
matrix with rank 2N − K, such that the matrix [H̄1P̄1, Q̄] has rank 2N . Note
that this condition will be satisfied almost surely if the elements of P̄1 and Q̄ are
chosen from any continuous distribution in an i.i.d. fashion. With this selection, the
channel outputs are:
Ȳ =H̄1P̄1v1 + Q̄1(u1 + u2) + N̄1 (5.29)
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Z̄ =Ḡ1P̄1v1 + Ḡ1H̄
−1
1 Q̄u1 + Ḡ2H̄
−1
2 Q̄u2 + N̄2 (5.30)
The decodability of v1 at the legitimate receiver in the high transmit power
regime follows immediately since the matrix [H̄1P̄1, Q̄] has rank 2N by our choice





2 Q̄]− rank[Ḡ1H̄−11 Q̄, Ḡ2H̄−12 Q̄] (5.31)
≤2K − 2K (5.32)
=0 (5.33)





2 Q̄] = 2K for almost all channel realizations of (Ḡ1, Ḡ2). This
follows from the following lemma by noting that each row and each column of Ḡi
has at least one entry drawn from a continuous distribution in an i.i.d. fashion and
the matrices H̄−1i Q̄ for i = 1, 2 do not depend on the Ḡis.
Lemma 5 Let P1 ∈ RN×m1 and P2 ∈ RN×m2 fixed matrices with ranks p1 and
p2, respectively. Let G1 and G2 be K × N matrices whose each row and each
column has at least one entry that is drawn from some continuous distribution in an
i.i.d. fashion, and the remaining elements are arbitrary but fixed. Then,
K ≥ rank[G1P1,G2P2] ≥ min (p1 + p2, K) (5.34)
almost surely.
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The proof of this lemma is relegated to Appendix 5.6.1.
Therefore, the security requirement in (5.22) is satisfied as well. This completes
the achievable scheme. We remark here that though the achievability has been shown
for linear framework, it can be easily shown that the leakage I(v1; Z̄) ≤ o(logP ), as
done in Chapter 4. Further by using stochastic encoding techniques, one can obtain
an achievable scheme for which the leakage 1
n
I(W ; Zn)→ 0 as n→∞.
5.4.2 Converse
In this section, we will prove the converse for the multiple access wiretap channel.
To that end, we consider two regimes of K. When 0 ≤ K ≤ N , we prove the
converse for general transmission schemes without any restrictions of linearity. For
the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we prove the converse under the assumption of linear
coding schemes only. We also provide a general upper bound in this regime which
does not match the achievablity; nevertheless, it shows that there is loss in s.d.o.f. for
the wiretap channel with one helper and the multiple access wiretap channel due to
no eavesdropper CSIT.
5.4.2.1 0 ≤ K ≤ N : Converse with No Restrictions
We wish to show that:




Let us first state three lemmas which are useful for the proof.
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Lemma 6 (Channel symmetry [15, Lemma 3]) Let ZK = {Z1, . . . , ZK} be en-
tropy symmetric, i.e., for any subsets A and B of {1, . . . , K}, with |A| = |B| ≤ K,
h({Zi, i ∈ A}) = h({Zi, i ∈ B}) (5.36)






Lemma 7 (Least alignment lemma [16, Lemma 3]) Consider two receivers,
each with L antennas. Suppose the channel gains to receiver 2 are not available
at the transmitters. If Y and Z denote the channel outputs at receivers 1 and 2,
respectively, we have
h(Zn) ≥ h(Yn) + no(logP ) (5.38)
Combining the above two lemmas, we have the following lemma.
Lemma 8 For the N ×N ×N ×K MIMO multiple access wiretap channel with no
eavesdropper CSIT, with K ≤ N
h(Zn) ≥ K
N
h(Yn) + no(logP ) (5.39)
We relegate the proof of this lemma to Appendix 5.6.2.
Let us now proceed with the converse proof. As in [4, 12], we define noisy
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The secrecy penalty lemma [4] can then be derived as
n(R1 +R2) ≤I(W1,W2; Yn|Zn) + nε (5.40)
≤h(Yn|Zn) + nc1 (5.41)
=h(Yn,Zn)− h(Zn) + nc1 (5.42)
≤h(X̃n1 , X̃n2 )− h(Zn) + nc2 (5.43)
≤h(X̃n1 ) + h(X̃n2 )− h(Zn) + nc2 (5.44)
The role of a helper lemma [4] also generalizes to the MIMO case as
nR1 ≤I(Xn1 ; Yn) (5.45)
=h(Yn)− h(Hn2Xn2 + Nn1 ) (5.46)
≤h(Yn)− h(X̃n2 ) + nc5 (5.47)
By symmetry, we also have
nR2 ≤h(Yn)− h(X̃n1 ) + nc5 (5.48)
Adding (5.44), (5.47) and (5.48), we have
2n(R1 +R2) ≤2h(Yn)− h(Zn) + no(logP ) (5.49)
≤2h(Yn)− K
N











+ no(logP ) (5.52)
where (5.50) follows from Lemma 8 and we have used the fact that h(Yn) ≤
N
2










+ o(logP ) (5.53)
Dividing by 1
2
logP and taking the limit P →∞, we have




which completes the proof of the converse for the regime 0 ≤ K ≤ N .
5.4.2.2 N ≤ K ≤ 2N : Converse with Linear Coding Strategies
We begin with the following lemma.
Lemma 9 For the N × N × N ×K multiple access wiretap channel, and for any
linear achievable scheme satisfying both the reliability and security constraints, and




















We relegate the proof of this lemma to Appendix 5.6.3.
To proceed with the upper bound, first note that since strictly positive sum
s.d.o.f. is achievable for the multiple access wiretap channel using linear schemes,
we can safely discard the case d1 + d2 = 0 for the purpose of the converse. There-
fore, from Lemma 9, the rank of the vector space spanned by the output at the




































































































where (5.57) follows from the decodability constraint, (5.58) follows from the secrecy





































The above equalities all hold almost surely since H̄i and Ḡi are both full column
rank almost surely.
Now dividing by n and taking limit n→∞, we have




5.4.2.3 N ≤ K ≤ 2N : Converse with No Restrictions
We have the following lemma.
Lemma 10 For the N ×N ×N ×K MIMO multiple access wiretap channel with
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no eavesdropper CSIT, with K ≤ 2N
h(Zn) ≥ K
2N
h(Yn,Zn) + no(logP ) (5.69)
The proof of this lemma is relegated to the Appendix 5.6.4.
Now we proceed with the upper bound as in the case of 0 ≤ K ≤ N :
n(R1 +R2) ≤I(W1,W2; Yn|Zn) + nε (5.70)
≤h(Yn|Zn) + nc1 (5.71)














+ no(logP ) (5.74)
The role of the helper lemmas yield:
nR1 ≤h(Yn)− h(X̃n2 ) + no(logP ) (5.75)
nR2 ≤h(Yn)− h(X̃n1 ) + no(logP ) (5.76)
Eliminating h(X̃n1 ) and h(X̃
n











+ no(logP ) (5.78)
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+ o(logP ) (5.79)
Now dividing by 1
2
logP and letting P →∞,




In this chapter, we considered two fundamental multi-user channel models: the
MIMO wiretap channel with one helper and the MIMO multiple access wiretap
channel. In each case, the eavesdropper has K antennas while the remaining ter-
minals have N antennas. We assumed that the CSIT of the legitimate receiver is
available but no eavesdropper CSIT is available. We determined the optimal sum
s.d.o.f. for each channel model for the regimeK ≤ N , and showed that in this regime,
the multiple access wiretap channel reduces to the wiretap channel with one helper
in the absence of eavesdropper CSIT. For the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we obtained
the optimal linear s.d.o.f., and showed that the multiple access wiretap channel and
the wiretap channel with one helper have the same optimal s.d.o.f. when restricted
to linear encoding strategies. In the absence of any such restrictions, we provided a
loose upper bound for the sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap channel in the
regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N . Our results showed that unlike in the SISO case, there is loss
of s.d.o.f. for even the wiretap channel with one helper due to lack of eavesdropper
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CSIT, especially when K ≥ N .
5.6 Appendix
5.6.1 Proof of Lemma 5
First note when N ≤ K, Gis have full column rank almost surely. Therefore,
rank[GiPi] = rank[Pi] = pi (5.81)
almost surely. On the other hand, when N ≥ K, we have
rank[GiPi] ≥ rank[GiP̂i] (5.82)
where P̂i is a N × pi submatrix of Pi with full column rank. Let p̄i = min(K, pi).
Now, the determinant of any p̄i× p̄i submatrix of GiP̂i is a multi-variate polynomial
of the random entries of Gi and is zero for only finitely many realizations. Therefore,
GiP̂i has rank p̄i. Note that when N ≤ K, p̄i = pi is satisfied trivially.
Therefore, there exists a set Ii ⊆ {1, . . . ,mi} such that |Ii| = p̄i and the
collection of column vectors Ci = {cij, j ∈ Ii} are linearly independent, where cij
denotes the jth column of GiPi. Then,
rank[G1P1,G2P2] ≥ rank[C1,C2] (5.83)
The matrix [C1,C2] is a K × p̄1 + p̄2 matrix. Now, if K ≤ p̄1 + p̄2, consider
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any K × K submatrix of [C1,C2]. The determinant of this submatrix is a multi-
variate polynomial function of the random entries of G1 and G2, and therefore, the
determinant can be zero for only finitely many realizations, corresponding to the
roots of the multi-variate polynomial function. Note that this is true if each row
and each column of Ḡi has at least one random entry. Also, the polynomial function
is not identically zero. Therefore, in this case,
rank[C1,C2] = K (5.84)
On the other hand, if K ≥ p̄1 + p̄2, we can consider a (p̄1 + p̄2) × (p̄1 + p̄2)
submatrix of [C1,C2], and using a similar argument, claim that
rank[C1,C2] = p̄1 + p̄2 (5.85)
Combining (5.83), (5.84) and (5.85), we have that
rank[G1P1,G2P2] ≥min (p̄1 + p̄2, K) (5.86)
= min (min(p1, K) + min(p2, K), K) (5.87)
= min (min(p1 + p2, K + p1, K + p2, 2K), K) (5.88)
= min (p1 + p2, K) (5.89)
Finally, it trivially holds that K ≥ rank[G1P1,G2P2]. This completes the proof of
the lemma.
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5.6.2 Proof of Lemma 8
Note that K ≤ N . Consider N −K additional outputs Ẑ at the eavesdropper as:
Ẑ(t) = Ĝ1(t)X1(t) + Ĝ2(t)X2(t) + N̂2(t) (5.90)
where each Ĝi is a (N −K)×N matrix whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion
from the same continuous distribution as the entries of Gi, and the entries of N̂2 are
i.i.d. zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian noise. Assume that the Ĝis are not available
at the transmitters either. Then, the enhanced output Z̄(t) = (Z(t), Ẑ(t)) is entropy




Now, since the Gis and Ĝis are not available at the transmitters, using Lemma 7,
we have
h(Z̄n) ≥ h(Yn) + no(logP ) (5.92)
Combining (5.91) and (5.92), we get the desired result that
h(Zn) ≥ K
N
h(Yn) + no(logP ) (5.93)
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5.6.3 Proof of Lemma 9






























































































where (5.97) follows from Lemma 5, (5.98) follows from the decodability require-
ment, and (5.99) follows almost surely since Ḡi is full column rank almost surely as
































which contradicts the security requirement in (5.22).
5.6.4 Proof of Lemma 10
Consider 2N −K additional outputs Ẑ at the eavesdropper:
Ẑ(t) = Ĝ1(t)X1(t) + Ĝ2(t)X2(t) + N̂2(t) (5.103)
where each Ĝi is a (2N−K)×N matrix whose entries are drawn in an i.i.d. fashion
from the same continuous distribution as the entries of Gi, and the entries of N̂2 are
i.i.d. zero-mean unit-variance Gaussian noise. Assume that the Ĝis are not available
at the transmitters either. Then, the enhanced output Z̄(t) = (Z(t), Ẑ(t)) is entropy




Now, given Z̄n, we can decode both inputs Xn1 and X
n
2 to within noise variance, and
therefore also Yn and Zn. Therefore,
h(Z̄n) ≥ h(Yn,Zn) + no(logP ) (5.105)
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Combining (5.104) and (5.105), we get the desired result that
h(Zn) ≥ K
2N
h(Yn,Zn) + no(logP ) (5.106)
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Chapter 6: Two-User MISO Broadcast Channel with Alternating
CSIT
6.1 Introduction
In this chapter, we focus on the effect of delay and time variation of the availability of
CSI. We consider the s.d.o.f. region of the fading two-user MISO broadcast channel
with confidential messages, in which the transmitter with two antennas has two
confidential messages, one for each of the single antenna users (see Fig. 6.1). The
CSIT from each user can be of the form Ii, i = 1, 2 where I1, I2 ∈ {P,D,N}, and
the forms P, D and N correspond to perfect and instantaneous, completely delayed,
and no CSIT, respectively. This gives rise to nine possible CSIT states: three
homogeneous states PP, DD and NN, and six heterogeneous states PD, DP, PN, NP,
DN and ND.
The optimal s.d.o.f. region is well known in the literature for each of the three
homogeneous states; the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 2 in state PP, 1 in state DD [15]
and 0 in state NN, due to statistical equivalence of both receivers in the absence of
any CSIT. Thus, in this chapter, we first focus on the heterogeneous CSIT settings,
namely states PD, PN and DN. We determine the optimal s.d.o.f. region for each
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of the three states. We introduce the local statistical equivalence property, which
states that if we consider the outputs of a receiver for such states in which it supplies
delayed or no CSIT, the entropy of the channel outputs conditioned on the past
outputs is the same as that of another artificial receiver whose channel is distributed
identically as the original receiver, and provide new converse proofs based on it. We
also provide a new achievable scheme for the DN state.
Next, we consider time variation of CSIT states. We assume that the CSIT
state I1I2 occurs for an arbitrary fraction λI1I2 of the total duration of communi-
cation, subject to the mild constraint λI1I2 = λI2I1 , when I1 6= I2. We determine
the optimal s.d.o.f. region of the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential
messages in this setting of alternating CSIT, which is first introduced in [23] without
any secrecy requirements.
With nine states, each occurring for an arbitrary fraction of the time, it is
not immediately clear how to optimally code across the states and the achievability
of the s.d.o.f. region is highly non-trivial. To this end, we first develop several key
constituent schemes, where each scheme uses a subset of the nine states to achieve
a particular s.d.o.f. value. Now given an arbitrary probability mass function (pmf)
on the nine CSIT states, we judiciously time share between the constituent schemes
to achieve the optimal s.d.o.f. region. We consider different sub-cases based on
the relative proportions of the various states and explicitly characterize how the
constituent schemes should be time shared to obtain the optimal s.d.o.f. region in
each sub-case.










Figure 6.1: The MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages.
the converse is to first enhance the channel by providing more CSIT to obtain a new
channel with fewer number of states but at least as large secrecy capacity as the
original channel. Outer bounds on the s.d.o.f. region for the enhanced channel are
then obtained by exploiting the local statistical equivalence property, yielding the
desired outer bounds for the original channel.
6.2 System Model
We consider a two-user MISO broadcast channel, shown in Fig. 6.1, where the
transmitter Tx, equipped with 2 antennas, wishes to send independent confidential
messages to two single antenna receivers 1 and 2. The input-output relations at
time t are given by,
Y (t) = H1(t)X(t) +N1(t) (6.1)
Z(t) = H2(t)X(t) +N2(t), (6.2)
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where Y (t) and Z(t) are the channel outputs of receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
The 2 × 1 channel input X(t) is power constrained as E[||X(t)||2] ≤ P , and N1(t)
and N2(t) are circularly symmetric complex white Gaussian noises with zero-mean
and unit-variance. The 1 × 2 channel vectors H1(t) and H2(t) of receivers 1 and
2, respectively, are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) with continuous
distributions, and are also i.i.d. over time. We denote H(t) = {H1(t),H2(t)} as the
collective channel vectors at time t and Hn = {H(1), . . . ,H(n)} as the sequence of
channel vectors up until and including time n.
In practice, the receivers estimate the channel coefficients and feed them back
to the transmitter. In general, the receiver can choose to send not only the current
measurements, but rather any function of all the channel measurements it has taken
upto that time. The CSIT at time t can thus be any function of the measured
channel coefficients upto time t. There are two key aspects to the CSIT: precision
and delay. Precision captures the fact that the measurements made at the receivers
and sent to the transmitter are imprecise (usually, quantized) and noisy. Delay is
introduced since making measurements and feeding them back to the transmitter
takes time. We will focus on the delay aspect of CSIT, and assume that the CSIT
when available, has infinite precision.
In order to model the delay in CSIT, we assume that at each time t, there are
3 possible CSIT states for each user:
• Perfect CSIT (P): This denotes the availability of precise and instantaneous
CSI of a user at the transmitter. In this state, the transmitter has precise
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channel knowledge before the start of the communication.
• Delayed CSIT (D): In this state, the transmitter does not have the CSI at
the beginning of the communication. In slot t, the receiver may send any
function of all the channel coefficients upto and including time t as CSI to the
transmitter. However, the CSIT becomes available only after a delay such that
the CSI is completely outdated, that is, independent of the current channel
realization.
• No CSIT (N): In this state, there is no CSI of the user available at the
transmitter.
Denote the CSIT of user 1 by I1 and the CSIT of user 2 by I2. Then,
I1, I2 ∈ {P,D,N} . (6.3)
Thus, for the two-user MISO broadcast channel, we have 9 CSIT states, namely PP,
DD, NN, PD, DP, PN, NP, DN, and ND. Let λI1I2 be the fraction of the time the
state I1I2 occurs. Then,
∑
I1,I2
λI1I2 = 1. (6.4)
We also assume symmetry: λI1I2 = λI2I1 for every I1I2. Specifically,
λPD = λDP (6.5)
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λDN = λND (6.6)
λPN = λNP . (6.7)
Further, we assume that perfect and global CSI is available at both receivers.
A secure rate pair (R1, R2) is achievable if there exists a sequence of codes













n,Hn) ≤ εn, (6.8)
where εn → 0 as n→∞. Informally, the constraints in (6.8) ensure that the infor-
mation leakage, per channel use, of the first receiver’s message at the second receiver
should be arbitrarily small, and vice versa. A s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2) is achievable, if










Let us define the following:
λP , λPP + λPD + λPN (6.10)
λD , λPD + λDD + λDN (6.11)
λN , λPN + λDN + λNN . (6.12)
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Using these definitions, it is easy to verify that
λP + λD + λN = 1. (6.13)
Here, we can interpret these three quantities as follows:
• λP : represents the total fraction of time the CSIT of a user is in the P state.
• λD: represents the total fraction of time the CSIT of a user is delayed, that
is, the state D.
• λN : represents the total fraction of time a user supplies no CSIT.
Given the probability mass function (pmf), λI1I2 , our goal is to characterize the
s.d.o.f. region of the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages.
6.3 Main Result and Discussion
Theorem 9 The s.d.o.f. region for the two-user MISO broadcast channel with con-
fidential messages with alternating CSIT, D(λI1I2), is the set of all non-negative
pairs (d1, d2) satisfying,
d1 ≤ min
(












3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (6.16)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (6.17)
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Figure 6.2: The sum s.d.o.f. as a function of λP and λD.
d1 + d2 ≤ 2(λP + λD). (6.18)
A proof for the achievability of this region will be provided in Section 6.5 using
constituent schemes presented in Section 6.4. A converse is provided in Section 6.6.
We next make a series of remarks highlighting the consequences and interesting
aspects of this theorem.
Remark 1. [Sum s.d.o.f.: max(d1 + d2)]
From the region stated in (6.14)-(6.18), it is clear that the sum s.d.o.f. is given by,




2 + 2λP − λPP
3
)




The sum s.d.o.f. expression in (6.19) can be significantly simplified by noting that






, and 2(λP +λD) = 2(1−λN) ≤ 2(1−λNN). These inequalities follow
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directly from (6.10)-(6.13). Using these inequalities, the sum s.d.o.f. expression
above is equivalent to
sum s.d.o.f. = min (2(λP + λD), 1 + λP ) (6.20)
= min (2(λP + λD), 2λP + λD + λN) (6.21)
= 2λP + λD + min(λD, λN). (6.22)
Fig. 6.2 shows the sum s.d.o.f. as a function of λP and λD.
Remark 2. [Same marginals property]
From (6.22), we notice that the marginal probabilities λP , λD and λN are sufficient
to determine the sum s.d.o.f. Thus, for any given pmf λI1I2, satisfying the symmetry
conditions (6.5)-(6.7), there exists an equivalent alternating CSIT problem having
only three states: PP, DD and NN occurring for λP , λD and λN fractions of the
time, respectively, that has the same sum s.d.o.f. This observation is similar to the
case when there is no secrecy [23]. However unlike in [23], the s.d.o.f. region does
not have the same property in general as we can see the explicit dependence of the
s.d.o.f. region in (6.14)-(6.18) on λPP and λNN .
Remark 3. [Channel knowledge equivalence]
We next highlight an interesting property which shows that from the sum s.d.o.f. per-
spective, no CSIT is equivalent to delayed CSIT when λD ≥ λN , and delayed CSIT































s.d.o.f.− 1, 1− s.d.o.f.2


Figure 6.3: Trade-off between delayed and perfect CSIT.
Equivalence of delayed and no CSIT when λD ≥ λN : From a sum s.d.o.f. per-
spective, we see that when λD ≥ λN , the sum s.d.o.f. depends only on λP . Hence,
as long as λD ≥ λN holds, the N states behave as D states in the sense that, if the
N states were enhanced to D states, the sum s.d.o.f. would not increase. Essentially,
the N states can be combined with various D states and we obtain the same sum
s.d.o.f. as if every N state were replaced by a D state. Consider an example, where






th fractions of the time, respec-






in this case. The sum s.d.o.f., from (6.22),
is 2λP + λD + λN =
7
5
. Now, if we enhance the N states to D states, we get the






th of the time, respectively. The
sum s.d.o.f. of this enhanced system is still 7
5
.
Equivalence of delayed and perfect CSIT when λD ≤ λN : From a sum s.d.o.f.
perspective, we see that when λD ≤ λN , the sum s.d.o.f. depends only on λN . Hence,
in this case, if λD ≤ λN , the delayed CSIT is as good as perfect CSIT, that is, every
D state can be enhanced to a P state without any increase in the sum s.d.o.f. For















The sum s.d.o.f. for this system is 4
5
, from (6.22). By enhancing the D states to P





of the time, respectively. The sum s.d.o.f. in for this enhanced system is still 4
5
.
Remark 4. [Minimum CSIT required for a sum s.d.o.f. value]
Fig. 6.3 shows the trade-off between λP and λD for a given value of sum s.d.o.f.
The highlighted corner point in each curve shows the most efficient point in terms
of CSIT requirement. Any other feasible point either involves redundant CSIT or
unnecessary instantaneous CSIT where delayed CSIT would have sufficed. For ex-
ample, following are the minimum CSIT requirements for various sum s.d.o.f. values:
































In general, for a given value of sum s.d.o.f. = s, the minimum CSIT requirements
are given by:





s− 1, 1− s
2
)





, if 0 ≤ s ≤ 1.
(6.27)
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Remark 5. [Cost of security]
We recall that in the case with no security [23], the sum d.o.f. is given by,
sum d.o.f. = 2− 2λN
3
− max(λN , 2λD)
3
. (6.28)
Comparing with (6.22), we see that the loss in d.o.f. that must be incurred to
incorporate secrecy constraints is given by,




λN , if λN ≥ 2λD
2
3
(2λN − λD), if 2λD ≥ λN ≥ λD
1
3
(λN + λD), if λD ≥ λN .
(6.29)
If we define α = λD/(λD + λN), we can rewrite (6.29) as follows,





















We show this loss as a function of α in Fig. 6.4. Note that λD + λN is the fraction
of the time a user feeds back imperfect (delayed or none) CSIT. If this fraction
is fixed, increasing the fraction of the delayed CSIT decreases the penalty due to
the security constraints, but only to a certain extent. When λN ≥ λD, increasing
















Figure 6.4: Cost of security.
constraints. However, once the fraction of the delayed CSIT (state D) matches that
of no CSIT (N), that is, λD ≥ λN , increasing the fraction of delayed CSIT further
does not reduce the penalty any more.
Remark 6. [S.d.o.f. characterization of individual CSIT states]
As an additional relevant result, we also characterize the respective s.d.o.f. regions
for the 6 individual CSIT states. To the best of our knowledge, the only CSIT states
for which the s.d.o.f. regions were previously known are: PP (with sum s.d.o.f.=
2), DD (with sum s.d.o.f.= 1), PN (with s.d.o.f.= 1), and NN (with s.d.o.f.= 0).
For the remaining two CSIT states, i.e., PD and DN, we establish the optimal
s.d.o.f. regions. In particular, for the PD CSIT state, we show in Appendix 6.8.4
that the s.d.o.f. region is given by d1 + d2 ≤ 1. For the DN state, we show in
Appendix 6.8.5 that the s.d.o.f. region is given by d1 + d2 ≤ 1/2. As the next
remark shows, these complete set of results for the individual CSIT states confirm
the synergistic benefits (or lack thereof) in various alternating CSIT scenarios.
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Remark 7. [Synergistic benefits]
It was shown in [23] that by coding across different states one can achieve higher
sum d.o.f. than by optimal encoding for each state separately and time sharing. A
similar result holds true in our case as well. We illustrate this with the help of a
few examples.
Example 1. Consider a special case where only states PD and DP occur, each
for half of the time. We show that the optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 3
2
in this case; see
(6.22) here. The best achievable scheme for the PD (or DP) state alone was known
to achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 1. This was either by treating the PD state as a PN state
and zero forcing, or by treating PD as a DD state. However a converse proof showing
the optimality of 1 sum s.d.o.f. was not known. In Appendix 6.8.4, we present a
converse proof to show that the sum s.d.o.f. of 1 is indeed optimal for the PD state
alone. Thus, by encoding for each state separately and time sharing between the
PD and DP states, we can achieve only 1 sum s.d.o.f., whereas joint encoding across
the states achieves sum s.d.o.f. of 3
2
. Thus, we have synergistic benefit of 50% in
this case.
Example 2. Consider another special case with three states: PD, DP and
NN each occurring for one-third of the time. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. is 4
3
. If we
encode for each state separately and time share between them, we can achieve a
sum s.d.o.f. of 1
3
× 1 + 1
3
× 1 + 1
3
× 0 = 2
3
, since the NN state does not provide any
secrecy. If we encode across the PD and DP states optimally and then time share






× 0 = 1 sum s.d.o.f. Thus, in this case
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too, we get synergistic benefit by coding across all the states together.
Example 3. Now, assume we have the following three states: PN, NP and DD
each occurring for one-third of the time. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. for this case is
4
3
. On the other hand, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the PN state alone is 1, [10], and
that of the DD state alone is also 1, [15]. Thus, by separately encoding for each
state and time sharing, we can achieve 1
3
× 1 + 1
3
× 1 + 1
3
× 1 = 1 sum s.d.o.f. Note
that the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for PN and NP states, each occurring for half of the
time, is also 1, using (6.22). Thus, by optimal encoding for PN and NP together
and time sharing with the DD state also yields sum s.d.o.f. of 1. Therefore, there is
synergistic benefit to be gained by coding across all the states together in this case
too.
Example 4. Consider the case where the two states, DD and NN occur for equal
fractions of time. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the DD state alone is 1 [15]. The NN
state, by itself does not provide any secrecy and its s.d.o.f. = 0. Thus, by encoding







achievable. However, by jointly encoding across both the DD and NN states, the
optimal sum s.d.o.f. of 1 is achievable. Thus, we have synergistic benefit of 100% in
terms of sum s.d.o.f. in this case.
Example 5. Finally, consider the case where the two states, DN and ND oc-
cur for equal fractions of time. We show in Appendix 6.8.5 that the optimal sum
s.d.o.f. for DN state is 1
2
. Thus, by separately encoding across the individual states,
only 1
2
sum s.d.o.f. is achievable. However, by jointly encoding across both the DN
and DN states, the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of 1 is achievable. Thus, we have synergistic
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benefit of 100% in terms of sum s.d.o.f. in this case.
Remark 7. [Lack of synergistic benefits]
There are some situations where joint encoding across alternating states does not
yield any benefit in terms of the s.d.o.f. region. For example, consider a case with
only 2 states, PN and NP, each occurring for half of the time. The optimal sum
s.d.o.f. for the PN state alone is 1, which is achieved by zero forcing. The optimal
sum s.d.o.f. of both PN and NP states together is also 1; thus, encoding for each state
separately is optimal in this case. Indeed separable encoding for each individual state
suffices to achieve the full s.d.o.f. region as well. This result is perhaps surprising,
since in the case with no security, we do get synergistic benefits of joint encoding
across the PN and NP states. The optimal sum s.d.o.f. with joint encoding is 3
2
,
while that for each state alone is 1, [23].
6.4 Constituent Schemes
Before we present the achievability of the s.d.o.f. region, we first present the key con-
stituent schemes that will be instrumental in the proof. We combine these schemes
carefully and time share between them to achieve the s.d.o.f. region. A summary of
these constituent schemes is shown in Table 6.1. Before we discuss the individual
schemes we make the following remark that applies to all the schemes presented
here.
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Summary of Constituent Schemes (CS)
Sum s.d.o.f. CS Notation CSIT States Fractions of States (d1, d2)





































































































































Table 6.1: Constituent schemes.
6.4.1 A Note on the Achievable Security Guarantee
Each scheme described in the following sections can be outlined as follows. We
neglect the impact of noise at high SNR. Then, to achieve a certain s.d.o.f. pair
(d1, d2), we send n1 symbols u = (u1, . . . , un1) and n2 symbols v = (v1, . . . , vn2)
intended for the first and second receivers, respectively, in nB slots, such that d1 =
n1/nB and d2 = n2/nB. Finally, we argue that the leakage of information symbols









n,Hn) ≤ εn. (6.31)
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To achieve this, we view the nB slots described in the scheme as a block and treat the
equivalent channel from u to (Y,H) and (Z,H) as a memoryless wiretap channel
(with (Y,H) being the legitimate receiver) by ignoring the CSI of the previous
block. We do the same for the channel from v to (Z,H) and (Y,H) (with (Z,H) as
the legitimate receiver). Note also that no information about H is used to create the
codebooks for u and v in any of the schemes. More formally, the following secrecy
rate pair is achievable for receivers 1 and 2, respectively, from [1]:
R1 =I(u; Y,H)− I(v; Z,H) = I(u; Y|H)− I(v; Z|H) (6.32)
R2 =I(v; Z,H)− I(u; Y,H) = I(v; Z|H)− I(u; Y|H), (6.33)
where we noted that u and v are all independent of H. Using the proposed scheme,
u (resp., v) can be reconstructed from (Y,H) (resp., (Z,H)) to within a noise
distortion. Thus,
I(u; Y|H) =n1 logP + o(logP ) (6.34)
I(v; Z|H) =n2 logP + o(logP ). (6.35)
Also, for each scheme,
I(v; Y|H) =o(logP ) (6.36)
I(u; Z|H) =o(logP ). (6.37)
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Thus, from (6.32) and (6.33), the achievable secure rates in each block are,
R1 =n1 logP + o(logP ) (6.38)
R2 =n2 logP + o(logP ). (6.39)








logP + o(logP ). (6.41)
These rates clearly yield the required s.d.o.f. pair (d1, d2), while also conforming to
our stringent security requirement.
In the following subsections, we now present the achievability of each scheme
in detail.
Notation: A particular sum s.d.o.f. value can be achieved in various ways
through alternation between different possible sets of CSIT states. To this end, we
use the following notation: if there are r schemes achieving a particular s.d.o.f. value,
we denote these schemes as: Ssum s.d.o.f.1 , S
sum s.d.o.f.
2 , . . . , S
sum s.d.o.f.
r . For example, in
Table 6.1, for achieving the sum s.d.o.f. value of 1, we present r = 3 distinct schemes





Given a 1 × 2 channel vector H(t), we denote by H(t)⊥, a 2 × 1 beamform-
ing vector that is orthogonal to the 1 × 2 channel vector H(t); in other words,
H(t)H(t)⊥ = 0.
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6.4.2 Scheme Achieving Sum s.d.o.f. of 2
A sum s.d.o.f. of 2 is achievable only in the state PP, that is, when the transmitter has
perfect CSIT from both users. This is achievable using zero-forcing. The following
scheme achieves a sum s.d.o.f. of 2.
6.4.2.1 Scheme S2
The scheme S2 uses the state PP and achieves the rate pair (d1, d2) = (1, 1). The
scheme is as follows. We wish to send confidential symbols u and v to receivers 1
and 2, respectively, in one time slot, thus achieving a sum s.d.o.f. of 2. Since the
transmitter knows both channel coefficients H1 and H2, it sends,




⊥ is a 2× 1 beamforming vector that is orthogonal to the 1× 2 channel
vector Hi(t) for i = 1, 2. This is to ensure that the symbols do not leak to unintended
receivers. For s.d.o.f. calculations, we disregard the additive noise and the outputs








which allows both receivers to decode their respective messages. Also, since u does
not appear at all in Z, the confidentiality of u is guaranteed. Similarly, the confi-
dentiality of v too is satisfied.
6.4.3 Schemes Achieving Sum s.d.o.f. of 3/2






In this subsection, we present the scheme S
3/2











We wish to send 3 confidential symbols from the transmitter to each of the
receivers in 4 channel uses at high P (that is negligible noise). Let us denote by
(u1, u2, u3) and (v1, v2, v3) the confidential symbols intended for receivers 1 and 2,
respectively. Also, in 2 of the 4 channel uses, the channel is in state PD; in the
remaining 2 uses, the channel is in state DP. The scheme is as follows:
1) At time t = 1, S(1) = PD: As the transmitter knows H1(1), it sends:




⊥ = 0, and q denotes an artificial noise distributed as CN (0, P ).
Here H1(1)
⊥ is a 2× 1 beamforming vector orthogonal to the 1× 2 channel vector
H1(1) of receiver 1 that ensures that the artificial noise q does not create interference
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at receiver 1. The receivers’ outputs are:
Y (1) = h11(1)u1 (6.46)
Z(1) = h21(1)u1 + qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥ ∆= K. (6.47)
Thus, receiver 1 has observed u1 while receiver 2 gets a linear combination of u1 and
q, which we denote as K. Due to delayed CSIT from receiver 2, the transmitter can
reconstruct K in the next channel use and use it for transmission.
2) At time t = 2, S(2) = DP: The transmitter knows H2(2) and K. It sends
X(2) = [v1 +K v2 +K]
T + u2H2(2)
⊥. (6.48)
The received signals are:
Y (2) =h11(2)v1 + h12(2)v2 + (h11(2) + h12(2))K + u2H1(2)H2(2)
⊥ (6.49)
=L1(v1, v2, K) + u2H1(2)H2(2)
⊥ (6.50)
Z(2) =h21(2)v1 + h22(2)v2 + (h21(2) + h22(2))K (6.51)
∆
=L2(v1, v2, K), (6.52)
where we have defined L1(v1, v2, K) and L2(v1, v2, K) as linear combinations of v1, v2
and K at receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
3) At time t = 3, S(3) = DP: The transmitter knows H2(3) and L1(v1, v2, K)
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(via delayed CSIT from t = 2). Using these, it transmits:
X(3) = [L1(v1, v2, K) 0]
T + u3H2(3)
⊥, (6.53)
and the channel outputs are:
Y (3) = h11(3)L1(v1, v2, K) + u3H1(3)H2(3)
⊥ (6.54)
Z(3) = h21(3)L1(v1, v2, K). (6.55)
At the end of this step, note that, receiver 2 can decode v1 and v2 by first eliminating
K using Z(1) and Z(3) to get a linear combination of v1 and v2, which it can then
use with Z(2) to solve for v1 and v2.
4) At time t = 4, S(4) = PD: The transmitter knows H1(4) and it sends
X(4) = [L1(v1, v2, K) 0]
T + v3H1(4)
⊥, (6.56)
and the channel outputs are:
Y (4) = h11(4)L1(v1, v2, K) (6.57)
Z(4) = h21(4)L1(v1, v2, K) + v3H2(4)H1(4)
⊥. (6.58)







t = 1 t = 2 t = 3 t = 4
u1
! K
State PD DP DP PD
decode (v1, v2, v3)
decode (u1, u2, u3)
CSIT
βL1(v1, v2,K) + v3
α1L1(v1, v2,K) + u2 α2L1(v1, v2,K) + u3 L1(v1, v2,K)
L2(v1, v2,K) L1(v1, v2,K)
L(u1, q)
Figure 6.5: Achieving 3
2
s.d.o.f. using scheme S
3/2
1 .
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Using Y, receiver 1 can decode all three symbols (u1, u2, u3) and using Z, receiver 2
can decode (v1, v2, v3). Next we prove that the information leakage is only o(logP ).
Security guarantees :
We consider the four slots as a single block and the equivalent channel from
u = (u1, u2, u3) to (Y,H) and (Z,H) as a memoryless channel by ignoring the CSI
of the previous block. We do the same for the channel from v = (v1, v2, v3) to
(Y,H) and (Z,H). Recall that all the random variables {ui, vi, i = 1, 2, 3} and q
are independent and distributed as CN (0, P ).
First, let us consider the confidentiality of the first user’s symbols u. The
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information leakage at user 2 is:










= (logP + o(logP ))− (logP + o(logP )) (6.65)
=o(logP ), (6.66)
where (6.60) follows from the fact that Z does not have any term involving (u2, u3),
and (6.61) follows from the Markov chain u1 → K → Z.
For the second user’s symbols, the information leakage at the first receiver is:
I(v; Y|H) =I(v1, v2, v3; Y|H) (6.67)
=I(v1, v2; Y|H) (6.68)
≤I(v1, v2;L1(v1, v2, K)|H) (6.69)
=h(L1(v1, v2, K)|H)− h(L1(v1, v2, K)|v1, v2,H) (6.70)
≤ logP − h(K|v1, v2,H) + o(logP ) (6.71)
= logP − h(K|H) + o(logP ) (6.72)
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= logP − logP + o(logP ) (6.73)
=o(logP ), (6.74)
where (6.68) follows since v3 does not appear in Y and (6.69) follows from the




In this sub-section, we present the scheme S
3/2















Let us consider the utilization of CSIT in the scheme S
3/2
1 stated above. In
the first slot, delayed CSIT is required from the second user, since that knowledge
allows the transmitter to reconstruct K and use it in the second slot. Similarly,
in the second time slot, delayed CSIT from the first user is required so that the
transmitter can reconstruct L1(v1, v2, K) to transmit in the third and fourth slots.
However, in the third and fourth slots, the transmitter does not require any CSIT of
the first and second users, respectively. Thus, the same scheme works with PN and
NP states in the last two slots. Since it is essentially the same scheme interpreted





























In this sub-section, we present the scheme S
4/3













We wish to send 2 symbols to each user in 3 time slots. Let (u1, u2) and (v1, v2)
be the symbols intended for the first and second users, respectively. Fig. 6.6 shows
the scheme. It is as follows:
1) At time t = 1, S(1) = PD: As the transmitter knows H1(1), it sends:




⊥ = 0, and q denotes an artificial noise distributed as CN (0, P ).
Here H1(1)
⊥ is a 2 × 1 beamforming vector that ensures that the artificial noise q
211
does not create interference at receiver 1. The receivers’ outputs are:
Y (1) = h11(1)u1 (6.76)
Z(1) = h21(1)u1 + qH2(1)H1(1)
⊥ ∆= K. (6.77)
Thus, receiver 1 has observed u1 while receiver 2 gets a linear combination of u1 and
q, which we denote as K. Due to delayed CSIT from receiver 2, the transmitter can
reconstruct K in the next channel use and use it for transmission.
2) At time t = 2, S(2) = DP: The transmitter knows H2(2) and K. It sends
X(2) = [v1 +K v2 +K]
T + u2H2(2)
⊥. (6.78)
The received signals are:
Y (2) =h11(2)v1 + h12(2)v2 + (h11(2) + h12(2))K + u2H1(2)H2(2)
⊥ (6.79)
=L1(v1, v2, K) + u2H1(2)H2(2)
⊥ (6.80)
Z(2) =h21(2)v1 + h22(2)v2 + (h21(2) + h22(2))K
∆
=L2(v1, v2, K), (6.81)
where we have defined L1(v1, v2, K) and L2(v1, v2, K) as independent linear combi-
nations of v1, v2 and K at receivers 1 and 2, respectively.
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3) At time t = 3, S(3) = NN: The transmitter transmits:
X(3) = [L1(v1, v2, K) 0]
T . (6.82)
The receivers get:
Y (3) =h11(3)L1(v1, v2, K) (6.83)
Z(3) =h21(3)L1(v1, v2, K). (6.84)



















Using Y, receiver 1 can decode (u1, u2), while receiver 2 can decode (v1, v2) using
Z. The information leakage is only o(logP ) as we show next.
Security guarantees :
The equivocation calculation follows similar to that of the scheme S
3/2
1 . For
the first user’s symbols u = (u1, u2), we have,





where (6.86) follows from the fact that Z does not have any term involving u2, and
(6.87) follows from the Markov chain u1 → K → Z.
For the second user’s symbols, the information leakage at the first receiver is:
I(v; Y|H) ≤I(v1, v2;L1(v1, v2, K)|H) (6.89)
=h(L1(v1, v2, K)|H)− h(L1(v1, v2, K)|v1, v2,H) (6.90)
≤ logP − h(K|v1, v2,H) + o(logP ) (6.91)
= logP − h(K|H) + o(logP ) (6.92)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (6.93)
=o(logP ), (6.94)




We now present the scheme S
4/3













In this case we will send 4 symbols to each user in 6 time slots. Let u =
(u1, u2, u3, u4) and v = (v1, v2, v3, v4) be the symbols intended for the first and





















decode u = (u1, u2, u3, u4)
decode v = (v1, v2, v3, v4)
t = 4 t = 5 t = 6





1) At time t = 1, S(1) = DD: In this slot, the transmitter sends artificial noise
symbols to create keys that can be used in later slots. The channel input is
X(1) = [q1 q2]
T , (6.95)
where q1 and q2 are i.i.d. as CN (0, P ). The received signals are:
Y (1) =h11(1)q1 + h12(1)q2
∆
= K1 (6.96)
Z(1) =h21(1)q1 + h22(1)q2
∆
= K2. (6.97)
Due to delayed CSIT, the transmitter learns K1 and K2 and uses them in the next
time slots.
2) At time t = 2, S(2) = DD: In this slot, the transmitter sends:
X(2) = [u1 + u2 + v3 + v4 +K1 v1 + v2 + u3 + u4 +K2]
T . (6.98)
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The received signals are:
Y (2) = h11(2)(u1 + u2 + v3 + v4 +K1) + h12(2)(v1 + v2 + u3 + u4 +K2) (6.99)
∆
= L1(u, K1) +G1(v, K2) (6.100)
Z(2) = h21(2)(u1 + u2 + v3 + v4 +K1) + h22(2)(v1 + v2 + u3 + u4 +K2) (6.101)
∆
= L2(u, K1) +G2(v, K2). (6.102)
Note that since K1 (or K2) is known at the first (or second) receiver, it can be
removed. The unintended symbols remain buried in the artificial noise, ensuring
security. Also, if G1 (or L2) could be sent to the second (or first) receiver, it would
provide a linear combination of the intended symbols that is linearly independent
of G2 (or L1). This is what we will do in the third and fourth time slots.
3) At time t = 3, S(3) = NP: In this state, the transmitter knows H2 perfectly.
It sends,
X(3) = [G1(v, K2) 0]
T + L3(u)H2(3)
⊥, (6.103)
where L3 is linearly independent of both L1 and L2. The received signals are:
Y (3) =h11(3)G1(v, K2) + L3(u)H1(3)H2(3)
⊥ (6.104)
Z(3) =h21(3)G1(v, K2). (6.105)
4) At time t = 4, S(4) = PN: In this state, the transmitter knows H1(4)
216
perfectly. It sends,
X(4) = [L2(u, K1) 0]
T +G3(v)H1(4)
⊥, (6.106)
where G3 is linearly independent of both G1 and G2. The received signals are:
Y (4) =h11(4)L2(u, K1) (6.107)
Z(4) =h21(4)L2(u, K1) +G3(v)H2(4)H1(4)
⊥. (6.108)
Now note that if we could supply G1 and L2 to the first and second receivers,
respectively, both receivers will end up with 3 linearly independent combinations of
their intended symbols. Thus, in the next two slots, the transmitter will supply G1
and L2 to the first and second receivers, respectively, as well as send one more linearly
independent combination of the intended information symbols to each receiver.
5) At time t = 5, S(5) = PN: In this state, the transmitter knows H1(5)
perfectly. It sends,




Y (5) = h11(5)G1(v, K2) (6.110)
Z(5) = h21(5)G1(v, K2) +G4(v)H2(5)H1(5)
⊥. (6.111)
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6) At time t = 6, S(6) = NP: Now the transmitter knows H2(6) perfectly, and
it sends:
X(6) = [L2(u, K1) 0] + L4(u)H2(6)
⊥. (6.112)
The received signals are:
Y (6) = h11(6)L2(u, K1) + L4(u)H1(6)H2(6)
⊥ (6.113)
Z(6) = h21(6)L2(u, K1). (6.114)





L1(u, K1) +G1(v, K2)
α1G1(v, K2) + L3(u)
L2(u, K1)
G1(v, K2)















The information symbols can now be decoded at the intended receivers from




For the first user’s symbols u = (u1, u2, u3, u4), we have,
I(u; Z|H) ≤I(u;L2(u, K1)|H) (6.115)
=h(L2(u, K1)|H)− h(L2(u, K1)|u,H) (6.116)
≤ logP − h(K1|u,H) + o(logP ) (6.117)
= logP − h(K1|H) + o(logP ) (6.118)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (6.119)
=o(logP ), (6.120)
where (6.115) follows from the Markov chain U → L2(u, K1)→ Z.
For the second user’s symbols, the information leakage at the first receiver is:
I(v; Y|H) ≤I(v;G1(v, K2)|H) (6.121)
=h(G1(v, K2)|H)− h(G1(v, K2)|v,H) (6.122)
≤ logP − h(K2|v,H) + o(logP ) (6.123)
= logP − h(K2|H) + o(logP ) (6.124)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (6.125)
=o(logP ), (6.126)
where (6.89) follows from the Markov chain v→ G1(v, K2)→ Y.
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6.4.5 Schemes Achieving Sum s.d.o.f. of 1
6.4.5.1 Scheme S11






This scheme was presented in [15]. The scheme was used to transmit 2 information
symbols to each receiver in 4 time slots. At t = 1, the transmitter sends artificial
noise symbols using both antennas. The received signals act as keys K1 and K2 for
the respective users 1 and 2. Since there is delayed CSIT, the transmitter can re-
construct these keys and use them in the next slots. At t = 2, the transmitter sends
the two information symbols (u1, u2) intended for the first receiver linearly com-
bined with the first user’s key. Thus, the first user can retrieve a linear combination
of just its intended symbols. However, the second user gets a linear combination
L(u1, u2, K1). Due to delayed CSIT however, the transmitter can reconstruct L.
In the third slot, the roles of the receivers are reversed and the transmitter sends
the second user’s symbols (v1, v2) linearly combined with the second user’s key K2.
This allows the second user to retrieve a linear combination of just its information
symbol, which however remain secure at the first user, which receives G(v1, v2, K2).
In the fourth slot, the transmitter sends a linear combination of L and G. Essen-
tially this provides the first user with L, from which it can eliminate K1 to get
another independent linear combination of (u1, u2). A similar situation takes place
at the second user. Finally, each user has two linearly independent combinations
of two symbols and thus can decode the information symbols intended for it. The
220
information leakage is only o(logP ), as shown in [15].
6.4.5.2 Scheme S12











The scheme S11 requires delayed CSIT from at least one user for the first 3
time slots. We need to modify this scheme to ensure that delayed CSIT is required
only for 2 of the 4 time slots. Fig. 6.8 shows the new scheme. It is as follows:
1) At time t = 1, S(1) = DD: The strategy in this slot is the same as in the
scheme S11 . In this slot, the transmitter sends artificial noise symbols to create keys
that can be used in later slots. The channel input is
X(1) = [q1 q2]
T , (6.127)
where q1 and q2 are i.i.d. as CN (0, P ). The received signals are:
Y (1) =h11(1)q1 + h12(1)q2
∆
= K1 (6.128)
Z(1) =h21(1)q1 + h22(1)q2
∆
= K2. (6.129)
Due to delayed CSIT, the transmitter learns K1 and K2 and uses them in the next
time slots.
2) At time t = 2, S(2) = DD: Instead of sending only the first user’s symbols as















L1(u1, u2,K1) +G1(v1, v2,K2)
NN






Figure 6.8: Achieving sum s.d.o.f. of 1 using S12 .
It sends:
X(2) = [u1 + v1 +K1 u2 + v2 +K2]
T . (6.130)
The received signals are:
Y (2) =h11(u1 + v1 +K1) + h12(u2 + v2 +K2) (6.131)
∆
=L1(u1, u2, K1) +G1(v1, v2, K2) (6.132)
Z(2) =h21(u1 + v1 +K1) + h22(u2 + v2 +K2) (6.133)
∆
=L2(u1, u2, K1) +G2(v1, v2, K2). (6.134)
We notice that if L2 and G1 could be provided to both users, each user can get 2
linear combinations of the symbols intended for it and hence decode both symbols.
Hence, in the remaining two slots, we will transmit L2 and G1 to both users and
this will not require any CSIT from any user.
3) At time t = 3, S(3) = NN: The transmitter does not have any CSIT. It
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sends:
X(3) = [L2(u1, u2, K1) 0]
T . (6.135)
The received signals are:
Y (3) =h11(3)L2(u1, u2, K1) (6.136)
Z(3) =h21(3)L2(u1, u2, K1). (6.137)
4) At time t = 4, S(4) = NN: The transmitter sends:
X(4) = [G1(v1, v2, K2) 0]
T . (6.138)
The received signals are:
Y (4) =h11(4)G1(v1, v2, K2) (6.139)
Z(4) =h21(4)G1(v1, v2, K2). (6.140)




















Clearly, user 1 can decode (u1, u2) and user 2 can get (v1, v2). The information
leakage is at most o(logP ) as we show below.
Security guarantees :
For the first user’s symbols u = (u1, u2), we have,
I(u; Z|H) ≤I(u;L2(u, K1)|H) (6.141)
=h(L2(u, K1)|H)− h(L2(u, K1)|u,H) (6.142)
≤ logP − h(K1|u,H) + o(logP ) (6.143)
= logP − h(K1|H) + o(logP ) (6.144)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (6.145)
=o(logP ), (6.146)
where (6.141) follows from the Markov chain U → L2(u, K1)→ Z.
For the second user’s symbols v = (v1, v2), the information leakage at the first
receiver is:
I(v; Y|H) ≤I(v;G1(v, K2)|H) (6.147)
=h(G1(v, K2)|H)− h(G1(v, K2)|v,H) (6.148)
≤ logP − h(K2|v,H) + o(logP ) (6.149)
= logP − h(K2|H) + o(logP ) (6.150)
= logP − logP + o(logP ) (6.151)
=o(logP ), (6.152)
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where (6.147) follows from the Markov chain v→ G1(v, K2)→ Y.
6.4.5.3 Scheme S13










). In particular, we present a scheme which achieves







as a function of the block length n. Taking








The scheme is shown in Fig. 6.9. Unlike all the other schemes in this chapter
where the optimal sum s.d.o.f. can be achieved within a finite number of time slots,
this scheme cannot achieve sum s.d.o.f. of 1 in a finite number of slots. Indeed,
there does not exist a scheme that can achieve sum s.d.o.f. of 1 in finitely many
slots. To see why, assume that there exists such a scheme with n slots. In this




Now, note that the delayed CSIT in the last slot cannot be used; thus, the scheme
would work equally well if the last slot were NN instead of DN or ND. However,
changing the state in the last slot to NN would imply λD <
1
2
, which in turn implies
that d1 + d2 < 1 from (6.18). Thus, no scheme that uses only a finite number of
slots can achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 1.
Here we provide an asymptotic scheme that achieves a sum s.d.o.f. of 4n
4n+1
in n
slots. As the number of slots n→∞, the sum s.d.o.f. approaches 1. We wish to send
2n symbols to each receiver in 4n+ 1 time slots. The scheme involves transmission



































































Figure 6.9: Achieving sum s.d.o.f. of 4n/(4n+ 1) using scheme S13 .
the last block D has n + 1 slots; thus, a total of 4n + 1 time slots are required in
the scheme. The scheme is as follows:
1) In block A, S(t) = DN: In each time slot i in block A, the transmitter
generates two artificial noise symbols and sends them using its two antennas. The
receivers receive different linear combinations of the two artificial noise symbols
K2i−1 and K2i as shown in Fig. 6.9. Due to delayed CSIT from the first user, the
transmitter can reconstruct each of K2i−1, i = 1, . . ., by the end of block A. Thus,
they can act as shared keys between the transmitter and the first receiver. However,
since the second receiver does not feedback any CSIT (due to the fact that the
state in the block is DN), the transmitter cannot reconstruct the observations of the
second receiver at the end of block A.
2) In block B, S(t) = ND: At the beginning of this slot, the transmitter
has the keys K2i−1, i = 1, . . . , n shared with the first user. It uses these keys to
send information intended for the first user. It creates 2n linearly independent
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combinations of the 2n symbols intended for the first receiver: a1, . . . , a2n. In slot
i, it transmits
XB(i) = [a2i−1 +K2i−1 a2i +K2i−1]
T . (6.153)
The first and second receivers receive linearly independent combinations given by
L2i−1(A2i−1, K2i−1) and L2i(A2i, K2i−1) in slot i, where Ai denotes the ith linear
combination of the first user’s symbols, as shown in Fig. 6.9. Since the state is
ND, the second user provides delayed CSIT to the transmitter. In the ith slot, the
second user feeds back HA2 (i), that is, the channel coefficients of the second user
in slot i within block A. Note that this is unlike any other achievable scheme we
have encountered so far; in all other schemes, the receiver feeds back the channel
coefficients of the current slot which appears as delayed CSIT at the beginning of the
next slot. Thus, at the end of slot B, the transmitter has all the channel coefficients
of the second user from block A; thus, it can reconstruct the outputs of the second
receiver in block A, K2i, i = 1, . . . , n, which now act as shared keys between the
transmitter and the second receiver.
3) In block C, S(t) = ND: At the beginning of this slot, the transmitter
has the keys K2i, i = 1, . . . , n shared with the second user. It uses these keys to
send information securely to the second user. It creates 2n linearly independent
combinations of the 2n symbols intended for the second receiver: b1, . . . , a2n. In slot
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i, it transmits
XC(i) = [b2i−1 +K2i−1 b2i +K2i−1]
T . (6.154)
The first and second receivers receive linearly independent combinationsG2i−1(B2i−1, K2i)
and G2i(B2i, K2i) in slot i, where Bi denotes the ith linear combination of the sec-
ond user’s symbols, as shown in Fig. 6.9. As CSIT, in the ith slot, the second user
feeds back the channel coefficients HB2 (i), which allows the transmitter to recon-
struct L2i(A2i, K2i−1). Note that now if L2i(A2i, K2i−1) and G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i) could
be exchanged, each of the receivers would receive 2n linear combinations of the 2n
symbols intended for it, thus, allowing both receivers to decode their own messages.
However, G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i) is not known to the transmitter yet, since the first user
has not fed back its channel in block C. This CSIT will be obtained in the next
block.
4) In block D, S(t) = ND: The transmitter wishes to send the symbols
L2i(A2i, K2i−1) + G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i), i = 1, . . . , n, in this block. To do so, the trans-
mitter does not transmit anything in the first slot in this block. It only acquires the
channel coefficients HC1 (i) from the first user who is supplying delayed CSIT in this
block. In the ith slot, i = 1, . . . , n, the transmitter acquires the channel coefficients
HC1 (i) and transmits:
XD(i) = [L2i−2(A2i−2, K2i−3) +G2i−3(B2i−3, K2i−2) 0]
T , i = 2, . . . , n+ 1.
(6.155)
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The first user can now obtain L2i−1(A2i−1, K2i−1) and L2i(A2i, K2i−1) for every i =
1, . . . , n, while the second user obtains G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i) and G2i(B2i, K2i) for i =
1, . . . , n. Now by eliminating the respective keys, each user can decode the 2n
symbols intended for it from the 2n linearly independent combinations available to
it. Also the keys ensure the confidentiality, and the information leakage is only
o(logP ), as we show next.
Security guarantees :
Let u = (a1, . . . , a2n) and v = (b1, . . . , b2n) be the symbols intended for users
1 and 2, respectively. The leakage of u at user 2 is given by
I(u; Z|H) ≤I(u; {L2i(A2i, K2i−1)}ni=1 |H) (6.156)
=h({L2i(A2i, K2i−1)}ni=1 |H)− h({L2i(A2i, K2i−1)}
n
i=1 |u,H) (6.157)
≤n logP − h({K2i−1}ni=1 |H) + o(logP ) (6.158)
=n logP − n logP + o(logP ) (6.159)
=o(logP ), (6.160)
where (6.156) follows due to the Markov chain u → {L2i(A2i, K2i−1)}ni=1 → Z, and
(6.159) follows from the fact that {K2i−1}ni=1 are mutually independent and each is
distributed as N (0, P ).
Similarly, for the second user’s symbols, the leakage at the first user is given
by,
I(v; Y|H) ≤I(v; {G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i)}ni=1 |H) (6.161)
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≤n logP − h({K2i}ni=1 |H) + o(logP ) (6.163)
=n logP − n logP + o(logP ) (6.164)
=o(logP ), (6.165)
where (6.161) follows due to the Markov chain v → {G2i−1(B2i−1, K2i)}ni=1 → Y,
and (6.164) follows from the fact that {K2i}ni=1 are mutually independent and each
is distributed as N (0, P ).






1 uses the state DD to achieve (d1, d2) = (
2
3
, 0). Such a scheme was
presented in [15]. The scheme can be summarized as follows. At time t = 1, the
transmitter sends two artificial noise symbols using its two antennas. Each user
receives a different linear combination of the noise symbols and they act as keys.
Let K1 and K2 be the keys at receivers 1 and 2, respectively. Due to delayed CSIT,
the transmitter can reconstruct K1. At time t = 2, the transmitter sends the two
symbols intended for the first receiver (u1, u2), linearly combined with K1. Receiver
1 can remove K1 from its received signal and get one linear combination of (u1, u2)
at the end of this slot. The second user receives a linear combination of u1, u2 and
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K1, say L(u1, u2, K1); however, not knowing K1, it cannot decode the information
symbols. Due to delayed CSIT, the transmitter learns L and transmits it in t = 3.
The second receiver gets no new information but the first receiver can get a second
linear combination of (u1, u2) by eliminating K1 from L. This allows receiver 1 to











) to achieve (d1, d2) =
(2
3
, 0). We note that in scheme S
2/3
1 , the delayed CSIT in slot t = 3 is not required.











Finally, the scheme S
2/3








achieve (d1, d2) = (
2
3
, 0). We notice that instead of having DD state in the first two
slots, it suffices to have DN in the first slot (since the transmitter does not need
K2) and ND in the second slot (since the transmitter only needs to reconstruct the












Now that we have all the required constituent schemes summarized in Table 6.1, we
proceed to show how these schemes can be combined to achieve the region stated in
Theorem 1. We restate the region of Theorem 1 here for convenience:
d1 ≤ min
(












3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (6.168)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (6.169)
d1 + d2 ≤ 2(λP + λD). (6.170)
We classify this region into two cases:
• Case A: in which d1 + d2 bound of (6.170) is inactive. This corresponds to
the condition
1 + λP ≤ 2λP + 2λD, (6.171)
which is equivalent to
λN ≤ λD. (6.172)
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• Case B: in which d1 + d2 bound of (6.170) is active which corresponds to
λN > λD. (6.173)
In the next two sub-sections, we present the achievability for each of these cases
separately.
6.5.1 Achievability for Case A: λD ≥ λN
For Case A, the s.d.o.f. region reduces to:
d1 ≤ min
(












3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP (6.176)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λP . (6.177)
Depending on which single user bound is active, we consider two cases:
1. 2+2λP−λPP
3




≥ 1 − λNN , which is equivalent to the condition λDD + 2λDN ≤
2λNN .


































(2λNN − λDD − 2λDN + λPP , 1− λNN )
(1− λNN , 2λNN − λDD − 2λDN + λPP )
(b) λDD + 2λDN ≤ 2λNN .
Figure 6.10: s.d.o.f. regions in case A.
6.5.1.1 Achievability of Point P1
We first show the achievability of the point P1 in both cases. To do so, let us consider
the two cases one by one:
1. λDD + 2λDN ≥ 2λNN : In this case, the single user bounds are:
d1 ≤




2 + 2λP − λPP
3
. (6.179)






. To achieve this point,
using the state PP, we achieve (1, 1), with PD,DP,PN,NP, we achieve the
pair (1, 0) either through zero-forcing, or by transmitting artificial noise in a











), we achieve the pair (2
3





3 , respectively. Essentially, the NN state can be fully
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Time sharing yields the following s.d.o.f. pair:
d2 = λPP (6.180)






(λDD + 2λDN + λNN) (6.181)
= 2λP − λPP +
2
3
(λDD + λNN) (6.182)
= 2λP − λPP +
2
3
(1− 2λP + λPP ) (6.183)
=
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
. (6.184)
2. λDD + 2λDN ≤ 2λNN : In this case the single user bounds are:
d1 ≤1− λNN (6.185)
d2 ≤1− λNN . (6.186)
Again, we wish to achieve the point P1 in Fig. 6.10b. The point P1 is given
by:
P1 : (d1, d2) = (1− λNN , λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD)). (6.187)
Here we consider two further subcases
• λNN ≤ λDD + λDN : In this case, to achieve the point P1, we first use
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up the full DN and ND states with a part of the NN state using scheme
S
2/3
3 . We alternate the remaining (λNN − λDN) duration of NN state




2 . Note that in this
subcase, 0 ≤ 2(λDD + λDN − λNN) ≤ λDD. We use the state DD for
duration 2(λDD + λDN − λNN) and state NN for duration (λDD + λDN −
λNN) together using scheme S
2/3







remaining (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD) duration of the state NN is alternated
with the remaining (2λNN −2λDN −λDD) duration of state DD using the







. The state PP allows us to
achieve the s.d.o.f. pair (1, 1) while the remaining states PD, DP, PN, and
NP each achieves (1, 0). Thus, by using time sharing, the s.d.o.f. pair is:
























×2(2λNN − 2λDN − λDD)
=λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD), (6.190)
which is precisely the point P1.
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• λNN ≥ λDD +λDN : In this case, the state NN cannot be completely used
with the states DD, DN and ND. But we note that λD ≥ λN implies
that λD ≥ λNN . We first use up the DN and ND states by alternating
with the NN state using scheme S
2/3
3 . A portion λDD of the remaining








. The remaining (λNN − λDN − λDD) portion of
the NN state is used with the PD and DP states through the scheme S
4/3
1







. For the remainder of the state PD, DP and
the states PN, NP, we can achieve the pair (1, 0), while (1, 1) is achieved
in the PP state. By time sharing, we get












×3(λNN − λDN − λDD)

















=λPP + 2λNN − 2λDN − λDD, (6.194)
which is again the point P1.
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6.5.1.2 Achieving the Sum s.d.o.f. Achieving Point P2
The point P2 corresponds to:









We rewrite the condition λD ≥ λN corresponding to case A as:
λPD + λDD ≥ λPN + λNN . (6.196)
From this condition it is not immediately clear how the constituent schemes should
be jointly utilized. Hence we break this condition into three mutually exclusive
cases:
1. Sub-case A1: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN ,
2. Sub-case A2: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN ,
3. Sub-case A3: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN .
Now, we consider these three sub-cases one by one:
Sub-case A1: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN . In this sub-case, the original condition
λD ≥ λN is automatically satisfied. For this sub-case, it is clear that the states PN





s.d.o.f. The remaining fraction of time for PD (and DP) is hence: λPD −
λPN . The state NN can be fully utilized along with DD to achieve 1 s.d.o.f. using
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the scheme S12 . The DN and ND states are alternated with each other to achieve 1
s.d.o.f. Thus, we achieve the following sum s.d.o.f.:








×(2λPD + 2λPN) + 1︸︷︷︸
S12
×(λDD + λNN) + 2λDN
= 2λPP + 3λPD + 3λPN + λDD + λNN + 2λDN (6.197)
= 1 + λP . (6.198)
Sub-case A2: λPD ≥ λPN , λDD ≤ λNN . As in sub-case A1, we can fully alternate
the PN and NP states with the PD and DP states using the scheme S
3/2
2 to achieve
the s.d.o.f. of 3
2
. Since λDD ≤ λNN , we instead fully alternate the state DD along
with NN using scheme S12 to achieve a sum s.d.o.f. of 1. The remaining fraction of
the NN state is λNN − λDD which can be alternated with the remaining fraction of
(PD,DP), which is λPD−λPN as long as λPD−λPN ≥ λNN −λDD. This achieves 43
sum s.d.o.f. Indeed, this is feasible as this is precisely the condition λD ≥ λN . The
DN and ND states are alternated with each other to achieve 1 s.d.o.f.























×2(λPD − λPN − λNN + λDD) (6.199)
=2λPP + 6λPN + 2λDD + 4λNN − 4λDD + 3λPD + 3λDD − 3λPN
− 3λNN + 2λDN (6.200)
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=2λPP + 3λPD + 3λPN + λDD + λNN + 2λDN (6.201)
=1 + λP . (6.202)
Sub-case A3: λPD ≤ λPN , λDD ≥ λNN . Unlike the previous two sub-cases, here,
we cannot fully alternate the PN and NP states with the PD and DP states. Instead,
we fully use up the PD and DP states with a part of the PN and NP states using
scheme S
3/2
2 to achieve the sum s.d.o.f. of
3
2
. The remaining duration of PN (or the
NP) state is λPN − λPD. Now, we can also fully alternate the NN state with DD
since λDD ≥ λNN using the scheme S12 to achieve the sum s.d.o.f. of 1; and thus,
the remaining fraction of DD state is λDD − λNN . We now alternate the remaining
PN and NP states with the remaining DD state using the scheme S
4/3
2 to achieve
the sum s.d.o.f. of 4
3
. For this to be feasible, we require λDD − λNN ≥ λPN − λPD
which is again precisely the condition λD ≥ λN . The remaining DD state achieves
sum s.d.o.f. of 1 using scheme S11 . The DN and ND states are alternated with each
other to achieve 1 s.d.o.f.

















×(3(λPN − λPD)) + 1︸︷︷︸
S11
×(λDD − λNN − λPN + λPD) + 2λDN
(6.203)
=2λPP + 6λPD + 2λNN + 4λPN − 4λPD + λPD + λDD − λPN
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− λNN + 2λDN (6.204)
=2λPP + 3λPD + 3λPN + λDD + λNN + 2λDN (6.205)
=1 + λP . (6.206)
Hence, for Case A, i.e., when λD ≥ λN , we have the complete characterization
of the s.d.o.f. region.
6.5.2 Achievability for Case B: λN > λD
In this case, the 3d1 + d2/d1 + 3d2 bounds are inactive at the symmetric sum rate
point. However, these 3d1 + d2/d1 + 3d2 bounds play a role at other points in
the region, in particular, when one of the users requires full secure rate, the 3d1 +
d2/d1 +3d2 bounds are relevant in some cases. Thus, these bounds are still partially
relevant. Based on whether the 3d1 + d2/d1 + 3d2 bounds are partially relevant or
completely irrelevant, we divide our achievability into two broad cases:
1. 3d1 + d2 bounds are partially relevant, at the point where one user requires
full secret rate,
2. 3d1 + d2 bounds are completely irrelevant to the region.
Now let us investigate each of these two cases individually.
6.5.2.1 When 3d1 + d2 Bounds are Partially Relevant
This case happens when the intersection of the lines defined by the 3d1 + d2 bound








(λP + λN , λP + 2λD − λN)










(a) λDD + 2λDN ≥ 2λNN .
Q
Q′
(2λNN − λDD − 2λDN + λPP , 1− λNN)
(1− λNN , 2λNN − λDD − 2λDN + λPP )
(λP + λN , λP + 2λD − λN)





(b) λDD + 2λDN ≤ 2λNN .
Figure 6.11: s.d.o.f. regions in case B when 3d1+d2 and d1+3d2 bounds are partially
active.
single user bounds and the d1 + d2 bound. We note that this depends on which of
the single user bounds is active, giving rise to two cases, as shown in Fig. 6.11:
• 1− λNN ≥ 2+2λP−λPP3 , in which case, the 3d1 + d2 bounds are always relevant,
since λPP ≤ 2(λP +λD)− 2+2λP−λPP3 . In this case, when one user requires full
rate, it suffices to achieve extremal point given by:
P : (d1, d2) =
(





• 1− λNN ≤ 2+2λP−λPP3 , in which case, the 3d1 + d2 bounds are relevant as long
as λNN ≤ λD. We will need to show the achievability of one of the extremal
points when one of the users requires full rate, given by:
Q : (d1, d2) = (1− λNN , λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD)). (6.208)
However, we note that in both cases, the extremal points that achieve the sum rate
are defined by the intersection of the lines 3d1+d2 = 2+2λP and d1+d2 = 2(λP+λD).
These points are symmetric with respect to the line d1 = d2 and it suffices to show
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the achievability of either one of them. As shown in the figures, it suffices to achieve
the point
S : (d1, d2) = (λP + λN , λP + 2λD − λN). (6.209)
Thus, to show the achievability of the full region, we need to show how the points
P , Q and S are achieved in their relevant cases. We will begin with point S since it
remains unaffected by which of the single user bounds is active.
The sum rate point S:
Now we are effectively operating under the constraint λNN ≤ λD ≤ λN , and
wish to achieve the point (λP + λN , λP + 2λD − λN). From this condition it is not
immediately clear how the constituent schemes should be jointly utilized. Hence
we focus on the second half of the inequality, which simplifies to λPD + λDD ≤
λPN + λNN , and break this condition into three mutually exclusive cases:
• Sub-case B1: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN ,
• Sub-case B2: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN ,
• Sub-case B3: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN .
Now let us consider each case one by one:
Sub-case B1: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN : In this case, the full DD state will be








The duration of the remaining NN state is (λNN −λDD). Now if λNN −λDD ≤ λDN ,




3 achieving the pair (
2
3





) using the scheme S13 . The PD and DP states are fully alternated with the
PN and NP states using scheme S
3/2







. The remaining PN






















×2(λDN − λNN + λDD)
=λPP + λPD + λDN + λNN + 2λPN















×2(λDN − λNN + λDD)
=λPP + 3λPD + 2λDD + λDN − λNN
=λP + 2λD − λN . (6.211)
If on the other hand, λNN − λDD ≥ λDN , the remaining state NN cannot be
fully alternated with the states DN and ND. However, λNN ≤ λDN+λDD+λPD from
our original condition. Therefore, the full DN and ND states are alternated with
a part of the NN state using scheme S
2/3
3 achieving the pair (
2
3
, 0). The remaining
duration of the NN state is (λNN − λDD − λDN), which can be fully alternated with
the PD and DP states using the scheme S
4/3







































×4(λPD − (λNN − λDN − λDD))
+ 1× 2(λPN − λPD + (λNN − λDN − λDD))


















×4(λPD − (λNN − λDN − λDD))
=λP + 2λD − λN . (6.213)
Sub-case B2: λPD ≥ λPN and λDD ≤ λNN : In this case, since λNN ≥ λDD,
the entire DD state is alternated with a portion of the NN state using scheme S12 to







. The remaining duration of the NN state is λNN−λDD.
Now if λNN − λDD ≤ λPD, the remaining NN state is used with a part of the PD
and DP states in scheme S
4/3







. The remaining portion of
the PD and DP states can then be utilized with the PN and NP states using scheme
S
3/2







. The remaining PN and NP states are utilized to just




























+ 1× (2λPN − 2 (λPD − (λNN − λDD))) (6.214)






















=λPP + 2λDD + 3λPD − λNN + λDN (6.217)
=λP + 2λD − λN . (6.218)
If on the other hand, λNN − λDD ≥ λPD, the full PD and DP states will be used up
with a part of the remaining NN state using scheme S
4/3






The remaining duration of the NN state is λNN − λDD − λPD, which is less than
λDN from our original condition. Therefore, this remaining NN state can be fully
utilized with the DN and ND states using scheme S
2/3








), while the PN and NP states
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×2(λDN + λDD + λPD − λNN) + 1× 2λPN (6.219)
=λPP + λPD + 2λPN + λDN + λNN (6.220)















×2(λDN + λDD + λPD − λNN)
=λPP + 2λDD + 3λPD + λDN − λNN (6.222)
=λP + 2λD − λN . (6.223)
Sub-case B3: λPD ≤ λPN and λDD ≥ λNN : To achieve the sum rate point, we
should alternate the entire PD and DP states with part of the PN and NP states using
the scheme S
3/2
2 . Also the entire NN state should be alternated with the DD state
using the scheme S12 . The remaining DD state can then be fully utilized with a part of
the remaining PN and NP states using scheme S
4/3
2 , since, λDD−λNN ≤ λPN−λPD.
The remaining PN and NP states will be exploited to achieve the s.d.o.f. pair (1, 0).


























+ 1× (2(λPN − λPD)− 2(λDD − λNN)) (6.224)
=λPP + λPD + 2λPN + λNN + λDN (6.225)

























=λPP + 3λPD + 2λDD − λNN + λDN (6.228)
=λP + 2λD − λN . (6.229)
The points P and Q:






when 1 − λNN ≥ 2+2λP−λPP3 , a condition that simplifies to λDD + 2λDN ≥
2λNN . To achieve this point, using the state PP, we achieve (1, 1), with











), we achieve the pair (2
3





3 , respectively. Essentially, the NN state is used up with the DD
state and the DN and ND states to achieve 2
3
s.d.o.f. for user 1.
Time sharing yields the following s.d.o.f. pair:
d2 = λPP (6.230)






(λDD + 2λDN + λNN) (6.231)
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= 2λP − λPP +
2
3
(λDD + 2λDN + λNN) (6.232)
= 2λP − λPP +
2
3
(1− 2λP + λPP ) (6.233)
=
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
. (6.234)
• Point Q: We need to achieve the point Q : (1− λNN , λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN −
λDD)) when 1− λNN ≤ 2+2λP−λPP3 , or equivalently, when λDD + 2λDN ≤ λNN
and under the added constraint λNN ≤ λD. Here, we consider two further
subcases:
– λNN ≤ λDD + λDN : In this case, to achieve the point Q, we first use up
the full DN and ND states with a part of the NN state using scheme S
2/3
3 .
We alternate the remaining (λNN − λDN) duration of NN state with the




2 . Note that in this case, 0 ≤
2(λDD +λDN −λNN) ≤ λDD. We use the state DD for duration 2(λDD +
λDN−λNN) and state NN for duration (λDD+λDN−λNN) together using
scheme S
2/3






. The remaining (2λNN −
2λDN − λDD) duration of the state NN is alternated with the remaining








. The state PP allows us to achieve the s.d.o.f. pair
(1, 1) while the remaining states PD, DP, PN, and NP each achieves (1, 0).
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Thus, by using time sharing, the s.d.o.f. pair is:
























×2(2λNN − 2λDN − λDD)
=λPP + (2λNN − 2λDN − λDD), (6.238)
which is precisely the point Q.
– λNN ≥ λDD +λDN : In this case, the state NN cannot be completely used
with the states DD, DN and ND. But we note that λD ≥ λNN . We first
use up the DN and ND states by alternating with the NN state using
scheme S
2/3
3 . A portion λDD of the remaining (λNN − λDN) duration of








The remaining (λNN − λDN − λDD) portion of the NN state is used with
the PD and DP states through the scheme S
4/3








For the remainder of the state PD, DP and the states PN, NP, we can
achieve the pair (1, 0), while (1, 1) is achieved in the PP state. By time
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sharing, we get












×3(λNN − λDN − λDD)

















=λPP + 2λNN − 2λDN − λDD, (6.242)
which is again the point Q.
Thus, we have achieved the point Q as well.
This completes the achievability of the full region when the 3d1 + d2 bounds are
relevant.
6.5.2.2 When 3d1 + d2 Bounds are Irrelevant
This case occurs when λNN ≥ λD. In this case, the single user bounds are
d1 ≤1− λNN (6.243)




(1− λNN , λPP + 2λPD + λDD)
d1
d2
(λPP + 2λPD + λDD, 1− λNN)
(a) λDN + λPN 6= 0.
d1
d2
(1− λNN , 1− λNN)
R
(b) λDN = λPN = 0.
Figure 6.12: s.d.o.f. regions in case B, when 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2 bounds are
completely irrelevant.
and as shown in Fig. 6.12a the only point to achieve is given by:
R : (d1, d2) = (1− λNN , λPP + 2λPD + λDD). (6.245)
Note that λPP + 2λPD + λDD ≤ 1− λNN with equality if and only if λPN = λDN =
0. Thus, it suffices to achieve the point R which goes to the degenerate point
(1− λNN , 1− λNN) when λPN = λDN = 0, as shown in Fig. 6.12b.
To achieve this point, we alternate part of the NN state with the DD state







, and with the PD and DP states using
the scheme S
4/3







and with the DN and ND states using the
scheme S
2/3
3 to achieve the pair (
2
3
, 0). The remaining NN state is left unused. The
































=λPP + λDD + 2λPD (6.248)
=1− λNN if λPN = λDN = 0. (6.249)
This completes the proof of the achievability.
6.6 Proof of the Converse
6.6.1 Local Statistical Equivalence Property and Associated Lemma
We introduce a property of the channel which we call local statistical equivalence.
Let us focus on the channel output of receiver 2 corresponding to the state PD and
DD at time t:
Zpd(t) = H2,pd(t)Xpd(t) +N2,pd(t) (6.250)
Zdd(t) = H2,dd(t)Xdd(t) +N2,dd(t). (6.251)
Now consider (H̃2,pd(t), H̃2,dd(t)), (Ñ2,pd(t), Ñ2,dd(t)), which are independent of and
identically distributed as (H2,pd(t),H2,dd(t)) and (N2,pd(t), N2,dd(t)), respectively.
Using these random variables, we define artificial channel outputs as:
Z̃pd(t) = H̃2,pd(t)Xpd(t) + Ñ2,pd(t) (6.252)
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Z̃dd(t) = H̃2,dd(t)Xdd(t) + Ñ2,dd(t). (6.253)
Let Ω = (Hn, H̃n). Now the local statistical equivalence property is the following:
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω) = h(Z̃pd(t), Z̃dd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω). (6.254)
This property shows that if we consider the outputs of a receiver for such states in
which it supplies delayed CSIT, then the entropy of the channel outputs conditioned
on the past outputs is the same as that of another artificial receiver whose channel
is distributed identically as the original receiver. Note that in an alternating CSIT
setting, we focus on only the states in which the receiver provides delayed CSIT;
hence we call it local. The original and artificial receivers have statistically equivalent
channels in the sense that the conditional differential entropies of the outputs at the
real and the artificial receivers given the past outputs are equal. The proof of
this property is given in Appendix 6.8.1. We next present the following lemma
which together with the local statistical equivalence property is instrumental in the
converse proofs.
Lemma 11 For our channel model, with CSIT alternating among the states DD,
PD and DP we have:
h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y ndd|Zn,Ω) (6.255)
2h(Zn|Ω)
.




≥ h(Zndp, Zndd|Y n,Ω) (6.257)
2h(Y n|Ω)
.
≥ h(Zndp, Zndd|Ω), (6.258)
where a
.









This lemma is proved in Appendix 6.8.2.
In the following sections, we use the local statistical equivalence property
along with Lemma 11 to prove the bounds on individual d.o.f. d1 and d2, the sum
d.o.f. (d1 + d2) and the weighted d.o.f. 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2.
6.6.2 The Single User Bounds
We recall the single user bounds in (6.14)-(6.15):
d1 ≤ min
(












6.6.2.1 Proof of di ≤ 2+2λP−λPP3 , i = 1, 2
In this section, we prove the following single-user bounds:
d1 ≤
2 + 2λP − λPP
3
=




2 + 2λP − λPP
3
=
2 + 2λP + 2λPD + 2λPN
3
. (6.262)
To do so, we enhance the transmitter in the following way:
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• First, if in any state, the transmitter has perfect CSIT from any of the users,
we provide perfect CSI for the other user too, that is, the states PP, PD, DP,
PN, NP are all enhanced to the state PP.
• Next, we enhance all the remaining states, (i.e., DD, DN, ND, NN) to DD.
The enhanced channel has two states: PP occurring for λpp = λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN
(using symmetry of the alternation), and DD occurring for the remaining fraction of
the time. Now, we have the following lemma for such a channel with only PP and
DD states.
Lemma 12 Consider the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential mes-
sages with only two states: PP and DD occurring for λpp and λdd fractions of time,









The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix 6.8.3.1.
Now using λpp = λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN in Lemma 12, we get the bounds in
(6.261)-(6.262).
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6.6.2.2 Proof of di ≤ 1− λNN , i = 1, 2
In this section, we prove the following single user bounds:
d1 ≤ 1− λNN (6.265)
d2 ≤ 1− λNN . (6.266)
To prove these, we again enhance the transmitter, but in a different way. We provide
the transmitter with perfect CSIT in every state except the NN state, that is, every
state except the NN state is enhanced to the PP state. Thus, we end up with a
system with two states: PP occurring for 1 − λNN fraction of the time and NN
occurring for λNN fraction of the time. Note that since there is no delayed CSIT in
the enhanced system, there is no feedback. For such a system we have the following
lemma.
Lemma 13 For the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages
with only two states: PP and NN occurring for 1 − λnn and λnn fractions of time,
respectively, and no feedback,
d1 ≤ 1− λnn (6.267)
d2 ≤ 1− λnn. (6.268)
The proof of this lemma is provided in Appendix 6.8.3.2.
Using λnn = λNN in Lemma 13, we get the bounds in (6.265)-(6.266).
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Combining the bounds in (6.261)-(6.262) and (6.265)-(6.266), we have the
bounds in (6.14)-(6.15).
6.6.3 Proof of d1 + d2 Bound
Recall the sum s.d.o.f. bound from (6.18):
d1 + d2 ≤ 2(λP + λD). (6.269)
The original system model has nine possible states, namely, PP, DD, NN, DP, PD,
PN, NP, DN, and ND. We enhance the transmitter in the following way: whenever
in any state, the transmitter receives delayed CSI of a channel, we provide perfect
CSI of the channel to the transmitter; in other words, we convert each D state
to a P state. This clearly does not decrease the secrecy capacity (and thus, the
s.d.o.f. region). Also note that the enhanced system does not have any delayed
CSIT, and hence no feedback. Now the enhanced system has only four states: PP,
PN, NP, NN, occurring for λpp = λPP + λDD + λDP + λPD, λpn = λPN + λDN ,
λnp = λNP + λND and λnn = λNN fractions of time, respectively. For such a system
with four states we have the following lemma:
Lemma 14 Consider the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential mes-
sages with only four of the nine states: PP, PN, NP and NN occurring for λpp, λpn,
λnp and λnn fractions of the time, with λpp + λpn + λnp + λnn = 1. Also, assume
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there is no feedback. Then,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2λpp + λpn + λnp. (6.270)
Proof of this lemma is presented in Appendix 6.8.3.3.
Thus, using λpp = λPP +λDD+λDP +λPD, λpn = λPN+λDN , λnp = λNP +λND
and λnn = λNN in Lemma 14, we have,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2(λPP + λDP + λPD + λDD) + λPN + λDN + λNP + λND (6.271)
= 2(λP + λD), (6.272)
where (6.272) follows due to the assumed symmetry: λPD = λDP , and this completes
the proof of the bound on d1 + d2.
6.6.4 Proof of 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2 Bounds
In this section, we prove the following bounds from (6.16)-(6.17):
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN (6.273)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN . (6.274)
To do so, we enhance the system in the following way: Whenever in any state, the
transmitter has no CSIT from a user, we provide the transmitter delayed CSIT of
that user’s channel; in other words, we enhance each N state to a D state. After this
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enhancement, we are left with only four states, namely PP, PD, DP and DD occurring
for λpp = λPP , λpd = λPD+λPN , λdp = λDP+λNP and λdd = λDD+λDN+λND+λNN
fractions of the time, respectively. We have the following lemma for such a system
with four states:
Lemma 15 Consider the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential mes-
sages with only four of the nine states: PP, PD, DP and DD occurring for λpp, λpd,
λdp and λdd fractions of the time, with λpd = λdp and λpp + λpd + λdp + λdd = 1.
Then,
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λpp + 2λpd (6.275)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λpp + 2λpd. (6.276)
We provide a proof for this lemma in Appendix 6.8.3.4.
Using λpp = λPP , λpd = λPD +λPN , λdp = λDP +λNP and λdd = λDD +λDN +
λND + λNN in Lemma 15, and symmetry of the alternating states, we have,
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN (6.277)
= 2 + 2λP (6.278)
d1 + 3d2 ≤ 2 + 2λPP + 2λPD + 2λPN (6.279)
= 2 + 2λP , (6.280)
which completes the proofs for the bounds on 3d1 + d2 and d1 + 3d2.
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6.7 Conclusions
In this chapter, we studied the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confidential
messages and characterized its s.d.o.f. region with alternating CSIT. The converse
proofs for the s.d.o.f. region presented in the chapter are based on novel arguments
such as local statistical equivalence property and enhancing the system model in dif-
ferent ways, where each carefully chosen enhancement strictly improves the quality
of CSIT in a certain manner. For each such enhanced system, we invoke the local
statistical equivalence property and incorporate the confidentiality constraints and
obtain corresponding upper bounds on the individual (d1, d2), sum (d1 + d2) and
weighted (3d1 + d2, d1 + 3d2) s.d.o.f.
To establish the achievability of the s.d.o.f. region, several constituent schemes
are developed, where each scheme by itself only operates over a subset of 9 states.
The achievability of the optimal s.d.o.f. region is then established by time-sharing
between the core constituent schemes. The core constituent schemes not only serve
the purpose of establishing the s.d.o.f. region but also highlight the synergies across
multiple CSIT states which can be exploited to achieve higher s.d.o.f. in compari-
son to their individually optimal s.d.o.f. values. Besides highlighting the synergistic
benefits of alternating CSIT for secrecy, the optimal s.d.o.f. region also quantifies
the information theoretic minimal CSIT required from each user to attain a cer-
tain s.d.o.f. value. In addition, we also quantify the loss in d.o.f., as a function of




6.8.1 Proof of Local Statistical Equivalence
In this subsection, we prove the local statistical equivalence property:
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω) = h(Z̃pd(t), Z̃dd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω). (6.281)
To this end, first denote by F , the common distribution of (H2,pd(t),H2,dd(t)), and
(H̃2,pd(t), H̃2,dd(t)). Let Ω =
{
H1(t),H2(t), H̃1(t), H̃2(t), t = 1, . . . , n
}
be the set of






h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd Ω)
=EF
[
h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ωt, H̃2,pd(t), H̃2,dd(t),H2,pd(t) = h(t),
H2,dd(t) = g(t))] (6.282)
=EF
[










h(h(t)Xpd(t) + Ñ2,pd(t),g(t)Xdd(t) + Ñ2,dd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1pd ,Ωt,









=h(Z̃pd(t), Z̃dd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω), (6.287)
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, (6.284) follows since the additive noises (N2,pd(t), N2,dd(t)) and
(Ñ2,pd(t), Ñ2,dd(t)) are i.i.d. and independent of all other random variables, (6.285)-
(6.286) follow since (H2,pd(t),H2,dd(t)) and (H̃2,pd(t), H̃2,dd(t)) have the same distri-






6.8.2 Proof of Lemma 11
We consider the scenario in which there are only three CSIT states, namely DD,PD



















Also let Ω denote the set of all channel vectors upto and including time n, that is,
in other words, Ω =
{
H1(t),H2(t), H̃1(t), H̃2(t), t = 1, . . . , n
}
. We wish to prove
that with CSIT alternating among the states DD, PD and DP we have:
h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y ndd|Zn,Ω) (6.288)
2h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y ndd|Ω) (6.289)
h(Y n|Ω)
.




≥ h(Zndp, Zndd|Ω). (6.291)
First we note that due to symmetry, it suffices to prove (6.288) and (6.289). We
proceed as follows:




h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω) + h(Zndp|Znpd, Zndd,Ω). (6.293)




h(Z̃pd(t), Z̃dd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω) + h(Zndp|Znpd, Zndd,Ω). (6.294)








h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Z̃pd(t), Z̃dd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω) + h(Zndp|Znpd, Zndd,Ω)








h(Ypd(t), Ydd(t)|Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Z̃pd(t), Z̃dd(t), Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd Ω)




h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Ypd(t), Ydd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd ,Ω) + h(Zndp|Znpd, Zndd,Ω)
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h(Zpd(t), Zdd(t), Ydd(t)Ypd(t)|Zt−1pd , Zt−1dd , Y t−1pd , Y t−1dd Ω)







dd|Ω) + h(Zndp|Znpd, Y npd, Zndd, Y nddΩ) + no(logP ) (6.299)
=h(Zn, Y npd, Y
n
dd|Ω) + no(logP ), (6.300)
where (6.295) follows by noting that
h(Zndp|Znpd, Zndd,Ω) ≥ h(Zndp|Znpd, Zndd,Xn,Ω) = no(logP ) (6.301)
and (6.296) follows since given (Zpd(t), Z̃pd(t), Zdd(t), Z̃dd(t)), one can reconstruct
(Xpd(t),Xdd(t)) and hence (Ypd(t), Ydd(t)) within noise distortion, implying that
h(Ypd(t), Ydd(t)|Zpd(t), Zdd(t)Z̃pd(t), Z̃dd(t), Zt−1pd ,Ω) ≤ no(logP ). (6.302)
Now both (6.288) and (6.289) can be derived from (6.300). We simply expand
the right hand side of (6.300) in two ways:
2h(Zn|Ω) ≥h(Zn, Y npd, Y ndd|Ω) + no(logP ) (6.303)
=h(Zn|Ω) + h(Y npd, Y ndd|Zn,Ω) + no(logP ), (6.304)
which implies h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y ndd|Zn,Ω), which is exactly (6.288). Alternatively
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from (6.300), we also have
2h(Zn|Ω) ≥h(Y npd, Y ndd|Ω) + h(Zn|Y npd, Y nddΩ) + no(logP ) (6.305)
≥h(Y npd, Y ndd|Ω) + no(logP ), (6.306)
which implies 2h(Zn|Ω)
.
≥ h(Y npd, Y ndd|Ω), thus proving the relation in (6.289). This
completes the proof of Lemma 11.
6.8.3 Proofs of Lemmas 12-15
6.8.3.1 Proof of Lemma 12
Recall that we wish to prove that for the two-user MISO broadcast channel with
only two states: PP and DD occurring for λpp and λdd fractions of time, respectively,








To do so, we proceed as follows:
nR1 ≤ I(W1;Y npp, Y ndd|Ω) + no(n) (6.308)
= I(W1;Y
n
dd|Ω) + I(W1;Y npp|Y ndd,Ω) + no(n) (6.309)
≤ nλpp logP + I(W1;Y ndd|Ω) + no(n) (6.310)
≤ nλpp logP + I(W1;Y ndd, Zndd|Ω) + no(n) (6.311)
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≤ nλpp logP + I(W1;Y ndd|Zndd,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.312)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y ndd|Zndd,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.313)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (6.314)
where (6.308) follows from decodability of W1 at receiver 1 and Fano’s inequality,
(6.313) follows from confidentiality constraint of message W1 at receiver 2, and
(6.314) follows from application of Lemma 11.
Starting from (6.310), we also have
nR1 ≤ nλpp logP + I(W1;Y ndd|Ω) + no(n) (6.315)
≤ nλpp logP + I(W1;Y ndd|Ω)− I(W1;Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.316)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y ndd|Ω)− h(Y ndd|W1,Ω)− h(Zndd|Ω) + h(Zndd|W1,Ω)
+ no(logP ) + no(n) (6.317)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y ndd|Ω)−
1
2
h(Zndd|W1,Ω)− h(Zndd|Ω) + h(Zndd|W1,Ω)
+ no(logP ) + no(n) (6.318)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y ndd|Ω) +
1
2
h(Zndd|W1,Ω)− h(Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n)
(6.319)
≤ nλpp logP + h(Y ndd|Ω) +
1
2
h(Zndd|Ω)− h(Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n)
(6.320)





h(Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.321)
≤ nλpp logP + nλdd logP −
1
2
h(Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (6.322)
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where (6.316) follows from confidentiality constraint of message W1 at receiver 2,
(6.318) follows from application of Lemma 11, and (6.320) follows from the fact that
conditioning reduces differential entropy.
Eliminating h(Zndd|Ω) from the bounds (6.322) and (6.314), we have,
3nR1 ≤(3nλpp + 2nλdd) logP + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.323)
=(2 + λpp)n logP + no(logP ). (6.324)
Now first dividing by n and letting n → ∞, then dividing by logP and letting





By symmetry, we get the same single user bound for user 2, completing the proof
of Lemma 12.
6.8.3.2 Proof of Lemma 13
We want to show that for the two-user MISO broadcast channel with only two states:
PP and NN occurring for 1− λnn and λnn fractions of time, respectively,
d1 ≤1− λnn (6.326)
d2 ≤1− λnn. (6.327)
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To prove this, we note that since there is no feedback, the secrecy capacity
depends only on the marginal distributions of channel outputs given the input dis-
tribution; [25]. Since the transmitter does not have channel knowledge of any of the
users in the state NN, our system with outputs






has the same secrecy capacity of a new system with outputs given by











nn) ≤ I(W1;Zn) ≤ no(logP ). (6.332)
Then we have,





pp|Y nnn) + no(n) (6.334)
≤I(W1;Y npp|Y nnn) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.335)
≤h(Y npp|Y nnn) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.336)
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≤h(Y npp) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.337)
≤n(1− λnn) logP + no(logP ) + no(n), (6.338)
where, (6.335) follows from equation (6.332), (6.336) follows since h(Y npp|Y nnn,W1) ≥
h(Y npp|Y nnn,W1,Xn) ≥ o(logP ), and (6.337) follows since conditioning reduces differ-
ential entropy.
Dividing by n, and letting n→∞, we get,
R1 ≤ (1− λnn) logP + o(logP ). (6.339)
Dividing by logP and letting P →∞, we have,
d1 ≤ 1− λnn. (6.340)
By symmetry, we also have,
d2 ≤ 1− λnn. (6.341)
This completes the proof of Lemma 13.
6.8.3.3 Proof of Lemma 14
We wish to prove that for the two-user MISO broadcast channel with no feedback
and only four of the nine states: PP, PN, NP and NN occurring for λpp, λpn, λnp and
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λnn fractions of the time, with λpp + λpn + λnp + λnn = 1,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2λpp + λpn + λnp. (6.342)
To that end, for each of the two receivers, we introduce another statistically equiv-
alent receiver. At receiver 1, we introduce a virtual receiver 1̃, with channel output
denoted by Ỹ , while the channel output at the virtual receiver 2̃ at receiver 2 is
denoted by Z̃. Since the secrecy capacity without feedback depends only on the
marginals [25], without loss of generality, we can assume that the channels in the
state NN are the same for all receivers. The outputs at each of the receivers are





























Ỹnp(t) =H̃1,np(t)Xnp(t) + Ñ1,np(t) (6.347)
Z̃pn(t) =H̃2,pn(t)Xpn(t) + Ñ2,pn(t), (6.348)
such that H̃1,np, H̃2,pn are i.i.d. with the same distribution as H1,np, H2,pn, respec-
tively, and Ñ1,np, Ñ2,pn are i.i.d. with same distribution as N1,np, N2,pn. We upper
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bound the first receiver’s rate as







nn|Ω) + I(W1, Y npp|Y npn, Y nnp, Y nnn,Ω) (6.350)
≤nλpp logP + I(W1, Y npn, Y nnp, Y nnn|Ω) (6.351)




nn|Ω) + I(W1;Y nnp|Y npnY nnn,Ω) + no(n) (6.352)




nn|Ω) + h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω) + no(n) (6.353)
≤n(λpp + λnp) logP + I(W1;Y npn, Y nnn|Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y nnn, Y npn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (6.354)
≤n(λpp + λnp) logP + I(W1;Y npn, Y nnn, Znpn, Z̃npn, Znnp,W2|Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (6.355)




pn|Y nnn, Znpn, Znnp,W2,Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (6.356)




pn|Y nnn, Znpn, Znnp,W2,Ω)
− h(Y npn, Z̃npn|Znpn, Y nnn, Znnp,W1,W2,Ω)− h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω)
+ no(n) + no(logP ) (6.357)
≤n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Y npn, Z̃npn|Znpn, Znnp, Y nnn,W2,Ω)
− h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (6.358)
=n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Z̃
n
pn|Znpn, Znnp, Y nnn,W2,Ω)
+ h(Y npn|Znpn, Z̃npn, Znnp, Y nnn,W2,Ω)− h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω)
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+ no(n) + no(logP ) (6.359)
≤n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Z̃npn|Znnp, Y nnn,W2,Ω)− h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω)
+ no(n) + no(logP ) (6.360)
=n(λpp + λnp) logP + h(Z
n
pn|Znnp, Y nnn,W2,Ω)− h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω)
+ no(n) + no(logP ), (6.361)

















+ I(W1;W2|Znpp, Znpn, Znnp, Y nnn,Ω) (6.363)
=no(logP ) + I(W1;W2|Znpp, Znpn, Znnp, Y nnn,Ω) (6.364)
≤no(logP ) +H(W2|Znpp, Znpn, Znnp, Y nnn,Ω) (6.365)
≤no(logP ) + no(n), (6.366)
where, (6.364) and (6.366) follow from the secrecy and decodability requirements,
respectively. In addition, (6.358) follows since h(Y npn, Z̃
n
pn|Znpn, Znnp, Y nnn,W1,W2,Ω) ≥
o(logP ), (6.360) follows since given Znpn and Z̃
n
pn, one can reconstruct X
n
pn and hence
Y npn to within noise distortion, and (6.361) follows due to the statistical equivalence
of receivers 2 and 2̃ in the state PN.
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Similarly, by symmetry, we have,
nR2 ≤n(λpp + λpn) logP + h(Y nnp|Y npn, Y nnn,W1,Ω)
− h(Znpn|Znnp, Y nnn,W2,Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ). (6.367)
Adding (6.361) and (6.367), we have,
n(R1 +R2) ≤ n(2λpp + λpn + λnp) logP + 2no(n) + o(logP ). (6.368)
First dividing by n log(P ) and letting n→∞, and then letting P →∞, we obtain,
d1 + d2 ≤ 2λpp + λpn + λnp. (6.369)
This completes the proof of Lemma 14.
6.8.3.4 Proof of Lemma 15
We want to show that for the two-user MISO broadcast channel with only four of
the nine states: PP, PD, DP and DD occurring for λpp, λpd, λdp and λdd fractions of
the time, with λpd = λdp and λpp + λpd + λdp + λdd = 1,
3d1 + d2 ≤2 + 2λpp + 2λpd (6.370)
d1 + 3d2 ≤2 + 2λpp + 2λpd. (6.371)
To do so, for each of the two receivers, we introduce another statistically
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equivalent receiver. At receiver 1, we introduce a virtual receiver 1̃, with channel
output denoted by Ỹ , while the channel output at the virtual receiver 2̃ at receiver
2 is denoted by Z̃. Since the capacity depends on the marginals, without loss of
generality, we can assume that the channels in the state NN are the same for all
receivers. The outputs at each of the receivers can be written as





























Ỹdp(t) =H̃1,dp(t)Xdp(t) + Ñ1,dp(t) (6.376)
Z̃pd(t) =H̃2,pd(t)Xpd(t) + Ñ2,pd(t), (6.377)
such that H̃1,dp, H̃2,pd are i.i.d. with the same distribution as H1,dp, H2,pd, respec-
tively, and Ñ1,dp, Ñ2,pd are i.i.d. with same distribution as N1,dp, N2,pd. We consider
a special case with only four states PP, PD, DP and DD. Aided by Lemma 11, we
proceed to prove Lemma 15, as follows:
nR1 ≤I(W1;Y n|Ω) + no(n) (6.378)






dd|W1,Ω)− h(Zndp, Zndd|Ω) + h(Zndp, Zndd|W1,Ω)
+ no(logP ) + no(n) (6.380)




dd|W1,Ω)− h(Zndp, Zndd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.381)









dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.383)




dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (6.384)
where (6.379) follows from the security constraints, (6.380) follows from a condi-
tioned version of Lemma 11 (conditioned on W1), and (6.382) follows, since condi-
tioning reduces differential entropy.
We also have the following bounds for user 1:
nR1 ≤I(W1;Y n|W2,Ω) + no(n) (6.385)
≤I(W1;Y n, Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (6.386)
=I(W1;Y
n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.387)





dd|Zn,W2,Ω) + h(Y npp|Y npd, Y ndp, Y ndd, Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n)
(6.389)
≤nλpp logP + h(Y ndp|Zn,W2,Ω) + h(Y npd, Y ndd|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n)
(6.390)
≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Y npd, Y ndd|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.391)
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≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (6.392)




n|Ω) + I(W1;W2|Zn,Ω) (6.394)
≤no(logP ) +H(W2|Zn,Ω) (6.395)
≤no(logP ) + no(n), (6.396)
using the security and reliability constraints. In addition, (6.392) follows from the
conditional version of Lemma 11 (conditioned on W2).
For receiver 2, we have
nR2 ≤I(W2;Zn|Ω) + no(n) (6.397)
=h(Zn|Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (6.398)
=h(Znpp|Znpd, Zndp, Zndd,Ω) + h(Znpd, Zndp, Zndd|Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (6.399)
≤nλpp logP + h(Znpd|Ω) + h(Zndp, Zndd|Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (6.400)
≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Zndp, Zndd|Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n). (6.401)
In summary, from (6.384), (6.392) and (6.401), we have,





dd|Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (6.402)
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nR1 ≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (6.403)
nR2 ≤n(λpp + λdp) logP + h(Zndp, Zndd|Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n). (6.404)
Eliminating h(Zndp, Z
n
dd|Ω) and h(Zn|W2,Ω) from these inequalities and taking the
limit n→∞, we arrive at
3R1 +R2 ≤ (2 + 2λpp + 2λdp) logP + o(logP ). (6.405)
Dividing by logP and taking the limit P →∞, we get the required result
3d1 + d2 ≤ 2 + 2λpp + 2λdp. (6.406)
6.8.4 Proof of the s.d.o.f. Region for PD State
In this subsection, we present the proof for the s.d.o.f. region of the fixed PD state
(perfect CSIT from user 1 and delayed CSIT from user 2). The s.d.o.f. region in
this case is given by all non-negative pairs (d1, d2) satisfying,
d1 + d2 ≤ 1. (6.407)
To prove this claim, we first provide a proof of the converse and then two achievable
schemes that are sufficient to achieve the full region.
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6.8.4.1 Converse
To this end, we create a virtual receiver with output Z̃n with a channel that is
statistically equivalent to user 2. The channel output Z̃ is given by
Z̃(t) = H̃2(t)X(t) + Ñ2(t), (6.408)
where H̃2 and Ñ2 are i.i.d. as H2 and N2, respectively. Then, the local statistical
equivalence property implies that
h(Z(t)|Zt−1,W2,Ω) = h(Z̃(t)|Zt−1,W2,Ω), (6.409)
where Ω is the set of all channel coefficients upto and including time n. Let us now
bound the rate of user 1:
nR1 ≤I(W1;Y n|W2,Ω) + no(n) (6.410)
≤I(W1;Y n, Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (6.411)
=I(W1;Y
n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.412)
≤I(W1;Y n, Z̃n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.413)
=h(Y n, Z̃n|Zn,W2,Ω)− h(Y n, Z̃n|Zn,W1,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n)
(6.414)
≤h(Y n, Z̃n|Zn,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.415)
=h(Z̃n|Zn,W2,Ω) + h(Y n|Zn, Z̃n,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.416)
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h(Z(t)|Zt−1,W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n) (6.420)
=h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(logP ) + no(n), (6.421)
where (6.412) follows since I(W1;Z
n|W2,Ω) ≤ no(logP ) from (6.393), (6.417) fol-
lows due to the fact that given Zn and Z̃n, it is possible to reconstruct Xn and
hence Y n to within noise distortion, and (6.420) follows from (6.409).
For the second user, we have,
nR2 ≤I(W2;Zn|Ω) + no(n) (6.422)
=h(Zn|Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n) (6.423)
≤n logP − h(Zn|W2,Ω) + no(n). (6.424)
Adding (6.421) and (6.424), we have,
n(R1 +R2) ≤ n logP + no(logP ) + no(n). (6.425)
Dividing by n and letting n→∞,
R1 +R2 ≤ logP + o(logP ). (6.426)
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Now dividing by logP and letting P →∞,
d1 + d2 ≤ 1. (6.427)
This completes the proof of the converse for the case of PD state alone.
6.8.4.2 Achievable Schemes
Note that it is sufficient to achieve only two points: a) (d1, d2) = (1, 0) and b)
(d1, d2) = (0, 1). The achievability of these corner points follow in straightforward
manner from existing arguments as follows: sending message to user 1 by superim-
posing it with artificial noise in a direction orthogonal to user 1’s channel to achieve
the pair (1, 0); and sending the message to user 2 in a direction orthogonal to user
1’s channel to achieve the pair (0, 1). This completes the proof of the achievability
of the region in (6.407).
6.8.5 Proof of the s.d.o.f. Region for DN State
For the MISO broadcast channel with confidential messages with the fixed state
DN (delayed CSIT from the first user and no CSIT from the second user), the
s.d.o.f. region is given by the set of all non-negative pairs (d1, d2) satisfying,





To prove this claim, we first provide a proof of the converse and then two achievable
schemes that are sufficient to achieve the full region.
6.8.5.1 Converse
We first create a virtual receiver with output Ỹ n with a statistically equivalent
channel as user 1. The channel output Ỹ (t) is given by
Ỹ (t) = H̃1(t)X(t) + Ñ1(t), (6.429)
where H̃1 and Ñ1 are i.i.d. as H1 and N1, respectively. Then, the local statistical
equivalence property implies that
h(Y (t)|Y t−1,W1,Ω) = h(Ỹ (t)|Y t−1,W1,Ω), (6.430)
where Ω is the set of all channel coefficients upto and including time n. Similar to
the proof of Lemma 11, Appendix 6.8.2, it can be readily shown that,
2h(Y n|W1,Ω) ≥ h(Zn|W1,Ω) + o(logP ). (6.431)
Then, for the first user, we have,
nR1 ≤I(W1;Y n|Ω)− I(W1;Zn|Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (6.432)




h(Zn|W1,Ω)− h(Zn|Ω) + h(Zn|W1,Ω) (6.434)
=h(Y n|Ω) + 1
2
h(Zn|W1,Ω)− h(Zn|Ω) (6.435)






where (6.434) follows from (6.431). For the second user,
nR2 ≤I(W2;Zn|Ω)− I(W2;Y n|Ω) + no(n) + no(logP ) (6.438)
=h(Zn|Ω)− h(Y n|Ω) + (h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω)) + no(n) + no(logP ).
(6.439)








logP + (h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω)) + no(n) + no(logP ).
(6.441)
Thus, in order to obtain d1 + d2 ≤ 1/2, it suffices to show that
h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω) ≤ no(logP ) (6.442)
where the transmitter has delayed CSIT from user 1 and no CSIT from user 2. To
this end, we invoke a recent result in [10, (39)-(66)], which showed that the maximum
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of h(Y n|W2,Ω)−h(Zn|W2,Ω) is less than no(logP ), under the assumption of perfect
CSIT from user 1 and no CSIT from user 2. Hence, the same upper bound on the
maximum value also holds under a weaker assumption of delayed CSIT from user
1. Thus, using the fact that
(h(Y n|W2,Ω)− h(Zn|W2,Ω)) ≤ no(logP ), (6.443)




logP + no(n) + no(logP ). (6.444)




logP + o(logP ). (6.445)
Dividing by logP and letting P →∞ yields




This completes the proof of the converse.
6.8.5.2 Achievable Schemes
To prove the achievability of the s.d.o.f. region in (6.428), it suffices to consider only











. Every other point in
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was presented in [15]. We include it here for completeness.






: We wish to send 1 symbol u securely to the
first user in 2 time slots. This can be done as follows:
1) At time t = 1: The transmitter does not have any channel knowledge. It
sends:
X(1) = [q1 q2]
T , (6.447)
where q1 and q2 denote independent artificial noise symbols distributed as CN (0, P ).
Both receivers receive linear combinations of the two symbols q1 and q2. The re-
ceivers’ outputs are:
Y (1) = h11(1)q1 + h12(1)q2
∆
= L1(q1, q2) (6.448)
Z(1) = h21(1)q1 + h22(1)q2. (6.449)
Due to delayed CSIT from receiver 1, the transmitter can reconstruct L1(q1, q2) in
the next time slot and use it for transmission.
2) At time t = 2: The transmitter sends:
X(2) = [u L1(q1, q2)]
T . (6.450)
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The received signals are:
Y (2) =h11(2)u+ h12(2)L1(q1, q2) (6.451)
Z(2) =h21(2)u+ h22(2)L1(q1, q2). (6.452)
Since the receivers have full channel knowledge, receiver 1 can recover u by elimi-
nating L1(q1, q2) from Y(1) and Y(2). On the other hand, the information leakage
to the second user is given by,
I(u;Z(1), Z(2)|Ω) =h(Z(1), Z(2)|Ω)− h(Z(1), Z(2)|u,Ω) (6.453)
≤2 logP − h(h21(1)q1 + h22(1)q2, h11(1)q1 + h12(1)q2|Ω) (6.454)
=2 logP − 2 logP + o(logP ) (6.455)
=o(logP ). (6.456)





: In this scheme, we wish to send 1 symbol u
securely to the second user in 2 time slots. This can be done as follows:
1) At time t = 1: The transmitter does not have any channel knowledge. It
sends:
X(1) = [u q1]
T , (6.457)
where q denotes an independent artificial noise symbol distributed as CN (0, P ).
Both receivers receive linear combinations of the two symbols u and q. The receivers’
286
outputs are:
Y (1) = h11(1)u+ h12(1)q
∆
= L(u, q) (6.458)
Z(1) = h21(1)u+ h22(1)q
∆
= G(u, q). (6.459)
Due to delayed CSIT from receiver 1, the transmitter can reconstruct L(u, q) in the
next times lot and use it for transmission.
2) At time t = 2: The transmitter sends:
X(2) = [L(u, q) 0]T . (6.460)
The received signals are:
Y (2) =h11(2)L(u, q) (6.461)
Z(2) =h21(2)L(u, q). (6.462)
Since the receivers have full channel knowledge, receiver 2 can recover u by elimi-
nating q from L(u, q) and G(u, q). On the other hand, the information leakage to
the first user is given by,
I(u;Y (1), Y (2)|Ω) =I(u;L(u, q)|Ω) (6.463)
=h(L(u, q)|Ω)− h(L(u, q)|u,Ω) (6.464)
≤ logP − logP + o(logP ) (6.465)
287
=o(logP ). (6.466)
This completes the proof of achievability.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions
In this dissertation, we explored how imperfect CSI affects physical layer security in
wireless networks. We determined the optimal secrecy capacity or the secure degrees
of freedom (s.d.o.f.) region of various channel models under no or delayed channel
state information at the transmitters (CSIT).
In Chapter 2, we considered the fast Rayleigh fading wiretap channel with co-
herence time of one symbol duration. We proved that the optimal input distribution
that achieves the secrecy capacity is discrete with finite number of mass points. We
evaluated the exact secrecy capacity numerically for various values of input power
and channel parameters. We showed that the secrecy capacity does not scale with
power and the s.d.o.f. is zero.
In Chapter 3, we established the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for three SISO channel
models: the wiretap channel with M helpers, the K-user multiple access wiretap
channel, and the K-user interference channel with an external eavesdropper, in the
absence of eavesdropper’s CSIT. While there is no loss in the s.d.o.f. for the wiretap
channel with helpers in the absence of the eavesdropper’s CSIT, the s.d.o.f. decreases
in the cases of the multiple access wiretap channel and the interference channel with
an external eavesdropper. We further showed that in the absence of eavesdropper’s
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CSIT, the K-user multiple access wiretap channel is equivalent to a wiretap channel
with (K − 1) helpers from a sum s.d.o.f. perspective.
In Chapter 4, we determined the optimal sum s.d.o.f. of the two-user MIMO
multiple access wiretap channel with N antennas at each transmitter, N antennas at
the legitimate receiver and K antennas at the eavesdropper. We provided optimal
achievable schemes based on interference alignment techniques. We also provided
matching converses to establish the optimality of the achievable schemes. Our results
highlight the effect of the number of eavesdropper antennas on the sum s.d.o.f. of
the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel.
In Chapter 5, we considered the MIMO wiretap channel with one helper and
the MIMO multiple access wiretap channel, with no eavesdropper CSIT. In each
case, the eavesdropper has K antennas while the remaining terminals have N an-
tennas. We determined the optimal sum s.d.o.f. for each channel model for the
regime K ≤ N , and showed that in this regime, the multiple access wiretap chan-
nel reduces to the wiretap channel with a helper in the absence of eavesdropper
CSIT. For the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N , we obtained the optimal linear s.d.o.f., and
showed that the multiple access wiretap channel and the wiretap channel with one
helper have the same optimal s.d.o.f. when restricted to linear encoding strategies.
In the absence of any such restrictions, we provided a loose upper bound for the
sum s.d.o.f. of the multiple access wiretap channel in the regime N ≤ K ≤ 2N .
Our results showed that unlike in the SISO case, there is loss of s.d.o.f. for even the
wiretap channel with one helper due to lack of eavesdropper CSIT, especially when
K ≥ N .
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In Chapter 6, we studied the two-user MISO broadcast channel with confiden-
tial messages and characterized its s.d.o.f. region with heterogeneous and alternating
CSIT. The converse proofs for the s.d.o.f. region presented in the chapter are based
on novel arguments such as local statistical equivalence property and enhancing the
system model in different ways, where each carefully chosen enhancement strictly
improves the quality of CSIT in a certain manner. To establish the achievability
of the s.d.o.f. region, several constituent schemes are developed, where each scheme
by itself only operates over a subset of nine states. The achievability of the opti-
mal s.d.o.f. region is then established by time-sharing between the core constituent
schemes. The core constituent schemes not only serve the purpose of establishing
the s.d.o.f. region but also highlight the synergies across multiple CSIT states which
can be exploited to achieve higher s.d.o.f. in comparison to their individually optimal
s.d.o.f. values.
The contents of Chapter 2 are published in [72], Chapter 3 in [73–75], Chapter
4 in [76–78], Chapter 5 in [79], and Chapter 6 in [80–83]. Additional results which
are not included in this dissertation are published in [84–88].
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